[PATCH 5.10 00/96] 5.10.260-rc1 review

[PATCH 5.10 00/96] 5.10.260-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.260 release.
There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.260-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 5.10.260-rc1

Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
    virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount

Junrui Luo <moonafterrain@outlook.com>
    misc: fastrpc: fix DMA address corruption due to find_vma misuse

Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com>
    mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add OF entry for RZ/G2H SoC

Santosh Kalluri <santosh.kalluri129@gmail.com>
    net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
    phonet: Pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify().

Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
    phonet: Pass ifindex to fill_addr().

Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
    Drivers: hv: vmbus: Improve the logic of reserving fb_mmio on Gen2 VMs

Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>
    misc: fastrpc: Fix NULL pointer dereference in rpmsg callback

Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
    misc: fastrpc: Add dma_mask to fastrpc_channel_ctx

Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
    mptcp: fix missing wakeups in edge scenarios

Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
    hv: utils: handle and propagate errors in kvp_register

Kyle Meyer <kyle.meyer@hpe.com>
    bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference

Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
    bnxt_en: Modify bnxt_disable_int_sync() to be called more than once.

Yongchao Wu <yongchao.wu@autochips.com>
    usb: cdns3: gadget: fix NULL pointer dereference in ep_queue

Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
    dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done

Dominik Woźniak <stalion@gmail.com>
    nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
    nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure

Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>
    NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup

Steffen Persvold <spersvold@gmail.com>
    fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode

Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
    fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var

Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com>
    KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path

Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
    ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors

Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
    fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()

Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>
    irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove

Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
    pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()

Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
    tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done

Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
    exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()

Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
    MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS

Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
    bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer

Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
    f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()

Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
    wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor

Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>
    wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding

Zenm Chen <zenmchen@gmail.com>
    wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S

Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
    keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths

Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
    KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()

Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
    mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto

Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
    net: cpsw_new: Fix potential unregister of netdev that has not been registered yet

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsg

Yuto Ohnuki <ytohnuki@amazon.com>
    ext4: add bounds check for inline data length in ext4_read_inline_page

Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
    ring-buffer: Remove ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync()

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tt: don't merge change entries with different VIDs

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize last_recv_time during init

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: prevent ELP transmission interval underflow

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: bla: annotate lasttime access with READ/WRITE_ONCE

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: add only finished tp_vars to lists

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: handle seqno wrap-around for fast recovery detection

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: fix fast recovery precondition

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid window underflow

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dec_cwnd explicitly

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dup_acks explicitly

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tp_meter: keep unacked list in ascending ordered

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: fix action bind logic

Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
    crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs

Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
    crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources

Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
    crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user()

Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
    Documentation: ioctl-number: Extend "Include File" column width

Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
    media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_push_si

Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
    vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write

André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
    regulator: core: fix locking in regulator_resolve_supply() error path

Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
    agp/amd64: Fix broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe()

Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
    net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()

Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
    i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length

Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
    RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace

Jiacheng Shi <billsjc@sjtu.edu.cn>
    vfio/iommu_type1: replace kfree with kvfree

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV entry number overflow

Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
    batman-adv: tt: reject oversized local TVLV buffers

Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
    netdevsim: Fix memory leak of nsim_dev->fa_cookie

Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
    net: 9p: fix refcount leak in p9_read_work() error handling

Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
    drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net/sched: cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer_careful()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: add skb_header_pointer_careful() helper

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    ip6_vti: set netns_immutable on the fallback device.

Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
    drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops

Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
    slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Register callbacks after creating the ngd

Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
    fuse: limit FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE to uptodate folios

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: free pedit keys on bail from offset check

Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
    net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption

Max Tottenham <mtottenh@akamai.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: Parse L3 Header for L4 offset

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: rate limit datapath messages

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: check static offsets a priori

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: remove extra check for key type

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: simplify tcf_pedit_act

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: transition act_pedit to rcu and percpu stats

Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
    net/sched: act_pedit: use NLA_POLICY for parsing 'ex' keys


-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst | 427 ++++++++++-----------
 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c                       |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                             |   1 +
 crypto/af_alg.c                                    |   2 +
 drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c                       |   2 +-
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h     |  32 --
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h       |  38 --
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h     |   3 -
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c        | 421 +-------------------
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c        |  70 ----
 drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c                      |   3 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c     |   2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c  |  15 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c |  12 +-
 .../drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h   |   5 +
 drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c                                |  25 +-
 drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c                             |  56 ++-
 drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c                             |   5 +
 drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c           |   2 +-
 drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c                       |   6 +
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c       |   8 +-
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c                             |   9 +-
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c      |   1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c          |   3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h |   1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_new.c                 |   4 +-
 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c                        |   1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c               |   1 +
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c    |   1 +
 .../net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h   |   2 +-
 drivers/regulator/core.c                           |  10 +-
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c                    |  11 +-
 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c                         |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c                         |   3 +
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c                    |   2 +-
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c                   |  12 +
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c                  |   2 +-
 fs/dlm/lockspace.c                                 |   2 +-
 fs/exfat/dir.c                                     |   4 +-
 fs/ext4/inline.c                                   |   8 +
 fs/f2fs/acl.c                                      |  18 +-
 fs/fuse/dev.c                                      |   4 +
 fs/fuse/file.c                                     |   8 +-
 fs/nfs/pnfs.c                                      |   2 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c                                  |  17 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c                                  |  17 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c                              |   3 +-
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                                  |   3 +-
 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c                                |  22 ++
 include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h               |   2 +
 include/linux/ring_buffer.h                        |   4 +-
 include/linux/skbuff.h                             |  12 +
 include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h                        |   2 +-
 include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h                      |  80 +++-
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c                                |   2 +-
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c                         |  74 +---
 kernel/trace/trace.c                               |  14 +-
 kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c                           |   8 +-
 net/9p/trans_fd.c                                  |   1 +
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c                        |  11 +-
 net/batman-adv/bat_v.c                             |   1 +
 net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c                         |  23 +-
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c             |  28 +-
 net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c             |  12 +-
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c                     |  22 +-
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h                     |   3 +-
 net/batman-adv/netlink.c                           |  10 +-
 net/batman-adv/routing.c                           |   3 +-
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c                          | 115 ++++--
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c                 |  40 +-
 net/batman-adv/tvlv.c                              |  69 +++-
 net/batman-adv/types.h                             |  21 +-
 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c                                 |   1 +
 net/mac802154/llsec.c                              |  14 +
 net/mptcp/protocol.c                               |   8 +
 net/phonet/pn_dev.c                                |  12 +-
 net/phonet/pn_netlink.c                            |  23 +-
 net/sched/act_pedit.c                              | 420 +++++++++++---------
 net/sched/cls_u32.c                                |  13 +-
 net/tipc/crypto.c                                  |   9 +
 security/keys/internal.h                           |   2 +
 security/keys/keyctl.c                             |  24 +-
 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c                        |   9 +-
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c                   |  33 +-
 86 files changed, 1206 insertions(+), 1246 deletions(-)

[PATCH 5.10 01/96] net/sched: act_pedit: use NLA_POLICY for parsing ex keys

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit 5036034572b79daa6d6600338e8e8229e2a44b09 ]

Transform two checks in the 'ex' key parsing into netlink policies
removing extra if checks.

Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 11 +++--------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index a44101b2f44191..510a3b5b8c0c1d 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -31,8 +31,9 @@ static const struct nla_policy pedit_policy[TCA_PEDIT_MAX + 1] = {
 };
 
 static const struct nla_policy pedit_key_ex_policy[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_MAX + 1] = {
-	[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HTYPE]  = { .type = NLA_U16 },
-	[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD]	  = { .type = NLA_U16 },
+	[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HTYPE] =
+		NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U16, TCA_PEDIT_HDR_TYPE_MAX),
+	[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD] = NLA_POLICY_MAX(NLA_U16, TCA_PEDIT_CMD_MAX),
 };
 
 static struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse(struct nlattr *nla,
@@ -82,12 +83,6 @@ static struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse(struct nlattr *nla,
 		k->htype = nla_get_u16(tb[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HTYPE]);
 		k->cmd = nla_get_u16(tb[TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD]);
 
-		if (k->htype > TCA_PEDIT_HDR_TYPE_MAX ||
-		    k->cmd > TCA_PEDIT_CMD_MAX) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto err_out;
-		}
-
 		k++;
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 02/96] net/sched: transition act_pedit to rcu and percpu stats

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit 52cf89f78c01bf39973f3e70d366921d70faff7a ]

The software pedit action didn't get the same love as some of the
other actions and it's still using spinlocks and shared stats in the
datapath.
Transition the action to rcu and percpu stats as this improves the
action's performance dramatically on multiple cpu deployments.

Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
	net/sched/act_pedit.c
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h |  81 +++++++++++++++----
 net/sched/act_pedit.c         | 148 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 2 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
index 3e02709a1df656..83fe3993178180 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
@@ -4,22 +4,29 @@
 
 #include <net/act_api.h>
 #include <linux/tc_act/tc_pedit.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
 
 struct tcf_pedit_key_ex {
 	enum pedit_header_type htype;
 	enum pedit_cmd cmd;
 };
 
-struct tcf_pedit {
-	struct tc_action	common;
-	unsigned char		tcfp_nkeys;
-	unsigned char		tcfp_flags;
-	u32			tcfp_off_max_hint;
+struct tcf_pedit_parms {
 	struct tc_pedit_key	*tcfp_keys;
 	struct tcf_pedit_key_ex	*tcfp_keys_ex;
+	u32 tcfp_off_max_hint;
+	unsigned char tcfp_nkeys;
+	unsigned char tcfp_flags;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+struct tcf_pedit {
+	struct tc_action common;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms __rcu *parms;
 };
 
 #define to_pedit(a) ((struct tcf_pedit *)a)
+#define to_pedit_parms(a) (rcu_dereference(to_pedit(a)->parms))
 
 static inline bool is_tcf_pedit(const struct tc_action *a)
 {
@@ -32,37 +39,81 @@ static inline bool is_tcf_pedit(const struct tc_action *a)
 
 static inline int tcf_pedit_nkeys(const struct tc_action *a)
 {
-	return to_pedit(a)->tcfp_nkeys;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+	int nkeys;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	parms = to_pedit_parms(a);
+	nkeys = parms->tcfp_nkeys;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return nkeys;
 }
 
 static inline u32 tcf_pedit_htype(const struct tc_action *a, int index)
 {
-	if (to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys_ex)
-		return to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys_ex[index].htype;
+	u32 htype = TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	parms = to_pedit_parms(a);
+	if (parms->tcfp_keys_ex)
+		htype = parms->tcfp_keys_ex[index].htype;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	return TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK;
+	return htype;
 }
 
 static inline u32 tcf_pedit_cmd(const struct tc_action *a, int index)
 {
-	if (to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys_ex)
-		return to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys_ex[index].cmd;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+	u32 cmd = __PEDIT_CMD_MAX;
 
-	return __PEDIT_CMD_MAX;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	parms = to_pedit_parms(a);
+	if (parms->tcfp_keys_ex)
+		cmd = parms->tcfp_keys_ex[index].cmd;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return cmd;
 }
 
 static inline u32 tcf_pedit_mask(const struct tc_action *a, int index)
 {
-	return to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys[index].mask;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+	u32 mask;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	parms = to_pedit_parms(a);
+	mask = parms->tcfp_keys[index].mask;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return mask;
 }
 
 static inline u32 tcf_pedit_val(const struct tc_action *a, int index)
 {
-	return to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys[index].val;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+	u32 val;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	parms = to_pedit_parms(a);
+	val = parms->tcfp_keys[index].val;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return val;
 }
 
 static inline u32 tcf_pedit_offset(const struct tc_action *a, int index)
 {
-	return to_pedit(a)->tcfp_keys[index].off;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+	u32 off;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	parms = to_pedit_parms(a);
+	off = parms->tcfp_keys[index].off;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return off;
 }
 #endif /* __NET_TC_PED_H */
diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 510a3b5b8c0c1d..0fbffebfbdc9d8 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -130,6 +130,17 @@ static int tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static void tcf_pedit_cleanup_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms =
+		container_of(head, struct tcf_pedit_parms, rcu);
+
+	kfree(parms->tcfp_keys_ex);
+	kfree(parms->tcfp_keys);
+
+	kfree(parms);
+}
+
 static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 			  struct nlattr *est, struct tc_action **a,
 			  int ovr, int bind, bool rtnl_held,
@@ -137,10 +148,9 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 			  struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
 	struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, pedit_net_id);
-	struct nlattr *tb[TCA_PEDIT_MAX + 1];
 	struct tcf_chain *goto_ch = NULL;
-	struct tc_pedit_key *keys = NULL;
-	struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *keys_ex;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *oparms, *nparms;
+	struct nlattr *tb[TCA_PEDIT_MAX + 1];
 	struct tc_pedit *parm;
 	struct nlattr *pattr;
 	struct tcf_pedit *p;
@@ -177,18 +187,25 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	keys_ex = tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse(tb[TCA_PEDIT_KEYS_EX], parm->nkeys);
-	if (IS_ERR(keys_ex))
-		return PTR_ERR(keys_ex);
+	nparms = kzalloc(sizeof(*nparms), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nparms)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	nparms->tcfp_keys_ex =
+		tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse(tb[TCA_PEDIT_KEYS_EX], parm->nkeys);
+	if (IS_ERR(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex);
+		goto out_free;
+	}
 
 	index = parm->index;
 	err = tcf_idr_check_alloc(tn, &index, a, bind);
 	if (!err) {
-		ret = tcf_idr_create(tn, index, est, a,
-				     &act_pedit_ops, bind, false, flags);
+		ret = tcf_idr_create_from_flags(tn, index, est, a,
+						&act_pedit_ops, bind, flags);
 		if (ret) {
 			tcf_idr_cleanup(tn, index);
-			goto out_free;
+			goto out_free_ex;
 		}
 		ret = ACT_P_CREATED;
 	} else if (err > 0) {
@@ -200,7 +217,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		}
 	} else {
 		ret = err;
-		goto out_free;
+		goto out_free_ex;
 	}
 
 	err = tcf_action_check_ctrlact(parm->action, tp, &goto_ch, extack);
@@ -208,48 +225,50 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		ret = err;
 		goto out_release;
 	}
-	p = to_pedit(*a);
-	spin_lock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
 
-	if (ret == ACT_P_CREATED ||
-	    (p->tcfp_nkeys && p->tcfp_nkeys != parm->nkeys)) {
-		keys = kmalloc(ksize, GFP_ATOMIC);
-		if (!keys) {
-			spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
-			ret = -ENOMEM;
-			goto put_chain;
-		}
-		kfree(p->tcfp_keys);
-		p->tcfp_keys = keys;
-		p->tcfp_nkeys = parm->nkeys;
+	nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint = 0;
+	nparms->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
+	nparms->tcfp_nkeys = parm->nkeys;
+
+	nparms->tcfp_keys = kmalloc(ksize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nparms->tcfp_keys) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto put_chain;
 	}
-	memcpy(p->tcfp_keys, parm->keys, ksize);
-	p->tcfp_off_max_hint = 0;
-	for (i = 0; i < p->tcfp_nkeys; ++i) {
-		u32 cur = p->tcfp_keys[i].off;
+
+	memcpy(nparms->tcfp_keys, parm->keys, ksize);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nparms->tcfp_nkeys; ++i) {
+		u32 cur = nparms->tcfp_keys[i].off;
 
 		/* sanitize the shift value for any later use */
-		p->tcfp_keys[i].shift = min_t(size_t, BITS_PER_TYPE(int) - 1,
-					      p->tcfp_keys[i].shift);
+		nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift = min_t(size_t,
+						   BITS_PER_TYPE(int) - 1,
+						   nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift);
 
 		/* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual
 		 * value with uchar max.
 		 */
-		cur += (0xff & p->tcfp_keys[i].offmask) >> p->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
+		cur += (0xff & nparms->tcfp_keys[i].offmask) >> nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
 
 		/* Each key touches 4 bytes starting from the computed offset */
-		p->tcfp_off_max_hint = max(p->tcfp_off_max_hint, cur + 4);
+		nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint =
+			max(nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint, cur + 4);
 	}
 
-	p->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
+	p = to_pedit(*a);
+
+	spin_lock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
 	goto_ch = tcf_action_set_ctrlact(*a, parm->action, goto_ch);
+	oparms = rcu_replace_pointer(p->parms, nparms, 1);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
 
-	kfree(p->tcfp_keys_ex);
-	p->tcfp_keys_ex = keys_ex;
+	if (oparms)
+		call_rcu(&oparms->rcu, tcf_pedit_cleanup_rcu);
 
-	spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
 	if (goto_ch)
 		tcf_chain_put_by_act(goto_ch);
+
 	return ret;
 
 put_chain:
@@ -257,19 +276,22 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		tcf_chain_put_by_act(goto_ch);
 out_release:
 	tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
+out_free_ex:
+	kfree(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex);
 out_free:
-	kfree(keys_ex);
+	kfree(nparms);
 	return ret;
-
 }
 
 static void tcf_pedit_cleanup(struct tc_action *a)
 {
 	struct tcf_pedit *p = to_pedit(a);
-	struct tc_pedit_key *keys = p->tcfp_keys;
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
 
-	kfree(keys);
-	kfree(p->tcfp_keys_ex);
+	parms = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parms, 1);
+
+	if (parms)
+		call_rcu(&parms->rcu, tcf_pedit_cleanup_rcu);
 }
 
 static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
@@ -320,28 +342,30 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			 struct tcf_result *res)
 {
 	struct tcf_pedit *p = to_pedit(a);
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
 	u32 max_offset;
 	int i;
 
-	spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);
+	parms = rcu_dereference_bh(p->parms);
 
 	max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
 		      skb_transport_offset(skb) :
 		      skb_network_offset(skb)) +
-		     p->tcfp_off_max_hint;
+		     parms->tcfp_off_max_hint;
 	if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
-		goto unlock;
+		goto done;
 
 	tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
+	tcf_action_update_bstats(&p->common, skb);
 
-	if (p->tcfp_nkeys > 0) {
-		struct tc_pedit_key *tkey = p->tcfp_keys;
-		struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex = p->tcfp_keys_ex;
+	if (parms->tcfp_nkeys > 0) {
+		struct tc_pedit_key *tkey = parms->tcfp_keys;
+		struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
 		enum pedit_header_type htype =
 			TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK;
 		enum pedit_cmd cmd = TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET;
 
-		for (i = p->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
+		for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
 			u32 *ptr, hdata;
 			int offset = tkey->off;
 			int hoffset;
@@ -417,11 +441,10 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 	}
 
 bad:
+	spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);
 	p->tcf_qstats.overlimits++;
-done:
-	bstats_update(&p->tcf_bstats, skb);
-unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&p->tcf_lock);
+done:
 	return p->tcf_action;
 }
 
@@ -440,30 +463,33 @@ static int tcf_pedit_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a,
 {
 	unsigned char *b = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
 	struct tcf_pedit *p = to_pedit(a);
+	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
 	struct tc_pedit *opt;
 	struct tcf_t t;
 	int s;
 
-	s = struct_size(opt, keys, p->tcfp_nkeys);
+	spin_lock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
+	parms = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parms, 1);
+	s = struct_size(opt, keys, parms->tcfp_nkeys);
 
-	/* netlink spinlocks held above us - must use ATOMIC */
 	opt = kzalloc(s, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (unlikely(!opt))
+	if (unlikely(!opt)) {
+		spin_unlock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
 		return -ENOBUFS;
+	}
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&p->tcf_lock);
-	memcpy(opt->keys, p->tcfp_keys, flex_array_size(opt, keys, p->tcfp_nkeys));
+	memcpy(opt->keys, parms->tcfp_keys,
+	       flex_array_size(opt, keys, parms->tcfp_nkeys));
 	opt->index = p->tcf_index;
-	opt->nkeys = p->tcfp_nkeys;
-	opt->flags = p->tcfp_flags;
+	opt->nkeys = parms->tcfp_nkeys;
+	opt->flags = parms->tcfp_flags;
 	opt->action = p->tcf_action;
 	opt->refcnt = refcount_read(&p->tcf_refcnt) - ref;
 	opt->bindcnt = atomic_read(&p->tcf_bindcnt) - bind;
 
-	if (p->tcfp_keys_ex) {
-		if (tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump(skb,
-					  p->tcfp_keys_ex,
-					  p->tcfp_nkeys))
+	if (parms->tcfp_keys_ex) {
+		if (tcf_pedit_key_ex_dump(skb, parms->tcfp_keys_ex,
+					  parms->tcfp_nkeys))
 			goto nla_put_failure;
 
 		if (nla_put(skb, TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX, s, opt))
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 03/96] net/sched: simplify tcf_pedit_act

