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From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
	 linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	 Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	 Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	 Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	 Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	 Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	 John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	patches@lists.linux.dev, Dan Williams <djbw@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2026 10:21:02 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <aur3SrC49Z7FW6c7@FV6GYCPJ69> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261103154539.GM274202@nvidia.com>

Tue, Nov 03, 2026 at 04:45:39PM +0100, jgg@nvidia.com wrote:
>On Mon, Nov 02, 2026 at 01:45:19PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 04:43:53PM +0100, jgg@nvidia.com wrote:
>> >On Fri, Oct 30, 2026 at 03:01:29PM +0100, Jiri Pirko wrote:
>> >> Wed, Oct 28, 2026 at 04:26:13PM +0100, aneesh.kumar@kernel.org wrote:
>> >> >+    type: action
>> >> >+    fd-access: read-write
>> >> >+    availability: dynamic
>> >> >+    optional: true
>> >> >+    request:
>> >> >+      attrs: refresh-request
>> >> >+    reply:
>> >> >+      attrs: change-reply
>> >> 
>> >> This differs from what I had in mind: a transport-neutral
>> >> ctlv-attestation-spdm family with SPDM_GET and SPDM_AUTHENTICATE.
>> >
>> >Yes, we should try very hard to keep all the SPDM stuff as transport
>> >neutral as possible.
>> >
>> >> SPDM_GET would report discovery BaseHash, discovered slots and their
>> >> certificate digests, authentication state, and the effective
>> >> authentication slot. SPDM_AUTHENTICATE would take device-generation and
>> >> the selected slot. EVIDENCE_GET would retrieve CERT_CHAIN with
>> >> blob-instance=slot without selecting the authentication slot.
>> >
>> >Do you have a mapping to ARM RMM operations already you can share with
>> >Aneesh?
>> 
>> Yes. For SPDM-capable PCIe endpoints, this is the mapping I figured out
>> with LLM, using the existing RMM 2.0-bet3 interface:
>
>Lets talk about this in this thread:
>
>https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261103151643.GI274202@nvidia.com/
>
>> sysfs connect (PCI/TSM and kernel SPDM requester):
>>   Perform preliminary negotiation and GET_DIGESTS/GET_CERTIFICATE.
>>   Retain the discovery snapshot and destroy the temporary requester.
>>   Do not create the endpoint PDEV yet.
>
>If we want to do what I called option a, with user space repeat, then
>we need a CTLV command to start the flow, not sysfs.
>
>I have been thinking sysfs should only create the attestation end
>point and not do any RMM operations

Okay, sysfs connect can just associate the TSM and create the
attestation instance. Starting/restarting the protocol would be driven
through CTLV, Is SPDM_GET op the one you have in mind, or something
additional done before it?


> 
>> SPDM_GET (attestation provider):
>>   Return the retained discovery information and connection state.
>>   There is no corresponding RMI discovery command.
>
>> EVIDENCE_GET(CERT_CHAIN, blob-instance=N):
>>   Return the retained DER certificate chain for slot N.
>
>I think these two are my #2
> 
>> SPDM_AUTHENTICATE(device-generation, slot):
>>   Validate the generation and selected slot.
>>   RMI_PDEV_CREATE(id_index=slot)
>
>Maybe PDEV_CREATE is in my #1?

For current RMM, PDEV_CREATE fixes the certificate slot through
id_index. For option (a), I would therefore leave it in #3:
START is a no-op; FINISH(slot) creates the PDEV and runs to PDEV_READY.


>
>>   RMI_PDEV_COMMUNICATE until PDEV_NEEDS_KEY
>>     -> RMM performs fresh negotiation and retrieves the selected chain
>>     -> CCA host driver relays requests over DOE and caches the chain
>>   Compare its DER certificates with the selected discovery identity.
>>     -> reject a mismatch before supplying the key
>>   Extract the leaf key; RMI_PDEV_SET_PUBKEY -> PDEV_HAS_KEY
>>   RMI_PDEV_COMMUNICATE until PDEV_READY
>
>This is my #3
>
>>   Prepare the root-port PDEV to READY and configure PCI IDE resources.
>>   RMI_PDEV_STREAM_CONNECT
>>   RMI_PDEV_COMMUNICATE on both PDEVs, honoring STREAM_WAIT
>>   RMI_PDEV_STREAM_COMPLETE
>>   Enable the endpoint IDE stream.
>>   Only then publish authenticated state and the new device-generation.
>
>Oh is IDE under the control of the OS for RMM? I hadn't read that far
>ahead. Then it should be done as part of the "ACCEPT" step #5

Yes, the host drives IDE setup through the RMI stream operations;
RMM handles key management. We can move that setup to host
EVIDENCE_ACCEPT, after appraising the session identity.


>
>ie the same place we would do RUN
>
>Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-04  9:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  6:24     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:09     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:45         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04  9:21           ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2026-11-04 14:00             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:05     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:35       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:22     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:39       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29  5:30     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:41         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30  9:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  3:47           ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11             ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 12:01                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-03 15:16                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04  8:03                     ` Xu Yilun
2026-11-04  9:49                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:41                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 16:54                           ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-04  9:03                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:48                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 16:31                 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-03 17:56                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32   ` Jason Gunthorpe

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