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From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
To: "Dmitry V. Levin" <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter()
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 01:38:16 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f793701-87c2-4125-19c5-4abcc485ff4e@linux.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20171206211251.GA23618@altlinux.org>

On 07.12.2017 00:12, Dmitry V. Levin wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 06, 2017 at 02:33:44AM +0300, Alexander Popov wrote:
>> Make STACKLEAK erase kernel stack after ptrace/seccomp/auditing
>> not to leave any sensitive information on the stack for the syscall code.
>>
>> This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last
>> public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code.
>> Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect
>> the original grsecurity/PaX code.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
>> ---
>>  arch/x86/entry/common.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
>>  1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
>> index d7d3cc2..d45b7cf 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
>> @@ -45,6 +45,12 @@ __visible inline void enter_from_user_mode(void)
>>  static inline void enter_from_user_mode(void) {}
>>  #endif
>>  
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void);
>> +#else
>> +static void erase_kstack(void) {}
>> +#endif
>> +
>>  static void do_audit_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 arch)
>>  {
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> @@ -81,11 +87,15 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>  		emulated = true;
>>  
>>  	if ((emulated || (work & _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) &&
>> -	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs))
>> +	    tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
>> +		erase_kstack();
>>  		return -1L;
>> +	}
>>  
>> -	if (emulated)
>> +	if (emulated) {
>> +		erase_kstack();
>>  		return -1L;
>> +	}
>>  
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
>>  	/*
>> @@ -117,8 +127,10 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>  		}
>>  
>>  		ret = __secure_computing(&sd);
>> -		if (ret == -1)
>> +		if (ret == -1) {
>> +			erase_kstack();
>>  			return ret;
>> +		}
>>  	}
>>  #endif
>>  
>> @@ -127,6 +139,7 @@ static long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
>>  
>>  	do_audit_syscall_entry(regs, arch);
>>  
>> +	erase_kstack();
>>  	return ret ?: regs->orig_ax;
>>  }

Hello Dmitry,

Thanks for the review.

> wrt adding erase_kstack() calls to syscall_trace_enter(), I think the only
> case where this would be appropriate is that still has a chance of
> executing syscall code.  In all cases where syscall_trace_enter() returns
> -1 no syscall code is going to be executed and the stack will be erased on
> exiting syscall anyway.
> 
> In other words, only the last hunk of this patch seems to be useful,
> all others look redundant.

I agree with your point. I'll fix it in v7.

> P.S.  I've trimmed the Cc list to those who took part in earlier rounds
> of this discussion.

Excuse me, I've returned everybody back to CC list again :)

Best regards,
Alexander

  reply	other threads:[~2017-12-11 22:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-12-05 23:33 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 0/6] Introduce the STACKLEAK feature and a test for it Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 1/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls Alexander Popov
2017-12-08 11:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-08 21:54     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-11  9:26       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 2/6] gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 18:57   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 23:05     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-12  0:09   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-15 15:28     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 3/6] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter() Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 21:12   ` Dmitry V. Levin
2017-12-11 22:38     ` Alexander Popov [this message]
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 4/6] lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK Alexander Popov
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 5/6] fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system Alexander Popov
2017-12-06 19:22   ` [kernel-hardening] " Laura Abbott
2017-12-06 20:40     ` Kees Cook
2017-12-06 23:06       ` Laura Abbott
2017-12-07 22:58         ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07  7:09     ` Alexander Popov
2017-12-07 20:47       ` Tobin C. Harding
2017-12-05 23:33 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH RFC v6 6/6] doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature Alexander Popov

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