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit 95b069382351826c0ae37938070aa82dbeaf288d ]

Remove the check for a negative number of keys as
this cannot ever happen

Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 67 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 0fbffebfbdc9d8..84152d3a492469 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -341,8 +341,12 @@ static int pedit_skb_hdr_offset(struct sk_buff *skb,
 static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			 struct tcf_result *res)
 {
+	enum pedit_header_type htype = TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK;
+	enum pedit_cmd cmd = TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET;
 	struct tcf_pedit *p = to_pedit(a);
+	struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex;
 	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
+	struct tc_pedit_key *tkey;
 	u32 max_offset;
 	int i;
 
@@ -358,88 +362,81 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 	tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
 	tcf_action_update_bstats(&p->common, skb);
 
-	if (parms->tcfp_nkeys > 0) {
-		struct tc_pedit_key *tkey = parms->tcfp_keys;
-		struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
-		enum pedit_header_type htype =
-			TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK;
-		enum pedit_cmd cmd = TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET;
-
-		for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
-			u32 *ptr, hdata;
-			int offset = tkey->off;
-			int hoffset;
-			u32 val;
-			int rc;
-
-			if (tkey_ex) {
-				htype = tkey_ex->htype;
-				cmd = tkey_ex->cmd;
-
-				tkey_ex++;
-			}
+	tkey = parms->tcfp_keys;
+	tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
 
-			rc = pedit_skb_hdr_offset(skb, htype, &hoffset);
-			if (rc) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit bad header type specified (0x%x)\n",
-					htype);
-				goto bad;
-			}
+	for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
+		int offset = tkey->off;
+		u32 *ptr, hdata;
+		int hoffset;
+		u32 val;
+		int rc;
 
-			if (tkey->offmask) {
-				u8 *d, _d;
-
-				if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + tkey->at)) {
-					pr_info("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
-						hoffset + tkey->at);
-					goto bad;
-				}
-				d = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + tkey->at,
-						       sizeof(_d), &_d);
-				if (!d)
-					goto bad;
-				offset += (*d & tkey->offmask) >> tkey->shift;
-			}
+		if (tkey_ex) {
+			htype = tkey_ex->htype;
+			cmd = tkey_ex->cmd;
 
-			if (offset % 4) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
-				goto bad;
-			}
+			tkey_ex++;
+		}
 
-			if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
-					hoffset + offset);
-				goto bad;
-			}
+		rc = pedit_skb_hdr_offset(skb, htype, &hoffset);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_info("tc action pedit bad header type specified (0x%x)\n",
+				htype);
+			goto bad;
+		}
 
-			ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + offset,
-						 sizeof(hdata), &hdata);
-			if (!ptr)
-				goto bad;
-			/* just do it, baby */
-			switch (cmd) {
-			case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET:
-				val = tkey->val;
-				break;
-			case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_ADD:
-				val = (*ptr + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
-				break;
-			default:
-				pr_info("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n",
-					cmd);
+		if (tkey->offmask) {
+			u8 *d, _d;
+
+			if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + tkey->at)) {
+				pr_info("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
+					hoffset + tkey->at);
 				goto bad;
 			}
+			d = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + tkey->at,
+					       sizeof(_d), &_d);
+			if (!d)
+				goto bad;
+			offset += (*d & tkey->offmask) >> tkey->shift;
+		}
 
-			*ptr = ((*ptr & tkey->mask) ^ val);
-			if (ptr == &hdata)
-				skb_store_bits(skb, hoffset + offset, ptr, 4);
+		if (offset % 4) {
+			pr_info("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
+			goto bad;
 		}
 
-		goto done;
-	} else {
-		WARN(1, "pedit BUG: index %d\n", p->tcf_index);
+		if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
+			pr_info("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
+				hoffset + offset);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + offset,
+					 sizeof(hdata), &hdata);
+		if (!ptr)
+			goto bad;
+		/* just do it, baby */
+		switch (cmd) {
+		case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET:
+			val = tkey->val;
+			break;
+		case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_ADD:
+			val = (*ptr + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_info("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n",
+				cmd);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		*ptr = ((*ptr & tkey->mask) ^ val);
+		if (ptr == &hdata)
+			skb_store_bits(skb, hoffset + offset, ptr, 4);
 	}
 
+	goto done;
+
 bad:
 	spin_lock(&p->tcf_lock);
 	p->tcf_qstats.overlimits++;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 04/96] net/sched: act_pedit: remove extra check for key type

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit 577140180ba28d0d37bc898c7bd6702c83aa106f ]

The netlink parsing already validates the key 'htype'.
Remove the datapath check as it's redundant.

Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 29 +++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 84152d3a492469..957ce9017c3f73 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -305,37 +305,28 @@ static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static int pedit_skb_hdr_offset(struct sk_buff *skb,
-				enum pedit_header_type htype, int *hoffset)
+static void pedit_skb_hdr_offset(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 enum pedit_header_type htype, int *hoffset)
 {
-	int ret = -EINVAL;
-
+	/* 'htype' is validated in the netlink parsing */
 	switch (htype) {
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_ETH:
-		if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
+		if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb))
 			*hoffset = skb_mac_offset(skb);
-			ret = 0;
-		}
 		break;
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK:
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_IP4:
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_IP6:
 		*hoffset = skb_network_offset(skb);
-		ret = 0;
 		break;
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_TCP:
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_UDP:
-		if (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)) {
+		if (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb))
 			*hoffset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
-			ret = 0;
-		}
 		break;
 	default:
-		ret = -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	}
-
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
@@ -367,10 +358,9 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 
 	for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
 		int offset = tkey->off;
+		int hoffset = 0;
 		u32 *ptr, hdata;
-		int hoffset;
 		u32 val;
-		int rc;
 
 		if (tkey_ex) {
 			htype = tkey_ex->htype;
@@ -379,12 +369,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			tkey_ex++;
 		}
 
-		rc = pedit_skb_hdr_offset(skb, htype, &hoffset);
-		if (rc) {
-			pr_info("tc action pedit bad header type specified (0x%x)\n",
-				htype);
-			goto bad;
-		}
+		pedit_skb_hdr_offset(skb, htype, &hoffset);
 
 		if (tkey->offmask) {
 			u8 *d, _d;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 05/96] net/sched: act_pedit: check static offsets a priori

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit e1201bc781c28766720e78a5e099ffa568be4d74 ]

Static key offsets should always be on 32 bit boundaries. Validate them on
create/update time for static offsets and move the datapath validation
for runtime offsets only.

iproute2 already errors out if a given offset and data size cannot be
packed to a 32 bit boundary. This change will make sure users which
create/update pedit instances directly via netlink also error out,
instead of finding out when packets are traversing.

Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 957ce9017c3f73..95ae885ecba168 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -239,8 +239,16 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 	memcpy(nparms->tcfp_keys, parm->keys, ksize);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nparms->tcfp_nkeys; ++i) {
+		u32 offmask = nparms->tcfp_keys[i].offmask;
 		u32 cur = nparms->tcfp_keys[i].off;
 
+		/* The AT option can be added to static offsets in the datapath */
+		if (!offmask && cur % 4) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Offsets must be on 32bit boundaries");
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto put_chain;
+		}
+
 		/* sanitize the shift value for any later use */
 		nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift = min_t(size_t,
 						   BITS_PER_TYPE(int) - 1,
@@ -249,7 +257,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		/* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual
 		 * value with uchar max.
 		 */
-		cur += (0xff & nparms->tcfp_keys[i].offmask) >> nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
+		cur += (0xff & offmask) >> nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
 
 		/* Each key touches 4 bytes starting from the computed offset */
 		nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint =
@@ -383,12 +391,12 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 					       sizeof(_d), &_d);
 			if (!d)
 				goto bad;
-			offset += (*d & tkey->offmask) >> tkey->shift;
-		}
 
-		if (offset % 4) {
-			pr_info("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
-			goto bad;
+			offset += (*d & tkey->offmask) >> tkey->shift;
+			if (offset % 4) {
+				pr_info("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
+				goto bad;
+			}
 		}
 
 		if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 06/96] net/sched: act_pedit: rate limit datapath messages

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit e3c9673e2f6e1b3aa4bb87c570336e10f364c28a ]

Unbounded info messages in the pedit datapath can flood the printk
ring buffer quite easily depending on the action created.
As these messages are informational, usually printing some, not all,
is enough to bring attention to the real issue.

Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 12 +++++-------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 95ae885ecba168..ecad6fc39dc3d7 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -383,8 +383,8 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			u8 *d, _d;
 
 			if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + tkey->at)) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
-					hoffset + tkey->at);
+				pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
+						    hoffset + tkey->at);
 				goto bad;
 			}
 			d = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + tkey->at,
@@ -394,14 +394,13 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 
 			offset += (*d & tkey->offmask) >> tkey->shift;
 			if (offset % 4) {
-				pr_info("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
+				pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset must be on 32 bit boundaries\n");
 				goto bad;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
-			pr_info("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
-				hoffset + offset);
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n", hoffset + offset);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
@@ -418,8 +417,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			val = (*ptr + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
 			break;
 		default:
-			pr_info("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n",
-				cmd);
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n", cmd);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 07/96] net/sched: act_pedit: Parse L3 Header for L4 offset

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Max Tottenham <mtottenh@akamai.com>

[ Upstream commit 6c02568fd1ae53099b4ab86365c5be1ff15f586b ]

Instead of relying on skb->transport_header being set correctly, opt
instead to parse the L3 header length out of the L3 headers for both
IPv4/IPv6 when the Extended Layer Op for tcp/udp is used. This fixes a
bug if GRO is disabled, when GRO is disabled skb->transport_header is
set by __netif_receive_skb_core() to point to the L3 header, it's later
fixed by the upper protocol layers, but act_pedit will receive the SKB
before the fixups are completed. The existing behavior causes the
following to edit the L3 header if GRO is disabled instead of the UDP
header:

    tc filter add dev eth0 ingress protocol ip flower ip_proto udp \
 dst_ip 192.168.1.3 action pedit ex munge udp set dport 18053

Also re-introduce a rate-limited warning if we were unable to extract
the header offset when using the 'ex' interface.

Fixes: 71d0ed7079df ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to
the conventional network headers")
Signed-off-by: Max Tottenham <mtottenh@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Hunt <johunt@akamai.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202305261541.N165u9TZ-lkp@intel.com/
Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
(cherry picked from commit 6c02568fd1ae53099b4ab86365c5be1ff15f586b)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index ecad6fc39dc3d7..df31b2b7b42253 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <net/pkt_sched.h>
 #include <linux/tc_act/tc_pedit.h>
@@ -313,28 +316,58 @@ static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
 	return true;
 }
 
-static void pedit_skb_hdr_offset(struct sk_buff *skb,
+static int pedit_l4_skb_offset(struct sk_buff *skb, int *hoffset, const int header_type)
+{
+	const int noff = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+	struct iphdr _iph;
+
+	switch (skb->protocol) {
+	case htons(ETH_P_IP): {
+		const struct iphdr *iph = skb_header_pointer(skb, noff, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
+
+		if (!iph)
+			goto out;
+		*hoffset = noff + iph->ihl * 4;
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
+		ret = ipv6_find_hdr(skb, hoffset, header_type, NULL, NULL) == header_type ? 0 : -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int pedit_skb_hdr_offset(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 enum pedit_header_type htype, int *hoffset)
 {
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
 	/* 'htype' is validated in the netlink parsing */
 	switch (htype) {
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_ETH:
-		if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb))
+		if (skb_mac_header_was_set(skb)) {
 			*hoffset = skb_mac_offset(skb);
+			ret = 0;
+		}
 		break;
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_NETWORK:
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_IP4:
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_IP6:
 		*hoffset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+		ret = 0;
 		break;
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_TCP:
+		ret = pedit_l4_skb_offset(skb, hoffset, IPPROTO_TCP);
+		break;
 	case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_HDR_TYPE_UDP:
-		if (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb))
-			*hoffset = skb_transport_offset(skb);
+		ret = pedit_l4_skb_offset(skb, hoffset, IPPROTO_UDP);
 		break;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
@@ -369,6 +402,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 		int hoffset = 0;
 		u32 *ptr, hdata;
 		u32 val;
+		int rc;
 
 		if (tkey_ex) {
 			htype = tkey_ex->htype;
@@ -377,7 +411,11 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			tkey_ex++;
 		}
 
-		pedit_skb_hdr_offset(skb, htype, &hoffset);
+		rc = pedit_skb_hdr_offset(skb, htype, &hoffset);
+		if (rc) {
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit unable to extract header offset for header type (0x%x)\n", htype);
+			goto bad;
+		}
 
 		if (tkey->offmask) {
 			u8 *d, _d;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 08/96] net/sched: fix pedit partial COW leading to page cache corruption

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>

[ Upstream commit 899ee91156e57784090c5565e4f31bd7dbffbc5a ]

tcf_pedit_act() computes the COW range for skb_ensure_writable()
once before the key loop using tcfp_off_max_hint, but the hint does
not account for the runtime header offset added by typed keys. This
can leave part of the write region un-COW'd.

Fix by moving skb_ensure_writable() inside the per-key loop where
the actual write offset is known, and add overflow checking on the
offset arithmetic. For negative offsets (e.g. Ethernet header edits
at ingress), use skb_cow() to COW the headroom instead. Guard
offset_valid() against INT_MIN, where negation is undefined.

Fixes: 8b796475fd78 ("net/sched: act_pedit: really ensure the skb is writable")
Reported-by: Yiming Qian <yimingqian591@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Keenan Dong <keenanat2000@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Han Guidong <2045gemini@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor@mojatatu.com>
Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Rajat Gupta <rajat.gupta@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260531123221.48732-1-jhs@mojatatu.com
[rename include file from linux/unaligned.h to asm/unaligned.h]
Conflicts:
	include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
	net/sched/act_pedit.c
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h |  1 -
 net/sched/act_pedit.c         | 77 +++++++++++++++++++----------------
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
index 83fe3993178180..a26d4cd3b8d6f3 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_act/tc_pedit.h
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ struct tcf_pedit_key_ex {
 struct tcf_pedit_parms {
 	struct tc_pedit_key	*tcfp_keys;
 	struct tcf_pedit_key_ex	*tcfp_keys_ex;
-	u32 tcfp_off_max_hint;
 	unsigned char tcfp_nkeys;
 	unsigned char tcfp_flags;
 	struct rcu_head rcu;
diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index df31b2b7b42253..35fa94ba0edf8f 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 #include <linux/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/overflow.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
 #include <net/netlink.h>
 #include <net/pkt_sched.h>
 #include <linux/tc_act/tc_pedit.h>
@@ -229,7 +231,6 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		goto out_release;
 	}
 
-	nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint = 0;
 	nparms->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
 	nparms->tcfp_nkeys = parm->nkeys;
 
@@ -257,14 +258,6 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 						   BITS_PER_TYPE(int) - 1,
 						   nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift);
 
-		/* The AT option can read a single byte, we can bound the actual
-		 * value with uchar max.
-		 */
-		cur += (0xff & offmask) >> nparms->tcfp_keys[i].shift;
-
-		/* Each key touches 4 bytes starting from the computed offset */
-		nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint =
-			max(nparms->tcfp_off_max_hint, cur + 4);
 	}
 
 	p = to_pedit(*a);
@@ -305,15 +298,12 @@ static void tcf_pedit_cleanup(struct tc_action *a)
 		call_rcu(&parms->rcu, tcf_pedit_cleanup_rcu);
 }
 
-static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset)
+static bool offset_valid(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
 {
-	if (offset > 0 && offset > skb->len)
-		return false;
-
-	if  (offset < 0 && -offset > skb_headroom(skb))
+	if (offset < -(int)skb_headroom(skb))
 		return false;
 
-	return true;
+	return offset <= (int)skb->len - len;
 }
 
 static int pedit_l4_skb_offset(struct sk_buff *skb, int *hoffset, const int header_type)
@@ -379,18 +369,10 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 	struct tcf_pedit_key_ex *tkey_ex;
 	struct tcf_pedit_parms *parms;
 	struct tc_pedit_key *tkey;
-	u32 max_offset;
 	int i;
 
 	parms = rcu_dereference_bh(p->parms);
 
-	max_offset = (skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) ?
-		      skb_transport_offset(skb) :
-		      skb_network_offset(skb)) +
-		     parms->tcfp_off_max_hint;
-	if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min(skb->len, max_offset)))
-		goto done;
-
 	tcf_lastuse_update(&p->tcf_tm);
 	tcf_action_update_bstats(&p->common, skb);
 
@@ -398,10 +380,11 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 	tkey_ex = parms->tcfp_keys_ex;
 
 	for (i = parms->tcfp_nkeys; i > 0; i--, tkey++) {
+		int write_offset, write_len;
 		int offset = tkey->off;
 		int hoffset = 0;
-		u32 *ptr, hdata;
-		u32 val;
+		u32 cur_val, val;
+		u32 *ptr;
 		int rc;
 
 		if (tkey_ex) {
@@ -419,13 +402,15 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 
 		if (tkey->offmask) {
 			u8 *d, _d;
+			int at_offset;
 
-			if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + tkey->at)) {
+			if (check_add_overflow(hoffset, (int)tkey->at, &at_offset) ||
+			    !offset_valid(skb, at_offset, sizeof(_d))) {
 				pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit 'at' offset %d out of bounds\n",
 						    hoffset + tkey->at);
 				goto bad;
 			}
-			d = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + tkey->at,
+			d = skb_header_pointer(skb, at_offset,
 					       sizeof(_d), &_d);
 			if (!d)
 				goto bad;
@@ -437,31 +422,51 @@ static int tcf_pedit_act(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tc_action *a,
 			}
 		}
 
-		if (!offset_valid(skb, hoffset + offset)) {
-			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n", hoffset + offset);
+		if (check_add_overflow(hoffset, offset, &write_offset)) {
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset overflow\n");
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
-		ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, hoffset + offset,
-					 sizeof(hdata), &hdata);
-		if (!ptr)
+		if (!offset_valid(skb, write_offset, sizeof(*ptr))) {
+			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit offset %d out of bounds\n",
+					    write_offset);
 			goto bad;
+		}
+
+		if (write_offset < 0) {
+			if (skb_cow(skb, -write_offset))
+				goto bad;
+			if (write_offset + (int)sizeof(*ptr) > 0) {
+				if (skb_ensure_writable(skb,
+							min_t(int, skb->len,
+							      write_offset + (int)sizeof(*ptr))))
+					goto bad;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (check_add_overflow(write_offset, (int)sizeof(*ptr),
+					       &write_len))
+				goto bad;
+			if (skb_ensure_writable(skb, min_t(int, skb->len,
+							   write_len)))
+				goto bad;
+		}
+
+		ptr = (u32 *)(skb->data + write_offset);
+		cur_val = get_unaligned(ptr);
 		/* just do it, baby */
 		switch (cmd) {
 		case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_SET:
 			val = tkey->val;
 			break;
 		case TCA_PEDIT_KEY_EX_CMD_ADD:
-			val = (*ptr + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
+			val = (cur_val + tkey->val) & ~tkey->mask;
 			break;
 		default:
 			pr_info_ratelimited("tc action pedit bad command (%d)\n", cmd);
 			goto bad;
 		}
 
-		*ptr = ((*ptr & tkey->mask) ^ val);
-		if (ptr == &hdata)
-			skb_store_bits(skb, hoffset + offset, ptr, 4);
+		put_unaligned((cur_val & tkey->mask) ^ val, ptr);
 	}
 
 	goto done;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 09/96] net/sched: act_pedit: free pedit keys on bail from offset check

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit 1b483d9f5805c7e3d628d4995e97f4311fcb82eb ]

Ido Schimmel reports a memleak on a syzkaller instance:
   BUG: memory leak
   unreferenced object 0xffff88803d45e400 (size 1024):
     comm "syz-executor292", pid 563, jiffies 4295025223 (age 51.781s)
     hex dump (first 32 bytes):
       28 bd 70 00 fb db df 25 02 00 14 1f ff 02 00 02  (.p....%........
       00 32 00 00 1f 00 00 00 ac 14 14 3e 08 00 07 00  .2.........>....
     backtrace:
       [<ffffffff81bd0f2c>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:42 [inline]
       [<ffffffff81bd0f2c>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:772 [inline]
       [<ffffffff81bd0f2c>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3452 [inline]
       [<ffffffff81bd0f2c>] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x25c/0x320 mm/slub.c:3491
       [<ffffffff81a865d9>] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline]
       [<ffffffff81a865d9>] __kmalloc+0x59/0x1a0 mm/slab_common.c:980
       [<ffffffff83aa85c3>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
       [<ffffffff83aa85c3>] tcf_pedit_init+0x793/0x1ae0 net/sched/act_pedit.c:245
       [<ffffffff83a90623>] tcf_action_init_1+0x453/0x6e0 net/sched/act_api.c:1394
       [<ffffffff83a90e58>] tcf_action_init+0x5a8/0x950 net/sched/act_api.c:1459
       [<ffffffff83a96258>] tcf_action_add+0x118/0x4e0 net/sched/act_api.c:1985
       [<ffffffff83a96997>] tc_ctl_action+0x377/0x490 net/sched/act_api.c:2044
       [<ffffffff83920a8d>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x46d/0xd70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6395
       [<ffffffff83b24305>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x185/0x490 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2575
       [<ffffffff83901806>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x26/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6413
       [<ffffffff83b21cae>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1339 [inline]
       [<ffffffff83b21cae>] netlink_unicast+0x5be/0x8a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1365
       [<ffffffff83b2293f>] netlink_sendmsg+0x9af/0xed0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1942
       [<ffffffff8380c39f>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
       [<ffffffff8380c39f>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:747 [inline]
       [<ffffffff8380c39f>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x3ef/0xaa0 net/socket.c:2503
       [<ffffffff838156d2>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x122/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2557
       [<ffffffff8381594f>] __sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x200 net/socket.c:2586
       [<ffffffff83815ab0>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2595 [inline]
       [<ffffffff83815ab0>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2593 [inline]
       [<ffffffff83815ab0>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0 net/socket.c:2593

The recently added static offset check missed a free to the key buffer when
bailing out on error.

