From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
x86@kernel.org, Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v7 00/24] pkeys-based page table hardening
Date: Wed, 6 May 2026 17:29:30 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <77d63e89-04be-4b76-b360-dc45badd1a78@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260505-kpkeys-v7-0-20c0bdd97197@arm.com>
On 05/05/2026 18:05, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> Kevin Brodsky (23):
> mm: Introduce kpkeys
> set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub
> arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions
> arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper
> arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE
> arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey()
> arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1
> arm64: Enable kpkeys
> memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header
> mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature
> mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables
> mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator
> mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables
> mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static page tables
> arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early()
> arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES
> arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified
> arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables
> arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir
> arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes
> arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches
> arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support
> mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables
>
> Yeoreum Yun (1):
> arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume()
>
> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +
> arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 ++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kpkeys.h | 76 ++++++++++++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 16 +--
> arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 66 +++++++++-
> arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h | 11 ++
> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +
> arch/arm64/include/asm/set_memory.h | 4 +
> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 5 +-
> arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 9 ++
> arch/arm64/kernel/sleep.S | 12 ++
> arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 2 +
> arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 1 +
> arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 48 +++++---
> arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 29 ++++-
> include/asm-generic/kpkeys.h | 21 ++++
> include/linux/kpkeys.h | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/memblock.h | 11 ++
> include/linux/mm.h | 14 ++-
> include/linux/set_memory.h | 7 ++
> mm/Kconfig | 5 +
> mm/Makefile | 2 +
> mm/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables.c | 180 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/memblock.c | 11 --
> mm/sparse-vmemmap.c | 29 +++--
> mm/tests/kpkeys_hardened_pgtables_kunit.c | 198 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> security/Kconfig.hardening | 24 ++++
> 27 files changed, 923 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Sashiko has found quite a few issues, some of which are potentially
concerning. I'll address them in RFC v8 - no need to point me to them
until then.
- Kevin
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-06 15:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-05 16:05 [PATCH RFC v7 00/24] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 01/24] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 02/24] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 03/24] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 04/24] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 05/24] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 06/24] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 07/24] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 08/24] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 09/24] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:05 ` [PATCH RFC v7 10/24] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 11/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 12/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 13/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 14/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 15/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static " Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 16/24] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 17/24] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 18/24] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 19/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 20/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 21/24] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 22/24] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 23/24] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-05 16:06 ` [PATCH RFC v7 24/24] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-06 15:29 ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
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