Fixes: e1201bc781c2 ("net/sched: act_pedit: check static offsets a priori")
Reported-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@idosch.org>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Tested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230425144725.669262-1-pctammela@mojatatu.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 35fa94ba0edf8f..0601deea04d725 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 		if (!offmask && cur % 4) {
 			NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Offsets must be on 32bit boundaries");
 			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto put_chain;
+			goto out_free_keys;
 		}
 
 		/* sanitize the shift value for any later use */
@@ -275,6 +275,8 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 
 	return ret;
 
+out_free_keys:
+	kfree(nparms->tcfp_keys);
 put_chain:
 	if (goto_ch)
 		tcf_chain_put_by_act(goto_ch);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 10/96] fuse: limit FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE to uptodate folios

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 4e3d1b2c48ca6c55f1e9ca7f8dccc76f120f276c ]

FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE must be limited to uptodate folios; !uptodate folios
can contain uninitialized data.
Since FUSE_NOTIFY_RETRIEVE is intended to only return data that is already
in the page cache and not wait for data from the FUSE daemon, treat
!uptodate folios as if they weren't present.

This only has security impact on systems that don't enable automatic
zero-initialization of all page allocations via
CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON or init_on_alloc=1.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 2d45ba381a74 ("fuse: add retrieve request")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260519-fuse-retrieve-uptodate-v1-1-a7a1912a37f9@google.com
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
[adjusted for stable: page instead of folio]
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/fuse/dev.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/fuse/dev.c b/fs/fuse/dev.c
index 9c8a7fdb34dd1a..fc93beee0719d9 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dev.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dev.c
@@ -1728,6 +1728,10 @@ static int fuse_retrieve(struct fuse_mount *fm, struct inode *inode,
 		page = find_get_page(mapping, index);
 		if (!page)
 			break;
+		if (!PageUptodate(page)) {
+			put_page(page);
+			break;
+		}
 
 		this_num = min_t(unsigned, num, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
 		ap->pages[ap->num_pages] = page;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 11/96] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Register callbacks after creating the ngd

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>

[ Upstream commit 2a9d50e9ea406e0c8735938484adc20515ef1b47 ]

When the remoteproc starts in parallel with the NGD driver being probed,
or the remoteproc is already up when the PDR lookup is being registered,
or in the theoretical event that we get an interrupt from the hardware,
these callbacks will operate on uninitialized data. This result in
issues to boot the affected boards.

One such example can be seen in the following fault, where
qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify() schedules work on the NULL ngd_up_work.

[   21.858578] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   21.858745] WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:2338 at __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790, CPU#2: kworker/2:2/116
...
[   21.859251] Call trace:
[   21.859255]  __queue_work+0x5e0/0x790 (P)
[   21.859265]  queue_work_on+0x6c/0xf0
[   21.859273]  qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_pdr_notify+0x110/0x150 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl]
[   21.859304]  qcom_slim_ngd_ssr_notify+0x24/0x40 [slim_qcom_ngd_ctrl]
[   21.859318]  notifier_call_chain+0xa4/0x230
[   21.859329]  srcu_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0xb8
[   21.859338]  ssr_notify_start+0x40/0x78 [qcom_common]
[   21.859355]  rproc_start+0x130/0x230
[   21.859367]  rproc_boot+0x3d4/0x518
...

Move the enablement of interrupts, and the registration of SSR and PDR
until after the NGD device has been registered.

This could be further refined by moving initialization to the control
driver probe and by removing the platform driver model from the picture.

Fixes: 917809e2280b ("slimbus: ngd: Add qcom SLIMBus NGD driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srini@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530204421.116824-6-srini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ dropped absent PDR/SSR registration block and kept 5.10's `res->start`/`dev_err` IRQ idiom, adding only `IRQF_NO_AUTOEN` plus a deferred `enable_irq(res->start)` after `of_qcom_slim_ngd_register()` ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 11 +++++++++--
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c b/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
index 8384f55ccd43e3..0c864bb2d4bdb1 100644
--- a/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c
@@ -1444,7 +1444,8 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	ret = devm_request_irq(dev, res->start, qcom_slim_ngd_interrupt,
-			       IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH, "slim-ngd", ctrl);
+			       IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH | IRQF_NO_AUTOEN,
+			       "slim-ngd", ctrl);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "request IRQ failed\n");
 		return ret;
@@ -1468,7 +1469,13 @@ static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	init_completion(&ctrl->qmi.qmi_comp);
 
 	platform_driver_register(&qcom_slim_ngd_driver);
-	return of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
+	ret = of_qcom_slim_ngd_register(dev, ctrl);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	enable_irq(res->start);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static int qcom_slim_ngd_ctrl_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 12/96] drm/amd/display: Bound VBIOS record-chain walk loops

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit ff287df16a1a58aca78b08d1f3ee09fc44da0351 ]

[Why & How]
All record-chain walk loops in bios_parser.c and bios_parser2.c use
for(;;) and only terminate on a 0xFF record_type sentinel or zero
record_size. A malformed VBIOS image missing the terminator record
causes unbounded iteration at probe time, potentially hundreds of
thousands of iterations with record_size=1. In the final iterations
near the BIOS image boundary, struct casts beyond the 2-byte header
validated by GET_IMAGE can also read out of bounds.

Cap all 14 record-chain walk loops to BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD (256)
iterations. The atombios.h defines up to 22 distinct record types
and atomfirmware.h has 13. Assuming an average of less than 10
records per type (which is reasonable since most are connector-
based) 256 is a generous upper bound.

Fixes: 4562236b3bc0 ("drm/amd/dc: Add dc display driver (v2)")
Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6 Mythos
Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 95700a3d660287ed657d6892f7be9ffc0e294a93)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 .../gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c    | 12 ++++++++----
 .../drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h  |  5 +++++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c
index d37ee8277480dc..b7b9e4c99537b7 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser.c
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	ATOM_I2C_RECORD *record;
 	struct bios_parser *bp = BP_FROM_DCB(dcb);
+	int i;
 
 	if (!info)
 		return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -294,11 +295,12 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_device_tag_record(
 {
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -870,6 +872,7 @@ static ATOM_HPD_INT_RECORD *get_hpd_record(struct bios_parser *bp,
 {
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -879,7 +882,7 @@ static ATOM_HPD_INT_RECORD *get_hpd_record(struct bios_parser *bp,
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -1576,6 +1579,7 @@ static ATOM_ENCODER_CAP_RECORD_V2 *get_encoder_cap_record(
 {
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -1585,7 +1589,7 @@ static ATOM_ENCODER_CAP_RECORD_V2 *get_encoder_cap_record(
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->usRecordOffset)
 					+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -2667,6 +2671,7 @@ enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(
 	unsigned int record_offset)
 {
 	unsigned int j;
+	unsigned int n;
 	struct bios_parser *bp;
 	ATOM_BRACKET_LAYOUT_RECORD *record;
 	ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *record_header;
@@ -2676,7 +2681,7 @@ enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(
 	record = NULL;
 	record_header = NULL;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
 
 		record_header = (ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER *)
 			GET_IMAGE(ATOM_COMMON_RECORD_HEADER, record_offset);
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c
index 2ad36721212404..9e9476f87f6190 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
 	struct atom_i2c_record *record;
 	struct atom_i2c_record dummy_record = {0};
 	struct bios_parser *bp = BP_FROM_DCB(dcb);
+	int i;
 
 	if (!info)
 		return BP_RESULT_BADINPUT;
@@ -316,7 +317,7 @@ static enum bp_result bios_parser_get_i2c_info(struct dc_bios *dcb,
 
 	offset = object->disp_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -446,6 +447,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_hpd_record(
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -455,7 +457,7 @@ static struct atom_hpd_int_record *get_hpd_record(
 	offset = le16_to_cpu(object->disp_recordoffset)
 			+ bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -1423,6 +1425,7 @@ static struct atom_encoder_caps_record *get_encoder_cap_record(
 {
 	struct atom_common_record_header *header;
 	uint32_t offset;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!object) {
 		BREAK_TO_DEBUGGER(); /* Invalid object */
@@ -1431,7 +1434,7 @@ static struct atom_encoder_caps_record *get_encoder_cap_record(
 
 	offset = object->encoder_recordoffset + bp->object_info_tbl_offset;
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (i = 0; i < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; i++) {
 		header = GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header, offset);
 
 		if (!header)
@@ -1870,6 +1873,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(
 {
 	unsigned int record_offset;
 	unsigned int j;
+	unsigned int n;
 	struct atom_display_object_path_v2 *object;
 	struct atom_bracket_layout_record *record;
 	struct atom_common_record_header *record_header;
@@ -1891,7 +1895,7 @@ static enum bp_result update_slot_layout_info(
 		(object->disp_recordoffset) +
 		(unsigned int)(bp->object_info_tbl_offset);
 
-	for (;;) {
+	for (n = 0; n < BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD; n++) {
 
 		record_header = (struct atom_common_record_header *)
 			GET_IMAGE(struct atom_common_record_header,
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h
index 75a29e68fb2782..991bbca950978e 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser_helper.h
@@ -38,4 +38,9 @@ uint32_t bios_get_vga_enabled_displays(struct dc_bios *bios);
 
 #define GET_IMAGE(type, offset) ((type *) bios_get_image(&bp->base, offset, sizeof(type)))
 
+/* Upper bound on the number of records in a VBIOS record chain. Prevents
+ * unbounded looping if the VBIOS image is malformed and lacks a terminator.
+ */
+#define BIOS_MAX_NUM_RECORD 256
+
 #endif
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 13/96] ip6_vti: set netns_immutable on the fallback device.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit d289d5307762d1838aaece22c6b6fcad9e8865f9 ]

john1988 and Noam Rathaus reported that vti6_init_net() does not set the
netns_immutable flag on the per-netns fallback tunnel device (ip6_vti0).

Other similar tunnel drivers (like ip6_tunnel, sit, ip6_gre, and ip_tunnel)
correctly set this flag during their fallback device initialization to
prevent them from being moved to another network namespace.

Fixes: 61220ab34948 ("vti6: Enable namespace changing")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@ssd-disclosure.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260608155918.787644-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport for version without 0c493da86374 ("net:
rename netns_local to netns_immutable") in v6.15-rc1 and without
05c1280a2bcf ("netdev_features: convert NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL to
dev->netns_local") in v6.12-rc1 and use NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL device
feature.]
Signed-off-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
index e471a5821b0de5..a67c9d6fbf7712 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_vti.c
@@ -1163,6 +1163,7 @@ static int __net_init vti6_init_net(struct net *net)
 		goto err_alloc_dev;
 	dev_net_set(ip6n->fb_tnl_dev, net);
 	ip6n->fb_tnl_dev->rtnl_link_ops = &vti6_link_ops;
+	ip6n->fb_tnl_dev->features |= NETIF_F_NETNS_LOCAL;
 
 	err = vti6_fb_tnl_dev_init(ip6n->fb_tnl_dev);
 	if (err < 0)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 14/96] net: add skb_header_pointer_careful() helper

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 13e00fdc9236bd4d0bff4109d2983171fbcb74c4 ]

This variant of skb_header_pointer() should be used in contexts
where @offset argument is user-controlled and could be negative.

Negative offsets are supported, as long as the zone starts
between skb->head and skb->data.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260128141539.3404400-2-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ Adjust context ]
Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <lanbincn@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Shivani: Modified to apply on 5.10.y ]
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/skbuff.h | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/skbuff.h b/include/linux/skbuff.h
index 4b5731245bf15b..667de403b2ebbd 100644
--- a/include/linux/skbuff.h
+++ b/include/linux/skbuff.h
@@ -3686,6 +3686,18 @@ skb_header_pointer(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len, void *buffer)
 				    skb_headlen(skb), buffer);
 }
 
+/* Variant of skb_header_pointer() where @offset is user-controlled
+ * and potentially negative.
+ */
+static inline void * __must_check
+skb_header_pointer_careful(const struct sk_buff *skb, int offset,
+			   int len, void *buffer)
+{
+	if (unlikely(offset < 0 && -offset > skb_headroom(skb)))
+		return NULL;
+	return skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, len, buffer);
+}
+
 /**
  *	skb_needs_linearize - check if we need to linearize a given skb
  *			      depending on the given device features.
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 15/96] net/sched: cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer_careful()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit cabd1a976375780dabab888784e356f574bbaed8 ]

skb_header_pointer() does not fully validate negative @offset values.

Use skb_header_pointer_careful() instead.

GangMin Kim provided a report and a repro fooling u32_classify():

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in u32_classify+0x1180/0x11b0
net/sched/cls_u32.c:221

Fixes: fbc2e7d9cf49 ("cls_u32: use skb_header_pointer() to dereference data safely")
Reported-by: GangMin Kim <km.kim1503@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CANn89iJkyUZ=mAzLzC4GdcAgLuPnUoivdLaOs6B9rq5_erj76w@mail.gmail.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260128141539.3404400-3-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bin Lan <lanbincn@139.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Shivani: Modified to apply on 5.10.y ]
Signed-off-by: Shivani Agarwal <shivani.agarwal@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/cls_u32.c | 13 ++++++-------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
index f2a0c10682fc81..e501390ccd7585 100644
--- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c
+++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c
@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@ static int u32_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcf_proto *tp,
 			int toff = off + key->off + (off2 & key->offmask);
 			__be32 *data, hdata;
 
-			if (skb_headroom(skb) + toff > INT_MAX)
-				goto out;
-
-			data = skb_header_pointer(skb, toff, 4, &hdata);
+			data = skb_header_pointer_careful(skb, toff, 4,
+							  &hdata);
 			if (!data)
 				goto out;
 			if ((*data ^ key->val) & key->mask) {
@@ -202,8 +200,9 @@ static int u32_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcf_proto *tp,
 		if (ht->divisor) {
 			__be32 *data, hdata;
 
-			data = skb_header_pointer(skb, off + n->sel.hoff, 4,
-						  &hdata);
+			data = skb_header_pointer_careful(skb,
+							  off + n->sel.hoff,
+							  4, &hdata);
 			if (!data)
 				goto out;
 			sel = ht->divisor & u32_hash_fold(*data, &n->sel,
@@ -217,7 +216,7 @@ static int u32_classify(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct tcf_proto *tp,
 			if (n->sel.flags & TC_U32_VAROFFSET) {
 				__be16 *data, hdata;
 
-				data = skb_header_pointer(skb,
+				data = skb_header_pointer_careful(skb,
 							  off + n->sel.offoff,
 							  2, &hdata);
 				if (!data)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 16/96] drm/amd/display: Use krealloc_array() in dal_vector_reserve()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>

[ Upstream commit da48bc4461b8a5ebfb9264c9b191a701d8e99009 ]

[Why & How]
dal_vector_reserve() computes the allocation size as
"capacity * vector->struct_size" using uint32_t arithmetic, which can
silently wrap to a small value on overflow. This would cause krealloc to
return a smaller buffer than expected, leading to heap overflows on
subsequent vector appends.

Replace krealloc() with krealloc_array() which performs an internal
overflow check and returns NULL on wrap, preventing the issue.

Fixes: 2004f45ef83f ("drm/amd/display: Use kernel alloc/free")
Assisted-by: Copilot:claude-opus-4.6
Reviewed-by: Alex Hung <alex.hung@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ray Wu <ray.wu@amd.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 37668568641ccc4cc1dbca4923d0a16609dd5707)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[ changed `krealloc_array(p, capacity, struct_size)` to `krealloc(p, array_size(capacity, struct_size))` since krealloc_array() is absent in 5.10 ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c
index 8f93d25f91ee2b..68c34a4e253ac1 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/basics/vector.c
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ bool dal_vector_reserve(struct vector *vector, uint32_t capacity)
 		return true;
 
 	new_container = krealloc(vector->container,
-				 capacity * vector->struct_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+				 array_size(capacity, vector->struct_size), GFP_KERNEL);
 
 	if (new_container) {
 		vector->container = new_container;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 17/96] net: 9p: fix refcount leak in p9_read_work() error handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>

commit 4ac7573e1f9333073fa8d303acc941c9b7ab7f61 upstream.

p9_req_put need to be called when m->rreq->rc.sdata is NULL to avoid
temporary refcount leak.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220712104438.30800-1-hbh25y@gmail.com
Fixes: 728356dedeff ("9p: Add refcount to p9_req_t")
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
[Dominique: commit wording adjustments, p9_req_put argument fixes for rebase]
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
[Alexander: this branch doesn't contain 8b11ff098af4 ("9p: Add client parameter
 to p9_req_put()"), therefore the parameter is removed from the added line]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Martyniuk <alexevgmart@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/9p/trans_fd.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/9p/trans_fd.c b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
index 40d458c438df1e..a75668534c81c3 100644
--- a/net/9p/trans_fd.c
+++ b/net/9p/trans_fd.c
@@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ static void p9_read_work(struct work_struct *work)
 			p9_debug(P9_DEBUG_ERROR,
 				 "No recv fcall for tag %d (req %p), disconnecting!\n",
 				 m->rc.tag, m->rreq);
+			p9_req_put(m->rreq);
 			m->rreq = NULL;
 			err = -EIO;
 			goto error;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 18/96] netdevsim: Fix memory leak of nsim_dev->fa_cookie

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>

commit 064bc7312bd09a48798418663090be0c776183db upstream.

kmemleak reports this issue:

unreferenced object 0xffff8881bac872d0 (size 8):
  comm "sh", pid 58603, jiffies 4481524462 (age 68.065s)
  hex dump (first 8 bytes):
    04 00 00 00 de ad be ef                          ........
  backtrace:
    [<00000000c80b8577>] __kmalloc+0x49/0x150
    [<000000005292b8c6>] nsim_dev_trap_fa_cookie_write+0xc1/0x210 [netdevsim]
    [<0000000093d78e77>] full_proxy_write+0xf3/0x180
    [<000000005a662c16>] vfs_write+0x1c5/0xaf0
    [<000000007aabf84a>] ksys_write+0xed/0x1c0
    [<000000005f1d2e47>] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
    [<000000006001c6ec>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

The issue occurs in the following scenarios:

nsim_dev_trap_fa_cookie_write()
  kmalloc() fa_cookie
  nsim_dev->fa_cookie = fa_cookie
..
nsim_drv_remove()

The fa_cookie allocked in nsim_dev_trap_fa_cookie_write() is not freed. To
fix, add kfree(nsim_dev->fa_cookie) to nsim_drv_remove().

Fixes: d3cbb907ae57 ("netdevsim: add ACL trap reporting cookie as a metadata")
Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1668504625-14698-1-git-send-email-wangyufen@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
[ The context change is due to the commit 5e388f3dc38c
("netdevsim: move vfconfig to nsim_dev") in v5.16
which is irrelevant to the logic of this patch. ]
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Dmitrichenko <mdmitrichenko@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c b/drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c
index c8834ea84732bd..a106365ce485e3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/netdevsim/dev.c
@@ -1173,6 +1173,7 @@ void nsim_dev_remove(struct nsim_bus_dev *nsim_bus_dev)
 				  ARRAY_SIZE(nsim_devlink_params));
 	devlink_unregister(devlink);
 	devlink_resources_unregister(devlink, NULL);
+	kfree(nsim_dev->fa_cookie);
 	devlink_free(devlink);
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 19/96] batman-adv: tt: reject oversized local TVLV buffers

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 1e9fab756f8395096d5bba7be0c373c4c8f5d165 upstream.

The commit 3a359bf5c61d ("batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response
buffers") added a check to ensure that a global return buffer size can be
stored in an u16. The same buffer handling also exists for the local data
buffer but was not touched.

A similar check should be also be in place for the local TVLV buffer. It
doesn't have the similar attack surface because it is only generated from
locally discovered MAC addresses but the dynamic nature could still cause
temporarily to large buffers.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index fa6dece492d3ab..fb51088494dcc6 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -943,12 +943,12 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 {
 	struct batadv_tvlv_tt_vlan_data *tt_vlan;
 	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
+	size_t change_offset;
 	u16 num_vlan = 0;
 	u16 vlan_entries = 0;
 	u16 total_entries = 0;
 	u16 tvlv_len;
 	u8 *tt_change_ptr;
-	int change_offset;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->softif_vlan_list_lock);
 	hlist_for_each_entry(vlan, &bat_priv->softif_vlan_list, list) {
@@ -964,8 +964,10 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	if (*tt_len < 0)
 		*tt_len = batadv_tt_len(total_entries);
 
-	tvlv_len = *tt_len;
-	tvlv_len += change_offset;
+	if (check_add_overflow(*tt_len, change_offset, &tvlv_len)) {
+		tvlv_len = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	*tt_data = kmalloc(tvlv_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!*tt_data) {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 20/96] batman-adv: tt: prevent TVLV entry number overflow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 99d9958fa10fb684b2a8e2c48a8d704122721420 upstream.

The helpers to prepare the buffers for the local and global TT based
replies are trying to sum up all TT entries which can be found for each
VLAN. In theory, this sum can be too big for an u16 and therefore overflow.
A too small buffer would then be allocated for the TVLV.

The too small buffer will be handled gracefully by
batadv_tt_tvlv_generate() and is not causing a buffer overflow - just a
truncated reply. But this overflow shouldn't have happened in the first and
the too small buffer should never have been allocated when an overflow was
detected.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 7ea7b4a14275 ("batman-adv: make the TT CRC logic VLAN specific")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index fb51088494dcc6..79da90b9cf0659 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -854,11 +854,18 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data(struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node,
 	u16 total_entries = 0;
 	u8 *tt_change_ptr;
 	int vlan_entries;
+	u16 sum_entries;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&orig_node->vlan_list_lock);
 	hlist_for_each_entry(vlan, &orig_node->vlan_list, list) {
 		vlan_entries = atomic_read(&vlan->tt.num_entries);
-		total_entries += vlan_entries;
+
+		if (check_add_overflow(vlan_entries, total_entries, &sum_entries)) {
+			*tt_len = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		total_entries = sum_entries;
 		num_vlan++;
 	}
 
@@ -945,15 +952,22 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_local_data(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	struct batadv_softif_vlan *vlan;
 	size_t change_offset;
 	u16 num_vlan = 0;
-	u16 vlan_entries = 0;
 	u16 total_entries = 0;
 	u16 tvlv_len;
 	u8 *tt_change_ptr;
+	int vlan_entries;
+	u16 sum_entries;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->softif_vlan_list_lock);
 	hlist_for_each_entry(vlan, &bat_priv->softif_vlan_list, list) {
 		vlan_entries = atomic_read(&vlan->tt.num_entries);
-		total_entries += vlan_entries;
+
+		if (check_add_overflow(vlan_entries, total_entries, &sum_entries)) {
+			tvlv_len = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		total_entries = sum_entries;
 		num_vlan++;
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 21/96] vfio/iommu_type1: replace kfree with kvfree

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiacheng Shi <billsjc@sjtu.edu.cn>

[ Upstream commit 2bed2ced40c97b8540ff38df0149e8ecb2bf4c65 ]

Variables allocated by kvzalloc should not be freed by kfree.
Because they may be allocated by vmalloc.
So we replace kfree with kvfree here.

Fixes: d6a4c185660c ("vfio iommu: Implementation of ioctl for dirty pages tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Shi <billsjc@sjtu.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211212091600.2560-1-billsjc@sjtu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
index b2a543e7cac454..eee8d2ab03d683 100644
--- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
+++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ static int vfio_dma_bitmap_alloc(struct vfio_dma *dma, size_t pgsize)
 
 static void vfio_dma_bitmap_free(struct vfio_dma *dma)
 {
-	kfree(dma->bitmap);
+	kvfree(dma->bitmap);
 	dma->bitmap = NULL;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 22/96] RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>

commit f6b079629becfa977f9c51fe53ad2e6dcc55ef44 upstream.

bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext() allocates uctx->shpg via
__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL). The buddy allocator does not zero pages
without __GFP_ZERO, so the page contains stale kernel data from
whatever object most recently freed it.

The page is then mapped into userspace via vm_insert_page() under
BNXT_RE_MMAP_SH_PAGE in bnxt_re_mmap(). The driver only ever writes
4 bytes (a u32 AVID) at offset BNXT_RE_AVID_OFFT (0x10) inside
bnxt_re_create_ah(); the remaining 4092 bytes of the page are exposed
to userspace unsanitised, leaking kernel memory contents.

Any user with access to /dev/infiniband/uverbsX on a host with a
bnxt_re device (typically rdma group membership) can read this data
via a single mmap() at pgoff 0 after IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT.

Other shared pages in the same file already use get_zeroed_page()
correctly:

  drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
      srq->uctx_srq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
      cq->uctx_cq_page  = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);

uctx->shpg is the only outlier. Bring it in line with the existing
convention by switching to get_zeroed_page().

Fixes: 1ac5a4047975 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Add bnxt_re RoCE driver")
Signed-off-by: Lord Ulf Henrik Holmberg <henrik.holmberg@defensify.se>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260509084011.11971-1-pomzm67@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c
@@ -3876,7 +3876,7 @@ int bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext(struct ib_uco
 
 	uctx->rdev = rdev;
 
-	uctx->shpg = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	uctx->shpg = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!uctx->shpg) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto fail;

[PATCH 5.10 23/96] i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>

commit 6036b5067a8199ba7a2dc7b377d4b9dd276d5f9e upstream.

The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0]
as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid
overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate
it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a
development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default)
that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter.

A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl
with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing
stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union
i2c_smbus_data.block buffer:

 BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)
 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223)
  __i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593)
  i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536)
  i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391)
  i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478)
  __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
  </TASK>

The bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly,
bypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in
i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same
function correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the
I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not.

Fix by rejecting transfers with data->block[0] == 0 or
data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with
both the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the
I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated().

Fixes: 4710317891e4 ("i2c-stub: Implement I2C block support")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c
@@ -215,6 +215,11 @@ static s32 stub_xfer(struct i2c_adapter
 		 * We ignore banks here, because banked chips don't use I2C
 		 * block transfers
 		 */
+		if (data->block[0] == 0 ||
+		    data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
 		if (data->block[0] > 256 - command)	/* Avoid overrun */
 			data->block[0] = 256 - command;
 		len = data->block[0];

[PATCH 5.10 24/96] net: qualcomm: rmnet: fix endpoint use-after-free in rmnet_dellink()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>

commit d00c953a8f69921f484b629801766da68f27f658 upstream.

rmnet_dellink() removes the endpoint from the hash table with
hlist_del_init_rcu() and then immediately frees it with kfree(). However,
RCU readers on the receive path (rmnet_rx_handler ->
__rmnet_map_ingress_handler) may still hold a reference to the endpoint and
dereference ep->egress_dev after the memory has been freed. The endpoint is
a kmalloc-32 object, and the stale read at offset 8 corresponds to the
egress_dev pointer.

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffde942eef
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 137 Comm: poc_write Not tainted 7.0.0+ #4 PREEMPTLAZY
  RIP: 0010:rmnet_vnd_rx_fixup (rmnet_vnd.c:27)
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __rmnet_map_ingress_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:48 rmnet_handlers.c:101)
   rmnet_rx_handler (rmnet_handlers.c:129 rmnet_handlers.c:235)
   __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0 (net/core/dev.c:6096)
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6208)
   netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6467)
   tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1955)
   tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2003)
   vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
   ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
   </TASK>

Add an rcu_head field to struct rmnet_endpoint and replace kfree() with
kfree_rcu() so the endpoint memory remains valid through the RCU grace
period. Also remove the rmnet_vnd_dellink() call and inline only the
nr_rmnet_devs decrement, since rmnet_vnd_dellink() would set
ep->egress_dev to NULL during the grace period, creating a data race
with lockless readers.

Fixes: ceed73a2cf4a ("drivers: net: ethernet: qualcomm: rmnet: Initial implementation")
Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260514122511.3083479-2-bestswngs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c |    8 ++++----
 drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.c
@@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ static void rmnet_dellink(struct net_dev
 	ep = rmnet_get_endpoint(real_port, mux_id);
 	if (ep) {
 		hlist_del_init_rcu(&ep->hlnode);
-		rmnet_vnd_dellink(mux_id, real_port, ep);
-		kfree(ep);
+		real_port->nr_rmnet_devs--;
+		kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
 	}
 
 	netdev_upper_dev_unlink(real_dev, dev);
@@ -229,9 +229,9 @@ static void rmnet_force_unassociate_devi
 		hash_for_each_safe(port->muxed_ep, bkt_ep, tmp_ep, ep, hlnode) {
 			unregister_netdevice_queue(ep->egress_dev, &list);
 			netdev_upper_dev_unlink(real_dev, ep->egress_dev);
-			rmnet_vnd_dellink(ep->mux_id, port, ep);
 			hlist_del_init_rcu(&ep->hlnode);
-			kfree(ep);
+			port->nr_rmnet_devs--;
+			kfree_rcu(ep, rcu);
 		}
 		rmnet_unregister_real_device(real_dev);
 		unregister_netdevice_many(&list);
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/rmnet/rmnet_config.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ struct rmnet_endpoint {
 	u8 mux_id;
 	struct net_device *egress_dev;
 	struct hlist_node hlnode;
+	struct rcu_head rcu;
 };
 
 /* One instance of this structure is instantiated for each real_dev associated

[PATCH 5.10 25/96] agp/amd64: Fix broken error propagation in agp_amd64_probe()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>

commit b08472db93b1ccff84a7adec5779d47f0e9d3a30 upstream.

A NULL pointer dereference was observed in the AMD64 AGP driver when
running in a virtualized environment (e.g. qemu/kvm) without a physical
AMD northbridge. The crash occurs in amd64_fetch_size() when attempting
to dereference the pointer returned by node_to_amd_nb(0).

The root cause of this crash is broken error propagation in
agp_amd64_probe(): When no AMD northbridges are found, cache_nbs()
correctly returns -ENODEV. However, the probe function erroneously
checks the return value against exactly -1, rather than < 0.

As a result, the hardware absence error is masked, allowing the driver
to improperly proceed with initialization. It eventually calls
agp_add_bridge(), which invokes amd64_fetch_size(). Since the hardware
does not exist, node_to_amd_nb(0) returns NULL, leading to a General
Protection Fault (GPF) when accessing its ->misc member.

Fix the issue by correcting the error check in agp_amd64_probe() to
abort properly when cache_nbs() returns any negative error code. This
prevents the driver from erroneously proceeding without hardware, thereby
avoiding the subsequent NULL pointer dereference at its source.

Fixes: a32073bffc65 ("[PATCH] x86_64: Clean and enhance up K8 northbridge access code")
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.18+
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504074823.99377-1-w15303746062@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
+++ b/drivers/char/agp/amd64-agp.c
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static int agp_amd64_probe(struct pci_de
 	/* Fill in the mode register */
 	pci_read_config_dword(pdev, bridge->capndx+PCI_AGP_STATUS, &bridge->mode);
 
-	if (cache_nbs(pdev, cap_ptr) == -1) {
+	if (cache_nbs(pdev, cap_ptr) < 0) {
 		agp_put_bridge(bridge);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}

[PATCH 5.10 26/96] regulator: core: fix locking in regulator_resolve_supply() error path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>

commit 497330b203d2c59c5ff3fa4c34d14494d7203bc3 upstream.

If late enabling of a supply regulator fails in
regulator_resolve_supply(), the code currently triggers a lockdep
warning:

    WARNING: drivers/regulator/core.c:2649 at _regulator_put+0x80/0xa0, CPU#6: kworker/u32:4/596
    ...
    Call trace:
     _regulator_put+0x80/0xa0 (P)
     regulator_resolve_supply+0x7cc/0xbe0
     regulator_register_resolve_supply+0x28/0xb8

as the regulator_list_mutex must be held when calling _regulator_put().

To solve this, simply switch to using regulator_put().

While at it, we should also make sure that no concurrent access happens
to our rdev while we clear out the supply pointer. Add appropriate
locking to ensure that.

While the code in question will be removed altogether in a follow-up
commit, I believe it is still beneficial to have this corrected before
removal for future reference.

Fixes: 36a1f1b6ddc6 ("regulator: core: Fix memory leak in regulator_resolve_supply()")
Fixes: 8e5356a73604 ("regulator: core: Clear the supply pointer if enabling fails")
Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109-regulators-defer-v2-2-1a25dc968e60@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nazar Kalashnikov <nazarkalashnikov0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/regulator/core.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/regulator/core.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c
@@ -2036,8 +2036,16 @@ static int regulator_resolve_supply(stru
 	if (rdev->use_count) {
 		ret = regulator_enable(rdev->supply);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			_regulator_put(rdev->supply);
+			struct regulator *supply;
+
+			regulator_lock_two(rdev, rdev->supply->rdev, &ww_ctx);
+
+			supply = rdev->supply;
 			rdev->supply = NULL;
+
+			regulator_unlock_two(rdev, supply->rdev, &ww_ctx);
+
+			regulator_put(supply);
 			goto out;
 		}
 	}

[PATCH 5.10 27/96] vc_screen: fix null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier() during concurrent vcs_write

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>

commit a287620312dc6dcb9a093417a0e589bf30fcf38a upstream.

A KASAN null-ptr-deref was observed in vcs_notifier():

BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in vcs_notifier+0x98/0x130
Read of size 2 at addr qmp_cmd_name: qmp_capabilities, arguments: {}

The issue is a race condition in vcs_write(). When the console_lock is
temporarily dropped (to copy data from userspace), the vc_data pointer
obtained from vcs_vc() may become stale. After re-acquiring the lock,
vcs_vc() is called again to re-validate the pointer. If the vc has been
deallocated in the meantime, vcs_vc() returns NULL, and the while loop
breaks (with written > 0). However, after the loop, vcs_scr_updated(vc)
is still called with the now-NULL vc pointer, leading to a null pointer
dereference in the notifier chain (vcs_notifier dereferences param->vc).

Fix this by adding a NULL check for vc before calling vcs_scr_updated().

Fixes: 8fb9ea65c9d1 ("vc_screen: reload load of struct vc_data pointer in vcs_write() to avoid UAF")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260604060734.2914976-1-yiyang13@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vc_screen.c
@@ -699,7 +699,7 @@ vcs_write(struct file *file, const char
 	}
 	*ppos += written;
 	ret = written;
-	if (written)
+	if (written && vc)
 		vcs_scr_updated(vc);
 
 unlock_out:

[PATCH 5.10 28/96] media: vidtv: fix NULL pointer dereference in vidtv_mux_push_si

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>

commit 7d8bf3d8f91073f4db347ed3aa6302b56107499c upstream.

syzbot reported a general protection fault in
vidtv_psi_ts_psi_write_into [1].

vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() can return NULL, but vidtv_mux_push_si() does
not check for this before dereferencing the returned pointer to access
the continuity counter. This leads to a general protection fault when
accessing a near-NULL address.

The root cause is that vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init() does not check the
return value of vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once() for PMT section PIDs.
If the allocation fails, the PID context is never created, but init
returns success. The subsequent vidtv_mux_push_si() call then gets
NULL from vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() and crashes.

Fix both the root cause (add error check in vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init
for PMT PIDs) and add defensive NULL checks in vidtv_mux_push_si for
all vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx() calls.

[1]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Workqueue: events vidtv_mux_tick
RIP: 0010:vidtv_psi_ts_psi_write_into+0x54a/0xbc0 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:197
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 vidtv_psi_table_header_write_into drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:799 [inline]
 vidtv_psi_pmt_write_into+0x3b2/0xa70 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_psi.c:1231
 vidtv_mux_push_si+0x932/0xe80 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:196
 vidtv_mux_tick+0xe9b/0x1480 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c:408

Fixes: f90cf6079bf67 ("media: vidtv: add a bridge driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+814c351d094f4f1a1b86@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=814c351d094f4f1a1b86
Signed-off-by: Ruslan Valiyev <linuxoid@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c
+++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_mux.c
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int vidtv_mux_pid_ctx_init(struct
 	/* add a ctx for all PMT sections */
 	while (p) {
 		pid = vidtv_psi_get_pat_program_pid(p);
-		vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once(m, pid);
+		if (!vidtv_mux_create_pid_ctx_once(m, pid))
+			goto free;
 		p = p->next;
 	}
 
@@ -170,6 +171,9 @@ static u32 vidtv_mux_push_si(struct vidt
 	nit_ctx = vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx(m, VIDTV_NIT_PID);
 	eit_ctx = vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx(m, VIDTV_EIT_PID);
 
+	if (!pat_ctx || !sdt_ctx || !nit_ctx || !eit_ctx)
+		return 0;
+
 	pat_args.offset             = m->mux_buf_offset;
 	pat_args.continuity_counter = &pat_ctx->cc;
 
@@ -186,6 +190,8 @@ static u32 vidtv_mux_push_si(struct vidt
 		}
 
 		pmt_ctx = vidtv_mux_get_pid_ctx(m, pmt_pid);
+		if (!pmt_ctx)
+			continue;
 
 		pmt_args.offset             = m->mux_buf_offset;
 		pmt_args.pmt                = m->si.pmt_secs[i];

[PATCH 5.10 29/96] Documentation: ioctl-number: Extend "Include File" column width

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 15afd5def819e4df2a29cef6fcfa6ae7ba167c0f ]

Extend width of "Include File" column to fit full path to
papr-physical-attestation.h in later commit.

Reviewed-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250714015711.14525-3-bagasdotme@gmail.com
Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst      | 428 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 214 insertions(+), 214 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
index a7373d4e3984cf..aa8d0cf534a3d6 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
@@ -66,17 +66,17 @@ This table lists ioctls visible from user land for Linux/x86.  It contains
 most drivers up to 2.6.31, but I know I am missing some.  There has been
 no attempt to list non-X86 architectures or ioctls from drivers/staging/.
 
-====  =====  ======================================================= ================================================================
-Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
+====  =====  ========================================================= ================================================================
+Code  Seq#    Include File                                             Comments
       (hex)
-====  =====  ======================================================= ================================================================
-0x00  00-1F  linux/fs.h                                              conflict!
-0x00  00-1F  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                       conflict!
-0x00  00-1F  linux/fb.h                                              conflict!
-0x00  00-1F  linux/wavefront.h                                       conflict!
+====  =====  ========================================================= ================================================================
+0x00  00-1F  linux/fs.h                                                conflict!
+0x00  00-1F  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                         conflict!
+0x00  00-1F  linux/fb.h                                                conflict!
+0x00  00-1F  linux/wavefront.h                                         conflict!
 0x02  all    linux/fd.h
 0x03  all    linux/hdreg.h
-0x04  D2-DC  linux/umsdos_fs.h                                       Dead since 2.6.11, but don't reuse these.
+0x04  D2-DC  linux/umsdos_fs.h                                         Dead since 2.6.11, but don't reuse these.
 0x06  all    linux/lp.h
 0x09  all    linux/raid/md_u.h
 0x10  00-0F  drivers/char/s390/vmcp.h
@@ -84,282 +84,282 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                           Comments
 0x10  20-2F  arch/s390/include/uapi/asm/hypfs.h
 0x12  all    linux/fs.h
              linux/blkpg.h
-0x1b  all                                                            InfiniBand Subsystem
-                                                                     <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
+0x1b  all                                                              InfiniBand Subsystem
+                                                                       <http://infiniband.sourceforge.net/>
 0x20  all    drivers/cdrom/cm206.h
 0x22  all    scsi/sg.h
 '!'   00-1F  uapi/linux/seccomp.h
-'#'   00-3F                                                          IEEE 1394 Subsystem
-                                                                     Block for the entire subsystem
+'#'   00-3F                                                            IEEE 1394 Subsystem
+                                                                       Block for the entire subsystem
 '$'   00-0F  linux/perf_counter.h, linux/perf_event.h
-'%'   00-0F  include/uapi/linux/stm.h                                System Trace Module subsystem
-                                                                     <mailto:alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
+'%'   00-0F  include/uapi/linux/stm.h                                  System Trace Module subsystem
+                                                                       <mailto:alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
 '&'   00-07  drivers/firewire/nosy-user.h
-'1'   00-1F  linux/timepps.h                                         PPS kit from Ulrich Windl
-                                                                     <ftp://ftp.de.kernel.org/pub/linux/daemons/ntp/PPS/>
+'1'   00-1F  linux/timepps.h                                           PPS kit from Ulrich Windl
+                                                                       <ftp://ftp.de.kernel.org/pub/linux/daemons/ntp/PPS/>
 '2'   01-04  linux/i2o.h
-'3'   00-0F  drivers/s390/char/raw3270.h                             conflict!
-'3'   00-1F  linux/suspend_ioctls.h,                                 conflict!
+'3'   00-0F  drivers/s390/char/raw3270.h                               conflict!
+'3'   00-1F  linux/suspend_ioctls.h,                                   conflict!
              kernel/power/user.c
-'8'   all                                                            SNP8023 advanced NIC card
-                                                                     <mailto:mcr@solidum.com>
+'8'   all                                                              SNP8023 advanced NIC card
+                                                                       <mailto:mcr@solidum.com>
 ';'   64-7F  linux/vfio.h
-'@'   00-0F  linux/radeonfb.h                                        conflict!
-'@'   00-0F  drivers/video/aty/aty128fb.c                            conflict!
-'A'   00-1F  linux/apm_bios.h                                        conflict!
-'A'   00-0F  linux/agpgart.h,                                        conflict!
+'@'   00-0F  linux/radeonfb.h                                          conflict!
+'@'   00-0F  drivers/video/aty/aty128fb.c                              conflict!
+'A'   00-1F  linux/apm_bios.h                                          conflict!
+'A'   00-0F  linux/agpgart.h,                                          conflict!
              drivers/char/agp/compat_ioctl.h
-'A'   00-7F  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'B'   00-1F  linux/cciss_ioctl.h                                     conflict!
-'B'   00-0F  include/linux/pmu.h                                     conflict!
-'B'   C0-FF  advanced bbus                                           <mailto:maassen@uni-freiburg.de>
-'C'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'C'   01-2F  linux/capi.h                                            conflict!
-'C'   F0-FF  drivers/net/wan/cosa.h                                  conflict!
+'A'   00-7F  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'B'   00-1F  linux/cciss_ioctl.h                                       conflict!
+'B'   00-0F  include/linux/pmu.h                                       conflict!
+'B'   C0-FF  advanced bbus                                             <mailto:maassen@uni-freiburg.de>
+'C'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'C'   01-2F  linux/capi.h                                              conflict!
+'C'   F0-FF  drivers/net/wan/cosa.h                                    conflict!
 'D'   all    arch/s390/include/asm/dasd.h
 'D'   40-5F  drivers/scsi/dpt/dtpi_ioctl.h
 'D'   05     drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h
-'E'   all    linux/input.h                                           conflict!
-'E'   00-0F  xen/evtchn.h                                            conflict!
-'F'   all    linux/fb.h                                              conflict!
-'F'   01-02  drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h                                  conflict!
-'F'   20     drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                              conflict!
-'F'   20     drivers/video/intelfb/intelfb.h                         conflict!
-'F'   20     linux/ivtvfb.h                                          conflict!
-'F'   20     linux/matroxfb.h                                        conflict!
-'F'   20     drivers/video/aty/atyfb_base.c                          conflict!
-'F'   00-0F  video/da8xx-fb.h                                        conflict!
-'F'   80-8F  linux/arcfb.h                                           conflict!
-'F'   DD     video/sstfb.h                                           conflict!
-'G'   00-3F  drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grulib.h                           conflict!
-'H'   00-7F  linux/hiddev.h                                          conflict!
-'H'   00-0F  linux/hidraw.h                                          conflict!
-'H'   01     linux/mei.h                                             conflict!
-'H'   02     linux/mei.h                                             conflict!
-'H'   03     linux/mei.h                                             conflict!
-'H'   00-0F  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'H'   20-40  sound/asound_fm.h                                       conflict!
-'H'   80-8F  sound/sfnt_info.h                                       conflict!
-'H'   10-8F  sound/emu10k1.h                                         conflict!
-'H'   10-1F  sound/sb16_csp.h                                        conflict!
-'H'   10-1F  sound/hda_hwdep.h                                       conflict!
-'H'   40-4F  sound/hdspm.h                                           conflict!
-'H'   40-4F  sound/hdsp.h                                            conflict!
+'E'   all    linux/input.h                                             conflict!
+'E'   00-0F  xen/evtchn.h                                              conflict!
+'F'   all    linux/fb.h                                                conflict!
+'F'   01-02  drivers/scsi/pmcraid.h                                    conflict!
+'F'   20     drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                                conflict!
+'F'   20     drivers/video/intelfb/intelfb.h                           conflict!
+'F'   20     linux/ivtvfb.h                                            conflict!
+'F'   20     linux/matroxfb.h                                          conflict!
+'F'   20     drivers/video/aty/atyfb_base.c                            conflict!
+'F'   00-0F  video/da8xx-fb.h                                          conflict!
+'F'   80-8F  linux/arcfb.h                                             conflict!
+'F'   DD     video/sstfb.h                                             conflict!
+'G'   00-3F  drivers/misc/sgi-gru/grulib.h                             conflict!
+'H'   00-7F  linux/hiddev.h                                            conflict!
+'H'   00-0F  linux/hidraw.h                                            conflict!
+'H'   01     linux/mei.h                                               conflict!
+'H'   02     linux/mei.h                                               conflict!
+'H'   03     linux/mei.h                                               conflict!
+'H'   00-0F  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'H'   20-40  sound/asound_fm.h                                         conflict!
+'H'   80-8F  sound/sfnt_info.h                                         conflict!
+'H'   10-8F  sound/emu10k1.h                                           conflict!
+'H'   10-1F  sound/sb16_csp.h                                          conflict!
+'H'   10-1F  sound/hda_hwdep.h                                         conflict!
+'H'   40-4F  sound/hdspm.h                                             conflict!
+'H'   40-4F  sound/hdsp.h                                              conflict!
 'H'   90     sound/usb/usx2y/usb_stream.h
-'H'   00-0F  uapi/misc/habanalabs.h                                  conflict!
+'H'   00-0F  uapi/misc/habanalabs.h                                    conflict!
 'H'   A0     uapi/linux/usb/cdc-wdm.h
-'H'   C0-F0  net/bluetooth/hci.h                                     conflict!
-'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/hidp/hidp.h                               conflict!
-'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/cmtp/cmtp.h                               conflict!
-'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/bnep/bnep.h                               conflict!
-'H'   F1     linux/hid-roccat.h                                      <mailto:erazor_de@users.sourceforge.net>
+'H'   C0-F0  net/bluetooth/hci.h                                       conflict!
+'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/hidp/hidp.h                                 conflict!
+'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/cmtp/cmtp.h                                 conflict!
+'H'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/bnep/bnep.h                                 conflict!
+'H'   F1     linux/hid-roccat.h                                        <mailto:erazor_de@users.sourceforge.net>
 'H'   F8-FA  sound/firewire.h
-'I'   all    linux/isdn.h                                            conflict!
-'I'   00-0F  drivers/isdn/divert/isdn_divert.h                       conflict!
-'I'   40-4F  linux/mISDNif.h                                         conflict!
+'I'   all    linux/isdn.h                                              conflict!
+'I'   00-0F  drivers/isdn/divert/isdn_divert.h                         conflict!
+'I'   40-4F  linux/mISDNif.h                                           conflict!
 'J'   00-1F  drivers/scsi/gdth_ioctl.h
 'K'   all    linux/kd.h
-'L'   00-1F  linux/loop.h                                            conflict!
-'L'   10-1F  drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.h                      conflict!
+'L'   00-1F  linux/loop.h                                              conflict!
+'L'   10-1F  drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_ctl.h                        conflict!
 'L'   20-2F  linux/lightnvm.h
-'L'   E0-FF  linux/ppdd.h                                            encrypted disk device driver
-                                                                     <http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/ppdd.html>
-'M'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'M'   01-16  mtd/mtd-abi.h                                           conflict!
+'L'   E0-FF  linux/ppdd.h                                              encrypted disk device driver
+                                                                       <http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/ppdd.html>
+'M'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'M'   01-16  mtd/mtd-abi.h                                             conflict!
       and    drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c
 'M'   01-03  drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas.h
-'M'   00-0F  drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                              conflict!
+'M'   00-0F  drivers/video/fsl-diu-fb.h                                conflict!
 'N'   00-1F  drivers/usb/scanner.h
 'N'   40-7F  drivers/block/nvme.c
-'O'   00-06  mtd/ubi-user.h                                          UBI
-'P'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'P'   60-6F  sound/sscape_ioctl.h                                    conflict!
-'P'   00-0F  drivers/usb/class/usblp.c                               conflict!
-'P'   01-09  drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c                        conflict!
+'O'   00-06  mtd/ubi-user.h                                            UBI
+'P'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'P'   60-6F  sound/sscape_ioctl.h                                      conflict!
+'P'   00-0F  drivers/usb/class/usblp.c                                 conflict!
+'P'   01-09  drivers/misc/pci_endpoint_test.c                          conflict!
 'Q'   all    linux/soundcard.h
-'R'   00-1F  linux/random.h                                          conflict!
-'R'   01     linux/rfkill.h                                          conflict!
+'R'   00-1F  linux/random.h                                            conflict!
+'R'   01     linux/rfkill.h                                            conflict!
 'R'   C0-DF  net/bluetooth/rfcomm.h
-'S'   all    linux/cdrom.h                                           conflict!
-'S'   80-81  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                       conflict!
-'S'   82-FF  scsi/scsi.h                                             conflict!
-'S'   00-7F  sound/asequencer.h                                      conflict!
-'T'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'T'   00-AF  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'T'   all    arch/x86/include/asm/ioctls.h                           conflict!
-'T'   C0-DF  linux/if_tun.h                                          conflict!
-'U'   all    sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
-'U'   00-CF  linux/uinput.h                                          conflict!
+'S'   all    linux/cdrom.h                                             conflict!
+'S'   80-81  scsi/scsi_ioctl.h                                         conflict!
+'S'   82-FF  scsi/scsi.h                                               conflict!
+'S'   00-7F  sound/asequencer.h                                        conflict!
+'T'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'T'   00-AF  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'T'   all    arch/x86/include/asm/ioctls.h                             conflict!
+'T'   C0-DF  linux/if_tun.h                                            conflict!
+'U'   all    sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
+'U'   00-CF  linux/uinput.h                                            conflict!
 'U'   00-EF  linux/usbdevice_fs.h
 'U'   C0-CF  drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h
-'V'   all    linux/vt.h                                              conflict!
-'V'   all    linux/videodev2.h                                       conflict!
-'V'   C0     linux/ivtvfb.h                                          conflict!
-'V'   C0     linux/ivtv.h                                            conflict!
-'V'   C0     media/davinci/vpfe_capture.h                            conflict!
-'V'   C0     media/si4713.h                                          conflict!
-'W'   00-1F  linux/watchdog.h                                        conflict!
-'W'   00-1F  linux/wanrouter.h                                       conflict! (pre 3.9)
-'W'   00-3F  sound/asound.h                                          conflict!
+'V'   all    linux/vt.h                                                conflict!
+'V'   all    linux/videodev2.h                                         conflict!
+'V'   C0     linux/ivtvfb.h                                            conflict!
+'V'   C0     linux/ivtv.h                                              conflict!
+'V'   C0     media/davinci/vpfe_capture.h                              conflict!
+'V'   C0     media/si4713.h                                            conflict!
+'W'   00-1F  linux/watchdog.h                                          conflict!
+'W'   00-1F  linux/wanrouter.h                                         conflict! (pre 3.9)
+'W'   00-3F  sound/asound.h                                            conflict!
 'W'   40-5F  drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c
 'W'   60-61  linux/watch_queue.h
-'X'   all    fs/xfs/xfs_fs.h,                                        conflict!
+'X'   all    fs/xfs/xfs_fs.h,                                          conflict!
              fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_ioctl32.h,
              include/linux/falloc.h,
              linux/fs.h,
-'X'   all    fs/ocfs2/ocfs_fs.h                                      conflict!
-'X'   01     linux/pktcdvd.h                                         conflict!
+'X'   all    fs/ocfs2/ocfs_fs.h                                        conflict!
+'X'   01     linux/pktcdvd.h                                           conflict!
 'Y'   all    linux/cyclades.h
 'Z'   14-15  drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h
-'['   00-3F  linux/usb/tmc.h                                         USB Test and Measurement Devices
-                                                                     <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-'a'   all    linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h                             ATM on linux
-                                                                     <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
-'a'   00-0F  drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h          conflict! qat driver
-'b'   00-FF                                                          conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
-                                                                     <mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl>
-'c'   all    linux/cm4000_cs.h                                       conflict!
-'c'   00-7F  linux/comstats.h                                        conflict!
-'c'   00-7F  linux/coda.h                                            conflict!
-'c'   00-1F  linux/chio.h                                            conflict!
-'c'   80-9F  arch/s390/include/asm/chsc.h                            conflict!
+'['   00-3F  linux/usb/tmc.h                                           USB Test and Measurement Devices
+                                                                       <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
+'a'   all    linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h                               ATM on linux
+                                                                       <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
+'a'   00-0F  drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h            conflict! qat driver
+'b'   00-FF                                                            conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
+                                                                       <mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl>
+'c'   all    linux/cm4000_cs.h                                         conflict!
+'c'   00-7F  linux/comstats.h                                          conflict!
+'c'   00-7F  linux/coda.h                                              conflict!
+'c'   00-1F  linux/chio.h                                              conflict!
+'c'   80-9F  arch/s390/include/asm/chsc.h                              conflict!
 'c'   A0-AF  arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h conflict!
-'d'   00-FF  linux/char/drm/drm.h                                    conflict!
-'d'   02-40  pcmcia/ds.h                                             conflict!
+'d'   00-FF  linux/char/drm/drm.h                                      conflict!
+'d'   02-40  pcmcia/ds.h                                               conflict!
 'd'   F0-FF  linux/digi1.h
-'e'   all    linux/digi1.h                                           conflict!
-'f'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                         conflict!
-'f'   00-1F  linux/ext3_fs.h                                         conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  fs/jfs/jfs_dinode.h                                     conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  fs/ext4/ext4.h                                          conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  linux/fs.h                                              conflict!
-'f'   00-0F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                     conflict!
+'e'   all    linux/digi1.h                                             conflict!
+'f'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                           conflict!
+'f'   00-1F  linux/ext3_fs.h                                           conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  fs/jfs/jfs_dinode.h                                       conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  fs/ext4/ext4.h                                            conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  linux/fs.h                                                conflict!
+'f'   00-0F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                       conflict!
 'f'   13-27  linux/fscrypt.h
 'f'   81-8F  linux/fsverity.h
 'g'   00-0F  linux/usb/gadgetfs.h
 'g'   20-2F  linux/usb/g_printer.h
-'h'   00-7F                                                          conflict! Charon filesystem
-                                                                     <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
-'h'   00-1F  linux/hpet.h                                            conflict!
+'h'   00-7F                                                            conflict! Charon filesystem
+                                                                       <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
+'h'   00-1F  linux/hpet.h                                              conflict!
 'h'   80-8F  fs/hfsplus/ioctl.c
-'i'   00-3F  linux/i2o-dev.h                                         conflict!
-'i'   0B-1F  linux/ipmi.h                                            conflict!
+'i'   00-3F  linux/i2o-dev.h                                           conflict!
+'i'   0B-1F  linux/ipmi.h                                              conflict!
 'i'   80-8F  linux/i8k.h
 'j'   00-3F  linux/joystick.h
-'k'   00-0F  linux/spi/spidev.h                                      conflict!
-'k'   00-05  video/kyro.h                                            conflict!
-'k'   10-17  linux/hsi/hsi_char.h                                    HSI character device
-'l'   00-3F  linux/tcfs_fs.h                                         transparent cryptographic file system
-                                                                     <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs>
-'l'   40-7F  linux/udf_fs_i.h                                        in development:
-                                                                     <http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-udf/>
-'m'   00-09  linux/mmtimer.h                                         conflict!
-'m'   all    linux/mtio.h                                            conflict!
-'m'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                       conflict!
-'m'   all    linux/synclink.h                                        conflict!
-'m'   00-19  drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h                         conflict!
-'m'   00     drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_ioctl.h                  conflict!
+'k'   00-0F  linux/spi/spidev.h                                        conflict!
+'k'   00-05  video/kyro.h                                              conflict!
+'k'   10-17  linux/hsi/hsi_char.h                                      HSI character device
+'l'   00-3F  linux/tcfs_fs.h                                           transparent cryptographic file system
+                                                                       <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://mikonos.dia.unisa.it/tcfs>
+'l'   40-7F  linux/udf_fs_i.h                                          in development:
+                                                                       <http://sourceforge.net/projects/linux-udf/>
+'m'   00-09  linux/mmtimer.h                                           conflict!
+'m'   all    linux/mtio.h                                              conflict!
+'m'   all    linux/soundcard.h                                         conflict!
+'m'   all    linux/synclink.h                                          conflict!
+'m'   00-19  drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.h                           conflict!
+'m'   00     drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_ioctl.h                    conflict!
 'n'   00-7F  linux/ncp_fs.h and fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c
-'n'   80-8F  uapi/linux/nilfs2_api.h                                 NILFS2
-'n'   E0-FF  linux/matroxfb.h                                        matroxfb
-'o'   00-1F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                     OCFS2
-'o'   00-03  mtd/ubi-user.h                                          conflict! (OCFS2 and UBI overlaps)
-'o'   40-41  mtd/ubi-user.h                                          UBI
-'o'   01-A1  `linux/dvb/*.h`                                         DVB
-'p'   00-0F  linux/phantom.h                                         conflict! (OpenHaptics needs this)
-'p'   00-1F  linux/rtc.h                                             conflict!
+'n'   80-8F  uapi/linux/nilfs2_api.h                                   NILFS2
+'n'   E0-FF  linux/matroxfb.h                                          matroxfb
+'o'   00-1F  fs/ocfs2/ocfs2_fs.h                                       OCFS2
+'o'   00-03  mtd/ubi-user.h                                            conflict! (OCFS2 and UBI overlaps)
+'o'   40-41  mtd/ubi-user.h                                            UBI
+'o'   01-A1  `linux/dvb/*.h`                                           DVB
+'p'   00-0F  linux/phantom.h                                           conflict! (OpenHaptics needs this)
+'p'   00-1F  linux/rtc.h                                               conflict!
 'p'   40-7F  linux/nvram.h
-'p'   80-9F  linux/ppdev.h                                           user-space parport
-                                                                     <mailto:tim@cyberelk.net>
-'p'   A1-A5  linux/pps.h                                             LinuxPPS
-                                                                     <mailto:giometti@linux.it>
+'p'   80-9F  linux/ppdev.h                                             user-space parport
+                                                                       <mailto:tim@cyberelk.net>
+'p'   A1-A5  linux/pps.h                                               LinuxPPS
+                                                                       <mailto:giometti@linux.it>
 'q'   00-1F  linux/serio.h
-'q'   80-FF  linux/telephony.h                                       Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK
-             linux/ixjuser.h                                         <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://www.quicknet.net>
+'q'   80-FF  linux/telephony.h                                         Internet PhoneJACK, Internet LineJACK
+             linux/ixjuser.h                                           <http://web.archive.org/web/%2A/http://www.quicknet.net>
 'r'   00-1F  linux/msdos_fs.h and fs/fat/dir.c
 's'   all    linux/cdk.h
 't'   00-7F  linux/ppp-ioctl.h
 't'   80-8F  linux/isdn_ppp.h
-'t'   90-91  linux/toshiba.h                                         toshiba and toshiba_acpi SMM
-'u'   00-1F  linux/smb_fs.h                                          gone
-'u'   20-3F  linux/uvcvideo.h                                        USB video class host driver
-'u'   40-4f  linux/udmabuf.h                                         userspace dma-buf misc device
-'v'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                         conflict!
-'v'   00-1F  linux/fs.h                                              conflict!
-'v'   00-0F  linux/sonypi.h                                          conflict!
-'v'   00-0F  media/v4l2-subdev.h                                     conflict!
-'v'   20-27  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h		     VAS API
-'v'   C0-FF  linux/meye.h                                            conflict!
-'w'   all                                                            CERN SCI driver
-'y'   00-1F                                                          packet based user level communications
-                                                                     <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
-'z'   00-3F                                                          CAN bus card conflict!
-                                                                     <mailto:hdstich@connectu.ulm.circular.de>
-'z'   40-7F                                                          CAN bus card conflict!
-                                                                     <mailto:oe@port.de>
-'z'   10-4F  drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h                        conflict!
+'t'   90-91  linux/toshiba.h                                           toshiba and toshiba_acpi SMM
+'u'   00-1F  linux/smb_fs.h                                            gone
+'u'   20-3F  linux/uvcvideo.h                                          USB video class host driver
+'u'   40-4f  linux/udmabuf.h                                           userspace dma-buf misc device
+'v'   00-1F  linux/ext2_fs.h                                           conflict!
+'v'   00-1F  linux/fs.h                                                conflict!
+'v'   00-0F  linux/sonypi.h                                            conflict!
+'v'   00-0F  media/v4l2-subdev.h                                       conflict!
+'v'   20-27  arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/vas-api.h                   VAS API
+'v'   C0-FF  linux/meye.h                                              conflict!
+'w'   all                                                              CERN SCI driver
+'y'   00-1F                                                            packet based user level communications
+                                                                       <mailto:zapman@interlan.net>
+'z'   00-3F                                                            CAN bus card conflict!
+                                                                       <mailto:hdstich@connectu.ulm.circular.de>
+'z'   40-7F                                                            CAN bus card conflict!
+                                                                       <mailto:oe@port.de>
+'z'   10-4F  drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.h                          conflict!
 '|'   00-7F  linux/media.h
 0x80  00-1F  linux/fb.h
 0x89  00-06  arch/x86/include/asm/sockios.h
 0x89  0B-DF  linux/sockios.h
-0x89  E0-EF  linux/sockios.h                                         SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
-0x89  F0-FF  linux/sockios.h                                         SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
+0x89  E0-EF  linux/sockios.h                                           SIOCPROTOPRIVATE range
+0x89  F0-FF  linux/sockios.h                                           SIOCDEVPRIVATE range
 0x8B  all    linux/wireless.h
-0x8C  00-3F                                                          WiNRADiO driver
-                                                                     <http://www.winradio.com.au/>
+0x8C  00-3F                                                            WiNRADiO driver
+                                                                       <http://www.winradio.com.au/>
 0x90  00     drivers/cdrom/sbpcd.h
 0x92  00-0F  drivers/usb/mon/mon_bin.c
 0x93  60-7F  linux/auto_fs.h
-0x94  all    fs/btrfs/ioctl.h                                        Btrfs filesystem
-             and linux/fs.h                                          some lifted to vfs/generic
-0x97  00-7F  fs/ceph/ioctl.h                                         Ceph file system
-0x99  00-0F                                                          537-Addinboard driver
-                                                                     <mailto:buk@buks.ipn.de>
-0xA0  all    linux/sdp/sdp.h                                         Industrial Device Project
-                                                                     <mailto:kenji@bitgate.com>
-0xA1  0      linux/vtpm_proxy.h                                      TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
-0xA3  80-8F                                                          Port ACL  in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
+0x94  all    fs/btrfs/ioctl.h                                          Btrfs filesystem
+             and linux/fs.h                                            some lifted to vfs/generic
+0x97  00-7F  fs/ceph/ioctl.h                                           Ceph file system
+0x99  00-0F                                                            537-Addinboard driver
+                                                                       <mailto:buk@buks.ipn.de>
+0xA0  all    linux/sdp/sdp.h                                           Industrial Device Project
+                                                                       <mailto:kenji@bitgate.com>
+0xA1  0      linux/vtpm_proxy.h                                        TPM Emulator Proxy Driver
+0xA3  80-8F                                                            Port ACL  in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:tlewis@mindspring.com>
 0xA3  90-9F  linux/dtlk.h
-0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                        Generic TEE subsystem
+0xA4  00-1F  uapi/linux/tee.h                                          Generic TEE subsystem
 0xAA  00-3F  linux/uapi/linux/userfaultfd.h
 0xAB  00-1F  linux/nbd.h
 0xAC  00-1F  linux/raw.h
-0xAD  00                                                             Netfilter device in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
-0xAE  00-1F  linux/kvm.h                                             Kernel-based Virtual Machine
-                                                                     <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
-0xAE  40-FF  linux/kvm.h                                             Kernel-based Virtual Machine
-                                                                     <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
-0xAE  20-3F  linux/nitro_enclaves.h                                  Nitro Enclaves
-0xAF  00-1F  linux/fsl_hypervisor.h                                  Freescale hypervisor
-0xB0  all                                                            RATIO devices in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:vgo@ratio.de>
-0xB1  00-1F                                                          PPPoX
-                                                                     <mailto:mostrows@styx.uwaterloo.ca>
+0xAD  00                                                               Netfilter device in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
+0xAE  00-1F  linux/kvm.h                                               Kernel-based Virtual Machine
+                                                                       <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
+0xAE  40-FF  linux/kvm.h                                               Kernel-based Virtual Machine
+                                                                       <mailto:kvm@vger.kernel.org>
+0xAE  20-3F  linux/nitro_enclaves.h                                    Nitro Enclaves
+0xAF  00-1F  linux/fsl_hypervisor.h                                    Freescale hypervisor
+0xB0  all                                                              RATIO devices in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:vgo@ratio.de>
+0xB1  00-1F                                                            PPPoX
+                                                                       <mailto:mostrows@styx.uwaterloo.ca>
 0xB3  00     linux/mmc/ioctl.h
-0xB4  00-0F  linux/gpio.h                                            <mailto:linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org>
-0xB5  00-0F  uapi/linux/rpmsg.h                                      <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
+0xB4  00-0F  linux/gpio.h                                              <mailto:linux-gpio@vger.kernel.org>
+0xB5  00-0F  uapi/linux/rpmsg.h                                        <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
 0xB6  all    linux/fpga-dfl.h
-0xB7  all    uapi/linux/remoteproc_cdev.h                            <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
+0xB7  all    uapi/linux/remoteproc_cdev.h                              <mailto:linux-remoteproc@vger.kernel.org>
 0xC0  00-0F  linux/usb/iowarrior.h
 0xCA  00-0F  uapi/misc/cxl.h
 0xCA  10-2F  uapi/misc/ocxl.h
 0xCA  80-BF  uapi/scsi/cxlflash_ioctl.h
-0xCB  00-1F                                                          CBM serial IEC bus in development:
-                                                                     <mailto:michael.klein@puffin.lb.shuttle.de>
-0xCC  00-0F  drivers/misc/ibmvmc.h                                   pseries VMC driver
+0xCB  00-1F                                                            CBM serial IEC bus in development:
+                                                                       <mailto:michael.klein@puffin.lb.shuttle.de>
+0xCC  00-0F  drivers/misc/ibmvmc.h                                     pseries VMC driver
 0xCD  01     linux/reiserfs_fs.h
 0xCF  02     fs/cifs/ioctl.c
 0xDB  00-0F  drivers/char/mwave/mwavepub.h
-0xDD  00-3F                                                          ZFCP device driver see drivers/s390/scsi/
-                                                                     <mailto:aherrman@de.ibm.com>
+0xDD  00-3F                                                            ZFCP device driver see drivers/s390/scsi/
+                                                                       <mailto:aherrman@de.ibm.com>
 0xE5  00-3F  linux/fuse.h
-0xEC  00-01  drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.h                   ChromeOS EC driver
-0xF3  00-3F  drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusb.h                     sisfb (in development)
-                                                                     <mailto:thomas@winischhofer.net>
-0xF6  all                                                            LTTng Linux Trace Toolkit Next Generation
-                                                                     <mailto:mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
+0xEC  00-01  drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_dev.h                     ChromeOS EC driver
+0xF3  00-3F  drivers/usb/misc/sisusbvga/sisusb.h                       sisfb (in development)
+                                                                       <mailto:thomas@winischhofer.net>
+0xF6  all                                                              LTTng Linux Trace Toolkit Next Generation
+                                                                       <mailto:mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
 0xFD  all    linux/dm-ioctl.h
 0xFE  all    linux/isst_if.h
-====  =====  ======================================================= ================================================================
+====  =====  ========================================================= ================================================================
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 30/96] crypto: qat - Replace kzalloc() + copy_from_user() with memdup_user()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit 1e26339703e2afd397037defa798682b2b93dcc0 ]

Replace kzalloc() followed by copy_from_user() with memdup_user() to
improve and simplify adf_ctl_alloc_resources(). memdup_user() returns
either -ENOMEM or -EFAULT (instead of -EIO) if an error occurs.

Remove the unnecessary device id initialization, since memdup_user()
(like copy_from_user()) immediately overwrites it.

No functional changes intended other than returning the more idiomatic
error code -EFAULT.

Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 13 +++----------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
index eb9b3be9d8ebed..cd2ab4e9c7c4e6 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -87,17 +87,10 @@ static int adf_ctl_alloc_resources(struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data **ctl_data,
 {
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
 
-	cfg_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg_data), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!cfg_data)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	/* Initialize device id to NO DEVICE as 0 is a valid device id */
-	cfg_data->device_id = ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(cfg_data, (void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data))) {
+	cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
+	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) {
 		pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
-		kfree(cfg_data);
-		return -EIO;
+		return PTR_ERR(cfg_data);
 	}
 
 	*ctl_data = cfg_data;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 31/96] crypto: qat - Return pointer directly in adf_ctl_alloc_resources

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

[ Upstream commit 5ce9891ea928208a915411ce8227f8c3e37e5ad9 ]

Returning values through arguments is confusing and that has
upset the compiler with the recent change to memdup_user:

../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:308:26: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
  308 |                  ctl_data->device_id);
      |                          ^~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:294:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
  294 |         struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
      |                                       ^~~~~~~~
In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop’,
    inlined from ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’ at ../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:386:9:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:273:48: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
  273 |         ret = adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(ctl_data->device_id);
      |                                        ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:261:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
  261 |         struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
      |                                       ^~~~~~~~
In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config’,
    inlined from ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’ at ../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:382:9:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:192:54: warning: ‘ctl_data’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
  192 |         accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
      |                                              ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c: In function ‘adf_ctl_ioctl’:
../drivers/crypto/intel/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c:185:39: note: ‘ctl_data’ was declared here
  185 |         struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
      |                                       ^~~~~~~~

Fix this by returning the pointer directly.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Stable-dep-of: d237230728c5 ("crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c | 31 +++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
index cd2ab4e9c7c4e6..543ffe00de67b2 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -82,19 +82,14 @@ static int adf_chr_drv_create(void)
 	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
-static int adf_ctl_alloc_resources(struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data **ctl_data,
-				   unsigned long arg)
+static struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *adf_ctl_alloc_resources(unsigned long arg)
 {
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
 
 	cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
-	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data)) {
+	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data))
 		pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
-		return PTR_ERR(cfg_data);
-	}
-
-	*ctl_data = cfg_data;
-	return 0;
+	return cfg_data;
 }
 
 static int adf_add_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
@@ -173,13 +168,13 @@ static int adf_copy_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
 				    unsigned long arg)
 {
-	int ret;
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
 	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
+	int ret = 0;
 
-	ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
 
 	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
 	if (!accel_dev) {
@@ -254,9 +249,9 @@ static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
 	int ret;
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
 
-	ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
 
 	if (adf_devmgr_verify_id(ctl_data->device_id)) {
 		pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", ctl_data->device_id);
@@ -288,9 +283,9 @@ static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
 	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
 	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
 
-	ret = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(&ctl_data, arg);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
+	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
+		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
 
 	ret = -ENODEV;
 	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 32/96] crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit d237230728c567297f2f98b425d63156ab2ed17f ]

The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs
for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration.
These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known
in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via
sysfs.

The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the
subject of a number of bug reports.

Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related
data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val,
adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused
adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal
module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression
algorithm registration.

Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed
IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(),
adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(),
adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros.

Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in
ioctl-number.rst.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: d8cba25d2c68 ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT driver framework")
Reported-by: Zhi Wang <wangzhi@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Bin Yu <byu@xidian.edu.cn>
Reported-by: MingYu Wang <w15303746062@163.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/61d6d499.ab89.19b9b7f3186.Coremail.wangzhi_xd@stu.xidian.edu.cn/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260508034841.256794-1-w15303746062@163.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260508023542.256299-1-w15303746062@163.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260504025120.98242-1-w15303746062@163.com/
Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ahsan Atta <ahsan.atta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst      |   1 -
 .../crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h    |  32 --
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h  |  38 --
 .../crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h    |   3 -
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c   | 409 +-----------------
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c   |  70 ---
 6 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 550 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h

diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
index aa8d0cf534a3d6..7c6e78f4eba07e 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/ioctl/ioctl-number.rst
@@ -215,7 +215,6 @@ Code  Seq#    Include File                                             Comments
                                                                        <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
 'a'   all    linux/atm*.h, linux/sonet.h                               ATM on linux
                                                                        <http://lrcwww.epfl.ch/>
-'a'   00-0F  drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h            conflict! qat driver
 'b'   00-FF                                                            conflict! bit3 vme host bridge
                                                                        <mailto:natalia@nikhefk.nikhef.nl>
 'c'   all    linux/cm4000_cs.h                                         conflict!
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h
index 1ef46ccfba47b1..cf0d29cc58e87f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_common.h
@@ -4,18 +4,11 @@
 #define ADF_CFG_COMMON_H_
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/ioctl.h>
 
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN 64
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
 #define ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES ADF_CFG_MAX_STR_LEN
-#define ADF_CFG_BASE_DEC 10
-#define ADF_CFG_BASE_HEX 16
-#define ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES 0xFE
-#define ADF_CFG_NO_DEVICE 0xFF
-#define ADF_CFG_AFFINITY_WHATEVER 0xFF
-#define MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE 32
 #define ADF_MAX_DEVICES (32 * 32)
 #define ADF_DEVS_ARRAY_SIZE BITS_TO_LONGS(ADF_MAX_DEVICES)
 
@@ -34,29 +27,4 @@ enum adf_device_type {
 	DEV_C3XXX,
 	DEV_C3XXXVF
 };
-
-struct adf_dev_status_info {
-	enum adf_device_type type;
-	__u32 accel_id;
-	__u32 instance_id;
-	__u8 num_ae;
-	__u8 num_accel;
-	__u8 num_logical_accel;
-	__u8 banks_per_accel;
-	__u8 state;
-	__u8 bus;
-	__u8 dev;
-	__u8 fun;
-	char name[MAX_DEVICE_NAME_SIZE];
-};
-
-#define ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC 'a'
-#define IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 0, \
-		struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 1, \
-		struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 2, \
-		struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data)
-#define IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 3, __u32)
-#define IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES _IOW(ADF_CTL_IOC_MAGIC, 4, __s32)
 #endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 421f4fb8b4dd2f..00000000000000
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_cfg_user.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only) */
-/* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */
-#ifndef ADF_CFG_USER_H_
-#define ADF_CFG_USER_H_
-
-#include "adf_cfg_common.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_strings.h"
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_key_val {
-	char key[ADF_CFG_MAX_KEY_LEN_IN_BYTES];
-	char val[ADF_CFG_MAX_VAL_LEN_IN_BYTES];
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *next;
-		__u64 padding3;
-	};
-	enum adf_cfg_val_type type;
-} __packed;
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_section {
-	char name[ADF_CFG_MAX_SECTION_LEN_IN_BYTES];
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params;
-		__u64 padding1;
-	};
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_section *next;
-		__u64 padding3;
-	};
-} __packed;
-
-struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data {
-	union {
-		struct adf_user_cfg_section *config_section;
-		__u64 padding;
-	};
-	__u8 device_id;
-} __packed;
-#endif
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h
index 469e06c93fafeb..e84b1ca844032a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_common_drv.h
@@ -79,11 +79,8 @@ int adf_devmgr_add_dev(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 void adf_devmgr_rm_dev(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
 		       struct adf_accel_dev *pf);
 struct list_head *adf_devmgr_get_head(void);
-struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id);
 struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_first(void);
 struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev);
-int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id);
-void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num);
 int adf_devmgr_in_reset(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 int adf_dev_started(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
 int adf_dev_restarting_notify(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
index 543ffe00de67b2..ba220f5d35a66b 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_ctl_drv.c
@@ -1,412 +1,14 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: (BSD-3-Clause OR GPL-2.0-only)
 /* Copyright(c) 2014 - 2020 Intel Corporation */
+
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/bitops.h>
-#include <linux/pci.h>
-#include <linux/cdev.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
-#include <linux/crypto.h>
 
-#include "adf_accel_devices.h"
 #include "adf_common_drv.h"
-#include "adf_cfg.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_common.h"
-#include "adf_cfg_user.h"
-
-#define DEVICE_NAME "qat_adf_ctl"
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(adf_ctl_lock);
-static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
-
-static const struct file_operations adf_ctl_ops = {
-	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
-	.unlocked_ioctl = adf_ctl_ioctl,
-	.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
-};
-
-struct adf_ctl_drv_info {
-	unsigned int major;
-	struct cdev drv_cdev;
-	struct class *drv_class;
-};
-
-static struct adf_ctl_drv_info adf_ctl_drv;
-
-static void adf_chr_drv_destroy(void)
-{
-	device_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class, MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0));
-	cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev);
-	class_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class);
-	unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0), 1);
-}
-
-static int adf_chr_drv_create(void)
-{
-	dev_t dev_id;
-	struct device *drv_device;
-
-	if (alloc_chrdev_region(&dev_id, 0, 1, DEVICE_NAME)) {
-		pr_err("QAT: unable to allocate chrdev region\n");
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
-
-	adf_ctl_drv.drv_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, DEVICE_NAME);
-	if (IS_ERR(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class)) {
-		pr_err("QAT: class_create failed for adf_ctl\n");
-		goto err_chrdev_unreg;
-	}
-	adf_ctl_drv.major = MAJOR(dev_id);
-	cdev_init(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, &adf_ctl_ops);
-	if (cdev_add(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev, dev_id, 1)) {
-		pr_err("QAT: cdev add failed\n");
-		goto err_class_destr;
-	}
-
-	drv_device = device_create(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class, NULL,
-				   MKDEV(adf_ctl_drv.major, 0),
-				   NULL, DEVICE_NAME);
-	if (IS_ERR(drv_device)) {
-		pr_err("QAT: failed to create device\n");
-		goto err_cdev_del;
-	}
-	return 0;
-err_cdev_del:
-	cdev_del(&adf_ctl_drv.drv_cdev);
-err_class_destr:
-	class_destroy(adf_ctl_drv.drv_class);
-err_chrdev_unreg:
-	unregister_chrdev_region(dev_id, 1);
-	return -EFAULT;
-}
-
-static struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *adf_ctl_alloc_resources(unsigned long arg)
-{
-	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *cfg_data;
-
-	cfg_data = memdup_user((void __user *)arg, sizeof(*cfg_data));
-	if (IS_ERR(cfg_data))
-		pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user cfg_data.\n");
-	return cfg_data;
-}
-
-static int adf_add_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
-				  const char *section,
-				  const struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *key_val)
-{
-	if (key_val->type == ADF_HEX) {
-		long *ptr = (long *)key_val->val;
-		long val = *ptr;
-
-		if (adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(accel_dev, section,
-						key_val->key, (void *)val,
-						key_val->type)) {
-			dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-				"failed to add hex keyvalue.\n");
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
-	} else {
-		if (adf_cfg_add_key_value_param(accel_dev, section,
-						key_val->key, key_val->val,
-						key_val->type)) {
-			dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-				"failed to add keyvalue.\n");
-			return -EFAULT;
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int adf_copy_key_value_data(struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev,
-				   struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data)
-{
-	struct adf_user_cfg_key_val key_val;
-	struct adf_user_cfg_key_val *params_head;
-	struct adf_user_cfg_section section, *section_head;
-
-	section_head = ctl_data->config_section;
-
-	while (section_head) {
-		if (copy_from_user(&section, (void __user *)section_head,
-				   sizeof(*section_head))) {
-			dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-				"failed to copy section info\n");
-			goto out_err;
-		}
-
-		if (adf_cfg_section_add(accel_dev, section.name)) {
-			dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-				"failed to add section.\n");
-			goto out_err;
-		}
-
-		params_head = section.params;
-
-		while (params_head) {
-			if (copy_from_user(&key_val, (void __user *)params_head,
-					   sizeof(key_val))) {
-				dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-					"Failed to copy keyvalue.\n");
-				goto out_err;
-			}
-			if (adf_add_key_value_data(accel_dev, section.name,
-						   &key_val)) {
-				goto out_err;
-			}
-			params_head = key_val.next;
-		}
-		section_head = section.next;
-	}
-	return 0;
-out_err:
-	adf_cfg_del_all(accel_dev);
-	return -EFAULT;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
-				    unsigned long arg)
-{
-	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
-	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
-		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
-
-	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
-	if (!accel_dev) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (adf_copy_key_value_data(accel_dev, ctl_data)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-	set_bit(ADF_STATUS_CONFIGURED, &accel_dev->status);
-out:
-	kfree(ctl_data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(int id)
-{
-	struct adf_accel_dev *dev;
-
-	list_for_each_entry(dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) {
-		if (id == dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
-			if (adf_devmgr_in_reset(dev) || adf_dev_in_use(dev)) {
-				dev_info(&GET_DEV(dev),
-					 "device qat_dev%d is busy\n",
-					 dev->accel_id);
-				return -EBUSY;
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static void adf_ctl_stop_devices(u32 id)
-{
-	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-
-	list_for_each_entry(accel_dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) {
-		if (id == accel_dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
-			if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev))
-				continue;
-
-			/* First stop all VFs */
-			if (!accel_dev->is_vf)
-				continue;
-
-			adf_dev_stop(accel_dev);
-			adf_dev_shutdown(accel_dev);
-		}
-	}
-
-	list_for_each_entry(accel_dev, adf_devmgr_get_head(), list) {
-		if (id == accel_dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
-			if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev))
-				continue;
-
-			adf_dev_stop(accel_dev);
-			adf_dev_shutdown(accel_dev);
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
-				  unsigned long arg)
-{
-	int ret;
-	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
-
-	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
-		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
-
-	if (adf_devmgr_verify_id(ctl_data->device_id)) {
-		pr_err("QAT: Device %d not found\n", ctl_data->device_id);
-		ret = -ENODEV;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	ret = adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(ctl_data->device_id);
-	if (ret)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (ctl_data->device_id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES)
-		pr_info("QAT: Stopping all acceleration devices.\n");
-	else
-		pr_info("QAT: Stopping acceleration device qat_dev%d.\n",
-			ctl_data->device_id);
-
-	adf_ctl_stop_devices(ctl_data->device_id);
-
-out:
-	kfree(ctl_data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
-				   unsigned long arg)
-{
-	int ret;
-	struct adf_user_cfg_ctl_data *ctl_data;
-	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-
-	ctl_data = adf_ctl_alloc_resources(arg);
-	if (IS_ERR(ctl_data))
-		return PTR_ERR(ctl_data);
-
-	ret = -ENODEV;
-	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(ctl_data->device_id);
-	if (!accel_dev)
-		goto out;
-
-	if (!adf_dev_started(accel_dev)) {
-		dev_info(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-			 "Starting acceleration device qat_dev%d.\n",
-			 ctl_data->device_id);
-		ret = adf_dev_init(accel_dev);
-		if (!ret)
-			ret = adf_dev_start(accel_dev);
-	} else {
-		dev_info(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
-			 "Acceleration device qat_dev%d already started.\n",
-			 ctl_data->device_id);
-	}
-	if (ret) {
-		dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Failed to start qat_dev%d\n",
-			ctl_data->device_id);
-		adf_dev_stop(accel_dev);
-		adf_dev_shutdown(accel_dev);
-	}
-out:
-	kfree(ctl_data);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_num_devices(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
-					 unsigned long arg)
-{
-	u32 num_devices = 0;
-
-	adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(&num_devices);
-	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &num_devices, sizeof(num_devices)))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd,
-				    unsigned long arg)
-{
-	struct adf_hw_device_data *hw_data;
-	struct adf_dev_status_info dev_info;
-	struct adf_accel_dev *accel_dev;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(&dev_info, (void __user *)arg,
-			   sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) {
-		pr_err("QAT: failed to copy from user.\n");
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
-
-	accel_dev = adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(dev_info.accel_id);
-	if (!accel_dev)
-		return -ENODEV;
-
-	hw_data = accel_dev->hw_device;
-	dev_info.state = adf_dev_started(accel_dev) ? DEV_UP : DEV_DOWN;
-	dev_info.num_ae = hw_data->get_num_aes(hw_data);
-	dev_info.num_accel = hw_data->get_num_accels(hw_data);
-	dev_info.num_logical_accel = hw_data->num_logical_accel;
-	dev_info.banks_per_accel = hw_data->num_banks
-					/ hw_data->num_logical_accel;
-	strlcpy(dev_info.name, hw_data->dev_class->name, sizeof(dev_info.name));
-	dev_info.instance_id = hw_data->instance_id;
-	dev_info.type = hw_data->dev_class->type;
-	dev_info.bus = accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->bus->number;
-	dev_info.dev = PCI_SLOT(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn);
-	dev_info.fun = PCI_FUNC(accel_to_pci_dev(accel_dev)->devfn);
-
-	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg, &dev_info,
-			 sizeof(struct adf_dev_status_info))) {
-		dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "failed to copy status.\n");
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static long adf_ctl_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
-{
-	int ret;
-
-	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&adf_ctl_lock))
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-	switch (cmd) {
-	case IOCTL_CONFIG_SYS_RESOURCE_PARAMETERS:
-		ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_config(fp, cmd, arg);
-		break;
-
-	case IOCTL_STOP_ACCEL_DEV:
-		ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_stop(fp, cmd, arg);
-		break;
-
-	case IOCTL_START_ACCEL_DEV:
-		ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_dev_start(fp, cmd, arg);
-		break;
-
-	case IOCTL_GET_NUM_DEVICES:
-		ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_get_num_devices(fp, cmd, arg);
-		break;
-
-	case IOCTL_STATUS_ACCEL_DEV:
-		ret = adf_ctl_ioctl_get_status(fp, cmd, arg);
-		break;
-	default:
-		pr_err("QAT: Invalid ioctl\n");
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		break;
-	}
-	mutex_unlock(&adf_ctl_lock);
-	return ret;
-}
 
 static int __init adf_register_ctl_device_driver(void)
 {
-	if (adf_chr_drv_create())
-		goto err_chr_dev;
-
 	if (adf_init_aer())
 		goto err_aer;
 
@@ -428,21 +30,16 @@ static int __init adf_register_ctl_device_driver(void)
 err_pf_wq:
 	adf_exit_aer();
 err_aer:
-	adf_chr_drv_destroy();
-err_chr_dev:
-	mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock);
 	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 static void __exit adf_unregister_ctl_device_driver(void)
 {
-	adf_chr_drv_destroy();
 	adf_exit_aer();
 	adf_exit_vf_wq();
 	adf_exit_pf_wq();
 	qat_crypto_unregister();
 	adf_clean_vf_map(false);
-	mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock);
 }
 
 module_init(adf_register_ctl_device_driver);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
index 92ec035576dfd8..9c4dd70865b3b8 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_dev_mgr.c
@@ -45,19 +45,6 @@ static struct vf_id_map *adf_find_vf(u32 bdf)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int adf_get_vf_real_id(u32 fake)
-{
-	struct list_head *itr;
-
-	list_for_each(itr, &vfs_table) {
-		struct vf_id_map *ptr =
-			list_entry(itr, struct vf_id_map, list);
-		if (ptr->fake_id == fake)
-			return ptr->id;
-	}
-	return -1;
-}
-
 /**
  * adf_clean_vf_map() - Cleans VF id mapings
  *
@@ -311,63 +298,6 @@ struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev(struct pci_dev *pci_dev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(adf_devmgr_pci_to_accel_dev);
 
-struct adf_accel_dev *adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(u32 id)
-{
-	struct list_head *itr;
-	int real_id;
-
-	mutex_lock(&table_lock);
-	real_id = adf_get_vf_real_id(id);
-	if (real_id < 0)
-		goto unlock;
-
-	id = real_id;
-
-	list_for_each(itr, &accel_table) {
-		struct adf_accel_dev *ptr =
-				list_entry(itr, struct adf_accel_dev, list);
-		if (ptr->accel_id == id) {
-			mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
-			return ptr;
-		}
-	}
-unlock:
-	mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-int adf_devmgr_verify_id(u32 id)
-{
-	if (id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(id))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -ENODEV;
-}
-
-static int adf_get_num_dettached_vfs(void)
-{
-	struct list_head *itr;
-	int vfs = 0;
-
-	mutex_lock(&table_lock);
-	list_for_each(itr, &vfs_table) {
-		struct vf_id_map *ptr =
-			list_entry(itr, struct vf_id_map, list);
-		if (ptr->bdf != ~0 && !ptr->attached)
-			vfs++;
-	}
-	mutex_unlock(&table_lock);
-	return vfs;
-}
-
-void adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(u32 *num)
-{
-	*num = num_devices - adf_get_num_dettached_vfs();
-}
-
 /**
  * adf_dev_in_use() - Check whether accel_dev is currently in use
  * @accel_dev: Pointer to acceleration device.
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 33/96] net/sched: act_pedit: fix action bind logic

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>

[ Upstream commit e9e42292ea76a8358b0c02ffd530d78e133a1b73 ]

The TC architecture allows filters and actions to be created independently.
In filters the user can reference action objects using:
tc action add action pedit ... index 1
tc filter add ... action pedit index 1

In the current code for act_pedit this is broken as it checks netlink
attributes for create/update before actually checking if we are binding to an
existing action.

tdc results:
1..69
ok 1 319a - Add pedit action that mangles IP TTL
ok 2 7e67 - Replace pedit action with invalid goto chain
ok 3 377e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32
ok 4 a0ca - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 (INVALID)
ok 5 dd8a - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 u16
ok 6 53db - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 (INVALID)
ok 7 5c7e - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 add value
ok 8 2893 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 quad
ok 9 3a07 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8-u16-u8
ok 10 ab0f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16-u8-u8
ok 11 9d12 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 set u16 clear u8 invert
ok 12 ebfa - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset overflow u32 (INVALID)
ok 13 f512 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 at offmask shift set
ok 14 c2cb - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 retain value
ok 15 1762 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 clear value
ok 16 bcee - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 retain value
ok 17 e89f - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 retain value
ok 18 c282 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 clear value
ok 19 c422 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 invert value
ok 20 d3d3 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 invert value
ok 21 57e5 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u8 preserve value
ok 22 99e0 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u16 preserve value
ok 23 1892 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP offset u32 preserve value
ok 24 4b60 - Add pedit action with RAW_OP negative offset u16/u32 set value
ok 25 a5a7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src
ok 26 86d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src & dst
ok 27 f8a9 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst
ok 28 c715 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set src (INVALID)
ok 29 8131 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set dst (INVALID)
ok 30 ba22 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth type set/clear sequence
ok 31 dec4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth set type (INVALID)
ok 32 ab06 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth add type
ok 33 918d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert src
ok 34 a8d4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert dst
ok 35 ee13 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP eth invert type
ok 36 7588 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src
ok 37 0fa7 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set dst
ok 38 5810 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set src & dst
ok 39 1092 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ihl & dsfield
ok 40 02d8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl & protocol
ok 41 3e2d - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ttl (INVALID)
ok 42 31ae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip ttl clear/set
ok 43 486f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set duplicate fields
ok 44 e790 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set ce, df, mf, firstfrag, nofrag fields
ok 45 cc8a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set tos
ok 46 7a17 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip set precedence
ok 47 c3b6 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add tos
ok 48 43d3 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip add precedence
ok 49 438e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear tos
ok 50 6b1b - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip clear precedence
ok 51 824a - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert tos
ok 52 106f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip invert precedence
ok 53 6829 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport & sport
ok 54 afd8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set icmp_type & icmp_code
ok 55 3143 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP beyond ip set dport (INVALID)
ok 56 815c - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src
ok 57 4dae - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set dst
ok 58 fc1f - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set src & dst
ok 59 6d34 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 dst retain value (INVALID)
ok 60 94bb - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 traffic_class
ok 61 6f5e - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 flow_lbl
ok 62 6795 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP ip6 set payload_len, nexthdr, hoplimit
ok 63 1442 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport & sport
ok 64 b7ac - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp sport set (INVALID)
ok 65 cfcc - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp flags set
ok 66 3bc4 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP tcp set dport, sport & flags fields
ok 67 f1c8 - Add pedit action with LAYERED_OP udp set dport & sport
ok 68 d784 - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #1
ok 69 70ca - Add pedit action with mixed RAW/LAYERED_OP #2

Fixes: 71d0ed7079df ("net/act_pedit: Support using offset relative to the conventional network headers")
Fixes: f67169fef8db ("net/sched: act_pedit: fix WARN() in the traffic path")
Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman@corigine.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/sched/act_pedit.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sched/act_pedit.c b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
index 0601deea04d725..fe9e826184c168 100644
--- a/net/sched/act_pedit.c
+++ b/net/sched/act_pedit.c
@@ -182,26 +182,6 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 	}
 
 	parm = nla_data(pattr);
-	if (!parm->nkeys) {
-		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Pedit requires keys to be passed");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	ksize = parm->nkeys * sizeof(struct tc_pedit_key);
-	if (nla_len(pattr) < sizeof(*parm) + ksize) {
-		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, pattr, "Length of TCA_PEDIT_PARMS or TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX pedit attribute is invalid");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	nparms = kzalloc(sizeof(*nparms), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!nparms)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	nparms->tcfp_keys_ex =
-		tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse(tb[TCA_PEDIT_KEYS_EX], parm->nkeys);
-	if (IS_ERR(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex);
-		goto out_free;
-	}
 
 	index = parm->index;
 	err = tcf_idr_check_alloc(tn, &index, a, bind);
@@ -210,25 +190,49 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 						&act_pedit_ops, bind, flags);
 		if (ret) {
 			tcf_idr_cleanup(tn, index);
-			goto out_free_ex;
+			return ret;
 		}
 		ret = ACT_P_CREATED;
 	} else if (err > 0) {
 		if (bind)
-			goto out_free;
+			return 0;
 		if (!ovr) {
 			ret = -EEXIST;
 			goto out_release;
 		}
 	} else {
-		ret = err;
-		goto out_free_ex;
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	if (!parm->nkeys) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "Pedit requires keys to be passed");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_release;
+	}
+	ksize = parm->nkeys * sizeof(struct tc_pedit_key);
+	if (nla_len(pattr) < sizeof(*parm) + ksize) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, pattr, "Length of TCA_PEDIT_PARMS or TCA_PEDIT_PARMS_EX pedit attribute is invalid");
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_release;
+	}
+
+	nparms = kzalloc(sizeof(*nparms), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!nparms) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_release;
+	}
+
+	nparms->tcfp_keys_ex =
+		tcf_pedit_keys_ex_parse(tb[TCA_PEDIT_KEYS_EX], parm->nkeys);
+	if (IS_ERR(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex);
+		goto out_free;
 	}
 
 	err = tcf_action_check_ctrlact(parm->action, tp, &goto_ch, extack);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		ret = err;
-		goto out_release;
+		goto out_free_ex;
 	}
 
 	nparms->tcfp_flags = parm->flags;
@@ -280,12 +284,12 @@ static int tcf_pedit_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
 put_chain:
 	if (goto_ch)
 		tcf_chain_put_by_act(goto_ch);
-out_release:
-	tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
 out_free_ex:
 	kfree(nparms->tcfp_keys_ex);
 out_free:
 	kfree(nparms);
+out_release:
+	tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
 	return ret;
 }
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 34/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: keep unacked list in ascending ordered

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 5aa8651527ea0b610e7a09fb3b8204c1398b9525 upstream.

When batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order inserts a new entry in the list of
unacked (out of order) packets, it searches from the entry with the newest
sequence number towards oldest sequence number. If an entry is found which
is older than the newly entry, the new entry has to be added after the
found one to keep the ascending order.

But for this operation list_add_tail() was used. But this function adds an
entry _before_ another one. As result, the list would contain a lot of
swapped sequence numbers. The consumer of this list
(batadv_tp_ack_unordered()) would then fail to correctly ack packets.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index fc2f0b49e5a06e..c837a91879ac2f 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1334,7 +1334,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 		 * one is attached _after_ it. In this way the list is kept in
 		 * ascending order
 		 */
-		list_add_tail(&new->list, &un->list);
+		list_add(&new->list, &un->list);
 		added = true;
 		break;
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 35/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dup_acks explicitly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit b2b68b32a715e0328662801576974aa37b942b00 upstream.

When an ack with a sequence number equal to the last_acked is received, the
dup_acks counter is increased to decide whether fast retransmit should be
performed. Only when the sequence numbers are not equal, the dup_acks is
set to the initial value (0).

But if the initial packet would have the sequence number
BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ, dup_acks would not be initialized and atomic_inc would
operate on an undefined starting value. It is therefore required to have it
explicitly initialized during the start of the sender session.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index c837a91879ac2f..1699fb8f8c82d4 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1055,6 +1055,7 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
 	tp_vars->icmp_uid = icmp_uid;
 
 	tp_vars->last_sent = BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ;
+	atomic_set(&tp_vars->dup_acks, 0);
 	atomic_set(&tp_vars->last_acked, BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ);
 	tp_vars->fast_recovery = false;
 	tp_vars->recover = BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 36/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize dec_cwnd explicitly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit febfb1b86224489535312296ecfa3d4bf467f339 upstream.

When batadv_tp_update_cwnd() is called, dec_cwnd is increased. But dec_cwnd
is only initialixed (to 0) when a duplicate Ack was received or when cwnd
is below the ss_threshold.

Just initialize the cwnd during the initialization to avoid any potential
access of uninitialized data.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 1699fb8f8c82d4..d8ad58ccef2608 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1065,6 +1065,8 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
 	 * soft_interface, hence its MTU
 	 */
 	tp_vars->cwnd = BATADV_TP_PLEN * 3;
+	tp_vars->dec_cwnd = 0;
+
 	/* at the beginning initialise the SS threshold to the biggest possible
 	 * window size, hence the AWND size
 	 */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 37/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid window underflow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 765947b81fb54b6ebb0bc1cfe55c0fa399e002b8 upstream.

In batadv_tp_avail(), win_left is calculated with 32-bit unsigned
arithmetic: win_left = win_limit - tp_vars->last_sent;

During Fast Recovery, cwnd is inflated and last_sent advances rapidly. When
Fast Recovery ends, cwnd drops abruptly back to ss_threshold. If the newly
shrunk win_limit is less than last_sent, the unsigned subtraction will
underflow, wrapping to a massive positive value. Instead of returning that
the window is full (unavailable), it returns that the sender can continue
sending.

To handle this situation, it must be checked whether the windows end
sequence number (win_limit) has to be compared with the last sent sequence
number. If it would be before the last sent sequence number, then more acks
are needed before the transmission can be started again.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index d8ad58ccef2608..10953096996ab1 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -825,10 +825,15 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 static bool batadv_tp_avail(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 			    size_t payload_len)
 {
+	u32 last_sent = READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_sent);
 	u32 win_left, win_limit;
 
 	win_limit = atomic_read(&tp_vars->last_acked) + tp_vars->cwnd;
-	win_left = win_limit - tp_vars->last_sent;
+
+	if (batadv_seq_before(last_sent, win_limit))
+		win_left = win_limit - last_sent;
+	else
+		win_left = 0;
 
 	return win_left >= payload_len;
 }
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 38/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: avoid divide-by-zero for dec_cwnd

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 33ccd52f3cc9ed46ce395199f89aa3234dc83314 upstream.

The cwnd is always MSS <= cwnd <= 0x20000000. But the calculation in
batadv_tp_update_cwnd() assumes unsigned 32 bit arithmetics.

    ((mss * 8) ** 2) / (cwnd * 8)

In case cwnd is actually 0x20000000, it will be shifted by 3 bit to the
left end up at 0x100000000 or U32_MAX + 1. It will therefore wrap around
and be 0 - resulting in:

    ((mss * 8) ** 2) / 0

This is of course invalid and cannot be calculated. The calculation should
must be simplified to avoid this overflow:

   (mss ** 2) * 8 / cwnd

It will keep the precision enhancement from the scaling (by 8) but avoid
the overflow in the divisor.

In theory, there could still be an overflow in the dividend. It is at the
moment fixed to BATADV_TP_PLEN in batadv_tp_recv_ack() - so it is not an
imminent problem. But allowing it to use the whole u32 bit range, would
mean that it can still use up to 67 bits. To keep this calculation safe for
32 bit arithmetic, mss must never use more than floor((32 - 3) / 2) bits -
or in other words: must never be larger than 16383.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 10953096996ab1..118cb5dd285c2d 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -153,9 +153,12 @@ static void batadv_tp_update_cwnd(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars, u32 mss)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	/* prevent overflow in (mss * mss) << 3 */
+	mss = min_t(u32, mss, (1U << 14) - 1);
+
 	/* increment CWND at least of 1 (section 3.1 of RFC5681) */
 	tp_vars->dec_cwnd += max_t(u32, 1U << 3,
-				   ((mss * mss) << 6) / (tp_vars->cwnd << 3));
+				   ((mss * mss) << 3) / tp_vars->cwnd);
 	if (tp_vars->dec_cwnd < (mss << 3)) {
 		spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->cwnd_lock);
 		return;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 39/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: fix fast recovery precondition

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 2b0d08f08ed3b2174f05c43089ec65f3543a025b upstream.

The fast recovery precondition checks if the recover (initialized to
BATADV_TP_FIRST_SEQ) is bigger than the received ack. But since recover is
only updated when this check is successful, it will never enter the fast
recovery mode.

According to RFC6582 Section 3.2 step 2, the check should actually be
different:

> When the third duplicate ACK is received, the TCP sender first
> checks the value of recover to see if the Cumulative
> Acknowledgment field covers more than recover

The precondition must therefore check if recover is smaller than the
received ack - basically swapping the operands of the current check.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 118cb5dd285c2d..cd196842478686 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (atomic_read(&tp_vars->dup_acks) != 3)
 			goto out;
 
-		if (recv_ack >= tp_vars->recover)
+		if (tp_vars->recover >= recv_ack)
 			goto out;
 
 		/* if this is the third duplicate ACK do Fast Retransmit */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 40/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle seqno wrap-around for fast recovery detection

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit f54c85ed42a1b27a516cf2a4728f5a612b799e07 upstream.

The recover variable and the last_sent sequence number are initialized on
purpose as a really high value which will wrap-around after the first 2000
bytes. The fast recovery precondition must therefore not use simple integer
comparisons but use helpers which are aware of the sequence number
wrap-arounds.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index cd196842478686..a4df826e4ece71 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -738,7 +738,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (atomic_read(&tp_vars->dup_acks) != 3)
 			goto out;
 
-		if (tp_vars->recover >= recv_ack)
+		if (!batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->recover, recv_ack))
 			goto out;
 
 		/* if this is the third duplicate ACK do Fast Retransmit */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 41/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: add only finished tp_vars to lists

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 15ccbf685222274f5add1387af58c2a41a95f81e upstream.

When the receiver variables (aka "session") are initialized, then they are
added to the list of sessions before the timer is set up. A RCU protected
reader could therefore find the entry and run mod_setup before
batadv_tp_init_recv() finished the timer initialization.

The same is true for batadv_tp_start(), which must first initialize the
finish_work and the test_length to avoid a similar problem.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index a4df826e4ece71..a015ff73812f5e 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1106,21 +1106,21 @@ void batadv_tp_start(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
 	tp_vars->prerandom_offset = 0;
 	spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->prerandom_lock);
 
-	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
-	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
-	spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tp_list_lock);
-
 	tp_vars->test_length = test_length;
 	if (!tp_vars->test_length)
 		tp_vars->test_length = BATADV_TP_DEF_TEST_LENGTH;
 
+	/* init work item for finished tp tests */
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tp_vars->finish_work, batadv_tp_sender_finish);
+
+	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
+	spin_unlock_bh(&bat_priv->tp_list_lock);
+
 	batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TP_METER, bat_priv,
 		   "Meter: starting throughput meter towards %pM (length=%ums)\n",
 		   dst, test_length);
 
-	/* init work item for finished tp tests */
-	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tp_vars->finish_work, batadv_tp_sender_finish);
-
 	/* start tp kthread. This way the write() call issued from userspace can
 	 * happily return and avoid to block
 	 */
@@ -1438,10 +1438,10 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list);
 
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
-	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
+	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
 
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
-	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
+	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
 
 	batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars);
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 42/96] batman-adv: bla: annotate lasttime access with READ/WRITE_ONCE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 98b0fb191c878a64cbaebfe231d96d57576acf8c upstream.

The lasttime field for claim, backbone_gw, and loopdetect tracks the
jiffies value of the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts.
These accesses are not consistently protected by a lock, so
READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used to prevent data races caused by compiler
optimizations.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 23721387c409 ("batman-adv: add basic bridge loop avoidance code")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 28 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
index 00185ed4940f23..5593ac0aae378a 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ batadv_bla_get_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *orig,
 		return NULL;
 
 	entry->vid = vid;
-	entry->lasttime = jiffies;
+	WRITE_ONCE(entry->lasttime, jiffies);
 	entry->crc = BATADV_BLA_CRC_INIT;
 	entry->bat_priv = bat_priv;
 	spin_lock_init(&entry->crc_lock);
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ batadv_bla_update_own_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	if (unlikely(!backbone_gw))
 		return;
 
-	backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+	WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
 	batadv_backbone_gw_put(backbone_gw);
 }
 
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		ether_addr_copy(claim->addr, mac);
 		spin_lock_init(&claim->backbone_lock);
 		claim->vid = vid;
-		claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies);
 		kref_get(&backbone_gw->refcount);
 		claim->backbone_gw = backbone_gw;
 		kref_init(&claim->refcount);
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 			return;
 		}
 	} else {
-		claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies);
 		if (claim->backbone_gw == backbone_gw)
 			/* no need to register a new backbone */
 			goto claim_free_ref;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_add_claim(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	spin_lock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 	backbone_gw->crc ^= crc16(0, claim->addr, ETH_ALEN);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
-	backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+	WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
 
 claim_free_ref:
 	batadv_claim_put(claim);
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ static bool batadv_handle_announce(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *an_addr,
 		return true;
 
 	/* handle as ANNOUNCE frame */
-	backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+	WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
 	crc = ntohs(*((__force __be16 *)(&an_addr[4])));
 
 	batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_BLA, bat_priv,
@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_backbone_gw(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, int now)
 						  head, hash_entry) {
 				if (now)
 					goto purge_now;
-				if (!batadv_has_timed_out(backbone_gw->lasttime,
+				if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime),
 							  BATADV_BLA_BACKBONE_TIMEOUT))
 					continue;
 
@@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_purge_claims(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 						primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr))
 				goto skip;
 
-			if (!batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime,
+			if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(claim->lasttime),
 						  BATADV_BLA_CLAIM_TIMEOUT))
 				goto skip;
 
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_periodic_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		eth_random_addr(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr);
 		bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr[0] = 0xba;
 		bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_addr[1] = 0xbe;
-		bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime, jiffies);
 		atomic_set(&bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_next,
 			   BATADV_BLA_LOOPDETECT_PERIODS);
 
@@ -1520,7 +1520,7 @@ static void batadv_bla_periodic_work(struct work_struct *work)
 						primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr))
 				continue;
 
-			backbone_gw->lasttime = jiffies;
+			WRITE_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime, jiffies);
 
 			batadv_bla_send_announce(bat_priv, backbone_gw);
 			if (send_loopdetect)
@@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ batadv_bla_loopdetect_check(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	/* If the packet came too late, don't forward it on the mesh
 	 * but don't consider that as loop. It might be a coincidence.
 	 */
-	if (batadv_has_timed_out(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime,
+	if (batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(bat_priv->bla.loopdetect_lasttime),
 				 BATADV_BLA_LOOPDETECT_TIMEOUT))
 		return true;
 
@@ -2023,7 +2023,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_rx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	if (own_claim) {
 		/* ... allow it in any case */
-		claim->lasttime = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(claim->lasttime, jiffies);
 		goto allow;
 	}
 
@@ -2127,7 +2127,7 @@ bool batadv_bla_tx(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		/* if yes, the client has roamed and we have
 		 * to unclaim it.
 		 */
-		if (batadv_has_timed_out(claim->lasttime, 100)) {
+		if (batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(claim->lasttime), 100)) {
 			/* only unclaim if the last claim entry is
 			 * older than 100 ms to make sure we really
 			 * have a roaming client here.
@@ -2513,7 +2513,7 @@ batadv_bla_backbone_dump_entry(struct sk_buff *msg, u32 portid,
 	backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc;
 	spin_unlock_bh(&backbone_gw->crc_lock);
 
-	msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - backbone_gw->lasttime);
+	msecs = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies - READ_ONCE(backbone_gw->lasttime));
 
 	if (is_own)
 		if (nla_put_flag(msg, BATADV_ATTR_BLA_OWN)) {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 43/96] batman-adv: prevent ELP transmission interval underflow

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 5e50d4b8ae3ea622122d3c6a38d7f6fe68dfddca upstream.

batadv_v_elp_start_timer() enqeues a delayed work. The time when it starts
is randomly chosen between (elp_interval - BATADV_JITTER) and
(elp_interval + BATADV_JITTER). The configured elp_interval must therefore
be larger or equal to BATADV_JITTER to avoid that it causes an underflow of
the unsigned integer. If this would happen, then a "fast" ELP interval
would turn into a "day long" delay.

At the same time, it must not be larger than the maximum value the variable
can store.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: a10800829040 ("batman-adv: Add elp_interval hardif genl configuration")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/netlink.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/netlink.c b/net/batman-adv/netlink.c
index 0b5cb03859b25b..e5a0b2c97162d2 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/netlink.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/netlink.c
@@ -939,9 +939,15 @@ static int batadv_netlink_set_hardif(struct sk_buff *skb,
 #ifdef CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV_BATMAN_V
 
 	if (info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_ELP_INTERVAL]) {
+		u32 elp_interval;
+
 		attr = info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_ELP_INTERVAL];
+		elp_interval = nla_get_u32(attr);
+
+		elp_interval = min_t(u32, elp_interval, INT_MAX);
+		elp_interval = max_t(u32, elp_interval, BATADV_JITTER);
 
-		atomic_set(&hard_iface->bat_v.elp_interval, nla_get_u32(attr));
+		atomic_set(&hard_iface->bat_v.elp_interval, elp_interval);
 	}
 
 	if (info->attrs[BATADV_ATTR_THROUGHPUT_OVERRIDE]) {
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 44/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: initialize last_recv_time during init

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 811cb00fa8cdc3f0a7f6eefc000a6888367c8c8f upstream.

The last_recv_time is the most important indicator for a receiver session
to figure out whether a session timed out or not. But this information was
only initialized after the session was added to the tp_receiver_list and
after the timer was started.

In the worst case, the timer (function) could have tried to access this
information before the actual initialization was reached. Like rest of the
variables of the tp_meter receiver session, this field has to be filled out
before any other (parallel running) context has the chance to access it.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index a015ff73812f5e..ea5640242ddc2e 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1412,8 +1412,10 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 
 	tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig,
 					      icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER);
-	if (tp_vars)
+	if (tp_vars) {
+		tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
 		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	if (!atomic_add_unless(&bat_priv->tp_num, 1, BATADV_TP_MAX_NUM)) {
 		batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TP_METER, bat_priv,
@@ -1440,6 +1442,8 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
 
+	tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
 
@@ -1488,9 +1492,9 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 				   icmp->orig);
 			goto out;
 		}
-	}
 
-	tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+		tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+	}
 
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
 	 * lost. Resend the ACK
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 45/96] batman-adv: frag: ensure fragment is writable before modifying TTL

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit b7293c6e8c15b2db77809b25cf8389e35331b27a upstream.

Before batman-adv is allowed to write to an skb, it either has to have its
own copy of the skb or use skb_cow() to ensure that the data part is not
shared. But batadv_frag_skb_fwd() modifies the TTL even when it is shared.

Adding a skb_cow() right before this operation avoids this and can at the
same time prepare it for the modifications required to forward the
fragment.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h |  3 ++-
 net/batman-adv/routing.c       |  3 +--
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
index 724e06e3e799f4..95c88bbdbcbee0 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
@@ -386,6 +386,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
  * @skb: skb to forward
  * @recv_if: interface that the skb is received on
  * @orig_node_src: originator that the skb is received from
+ * @rx_result: set to NET_RX_SUCCESS when the fragment was forwarded and
+ *  NET_RX_DROP when it was dropped; only valid when true is returned
  *
  * Look up the next-hop of the fragments payload and check if the merged packet
  * will exceed the MTU towards the next-hop. If so, the fragment is forwarded
@@ -395,7 +397,8 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
  */
 bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			 struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if,
-			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src)
+			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src,
+			 int *rx_result)
 {
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(recv_if->soft_iface);
 	struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_dst;
@@ -418,12 +421,22 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 */
 	total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
 	if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) {
+		if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
+			ret = true;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		packet = (struct batadv_frag_packet *)skb->data;
+
 		batadv_inc_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD);
 		batadv_add_counter(bat_priv, BATADV_CNT_FRAG_FWD_BYTES,
 				   skb->len + ETH_HLEN);
 
 		packet->ttl--;
 		batadv_send_unicast_skb(skb, neigh_node);
+		*rx_result = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 		ret = true;
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h
index 881ef328b6cd7e..aba6eecb7d0e76 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.h
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ void batadv_frag_purge_orig(struct batadv_orig_node *orig,
 			    bool (*check_cb)(struct batadv_frag_table_entry *));
 bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 			 struct batadv_hard_iface *recv_if,
-			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src);
+			 struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node_src,
+			 int *rx_result);
 bool batadv_frag_skb_buffer(struct sk_buff **skb,
 			    struct batadv_orig_node *orig_node);
 int batadv_frag_send_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/routing.c b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
index 9e5c71e406ffc6..f6df66a534c41e 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/routing.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/routing.c
@@ -1143,10 +1143,9 @@ int batadv_recv_frag_packet(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 	/* Route the fragment if it is not for us and too big to be merged. */
 	if (!batadv_is_my_mac(bat_priv, frag_packet->dest) &&
-	    batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src)) {
+	    batadv_frag_skb_fwd(skb, recv_if, orig_node_src, &ret)) {
 		/* skb was consumed */
 		skb = NULL;
-		ret = NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 		goto put_orig_node;
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 46/96] batman-adv: frag: avoid underflow of TTL

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 493d9d2528e1a09b090e4b37f0f553def7bd5ce9 upstream.

Packets with a TTL are using it to limit the amount of time this packet can
be forwarded. But for batadv_frag_packet, the TTL was always only reduced
but it was never evaluated. It could even underflow without any effect.

Check the TTL in batadv_frag_skb_fwd() before attempting to prepare it for
forwarding. This keeps it in sync with the not fragmented unicast packet.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 610bfc6bc99b ("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
index 95c88bbdbcbee0..43dfe86f07a9b1 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/fragmentation.c
@@ -421,6 +421,13 @@ bool batadv_frag_skb_fwd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 */
 	total_size = ntohs(packet->total_size);
 	if (total_size > neigh_node->if_incoming->net_dev->mtu) {
+		if (packet->ttl < 2) {
+			kfree_skb(skb);
+			*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
+			ret = true;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
 		if (skb_cow(skb, ETH_HLEN) < 0) {
 			kfree_skb(skb);
 			*rx_result = NET_RX_DROP;
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 47/96] batman-adv: v: prevent OGM aggregation on disabled hardif

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit d11c00b95b2a3b3934007fc003dccc6fdcc061ad upstream.

When an interface gets disabled, the worker is correctly disabled by
batadv_hardif_disable_interface() -> ... -> batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable().
In this process, the skb aggr_list is also freed.

But batadv_v_ogm_send_meshif() can still queue new skbs (via
batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if()) to the aggr_list. This will only stop after all
cores can no longer find the RCU protected list of hard interfaces. These
queued skbs will never be freed or consumed by batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work.

The batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable() function must block
batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if() to avoid leak of skbs.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: f89255a02f1d ("batman-adv: BATMAN_V: introduce per hard-iface OGMv2 queues")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/bat_v.c     |  1 +
 net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 net/batman-adv/types.h     |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c
index 6dc39fc0350e6a..7b9bc8a4bd48f5 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v.c
@@ -1084,6 +1084,7 @@ void batadv_v_hardif_init(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 
 	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len = 0;
 	skb_queue_head_init(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list);
+	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false;
 	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq,
 			  batadv_v_ogm_aggr_work);
 }
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
index 939aa4b303ad98..12de9b44064dd4 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
@@ -255,11 +255,18 @@ static void batadv_v_ogm_queue_on_if(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	}
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+	if (!hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled) {
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
 	if (!batadv_v_ogm_queue_left(skb, hard_iface))
 		batadv_v_ogm_aggr_send(bat_priv, hard_iface);
 
 	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_len += batadv_v_ogm_len(skb);
 	__skb_queue_tail(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list, skb);
+
+unlock:
 	spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
 }
 
@@ -422,6 +429,10 @@ int batadv_v_ogm_iface_enable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 {
 	struct batadv_priv *bat_priv = netdev_priv(hard_iface->soft_iface);
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = true;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+
 	batadv_v_ogm_start_queue_timer(hard_iface);
 	batadv_v_ogm_start_timer(bat_priv);
 
@@ -437,6 +448,7 @@ void batadv_v_ogm_iface_disable(struct batadv_hard_iface *hard_iface)
 	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_wq);
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
+	hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list_enabled = false;
 	batadv_v_ogm_aggr_list_free(hard_iface);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&hard_iface->bat_v.aggr_list.lock);
 }
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 238d9824c2d62f..28f239421f74a3 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -131,6 +131,12 @@ struct batadv_hard_iface_bat_v {
 	/** @aggr_list: queue for to be aggregated OGM packets */
 	struct sk_buff_head aggr_list;
 
+	/**
+	 * @aggr_list_enabled: aggr_list is active and new skbs can be
+	 * enqueued. Protected by aggr_list.lock after initialization
+	 */
+	bool aggr_list_enabled:1;
+
 	/** @aggr_len: size of the OGM aggregate (excluding ethernet header) */
 	unsigned int aggr_len;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 48/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: restrict number of unacked list entries

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit e7c775110e1858e5a7471a23a9c9658c0af9df89 upstream.

When the unacked_list is unbound, an attacker could send messages with
small lengths and appropriated seqno + gaps to force the receiver to
allocate more and more unacked_list entries. And the end either causing an
out-of-memory situation or increase the management overhead for the (large)
list that significant portions of CPU cycles are wasted in searching
through the list.

When limiting the list to a specific number, it is important to still
correctly add a new entry to the list. But if the list became larger than
the limit, the last entry of the list (with the highest seqno) must be
dropped to still allow the earlier seqnos to finish and therefore to
continue the process. Otherwise, the process might get stuck with too high
seqnos which are not handled by batadv_tp_ack_unordered().

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/types.h    |  3 +++
 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index ea5640242ddc2e..c7de8dfe9b65bd 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@
 #define BATADV_TP_PLEN (BATADV_TP_PACKET_LEN - ETH_HLEN - \
 			sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet))
 
+/**
+ * BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED - maximum number of packets a receiver didn't yet ack
+ */
+#define BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED 100
+
 static u8 batadv_tp_prerandom[4096] __read_mostly;
 
 /**
@@ -1205,6 +1210,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t)
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) {
 		list_del(&un->list);
 		kfree(un);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 
@@ -1317,6 +1323,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 	/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
 	if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) {
 		list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
@@ -1347,12 +1354,24 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 		 */
 		list_add(&new->list, &un->list);
 		added = true;
+		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
 		break;
 	}
 
 	/* received packet with smallest seqno out of order; add it to front */
-	if (!added)
+	if (!added) {
 		list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
+	}
+
+	/* remove the last (biggest) unacked seqno when list is too large */
+	if (tp_vars->unacked_count > BATADV_TP_MAX_UNACKED) {
+		un = list_last_entry(&tp_vars->unacked_list,
+				     struct batadv_tp_unacked, list);
+		list_del(&un->list);
+		kfree(un);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
+	}
 
 out:
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
@@ -1389,6 +1408,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
 
 		list_del(&un->list);
 		kfree(un);
+		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 }
@@ -1438,6 +1458,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 
 	spin_lock_init(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tp_vars->unacked_list);
+	tp_vars->unacked_count = 0;
 
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 28f239421f74a3..b12b0851df6e7e 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -1508,6 +1508,9 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars {
 	/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */
 	spinlock_t unacked_lock;
 
+	/** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */
+	size_t unacked_count;
+
 	/** @last_recv_time: time (jiffies) a msg was received */
 	unsigned long last_recv_time;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 49/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: annotate last_recv_time access with READ/WRITE_ONCE

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit d67c728f07fca2ee6ffdc6dd4421cf2e8691f4d1 upstream.

The last_recv_time field for batadv_tp_receiver tracks the jiffies value of
the most recent activity and is used to detect timeouts. These accesses are
not consistently protected by a lock, so READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE must be used
to prevent data races caused by compiler optimizations.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index c7de8dfe9b65bd..91392e48514d64 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown(struct timer_list *t)
 	bat_priv = tp_vars->bat_priv;
 
 	/* if there is recent activity rearm the timer */
-	if (!batadv_has_timed_out(tp_vars->last_recv_time,
+	if (!batadv_has_timed_out(READ_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time),
 				  BATADV_TP_RECV_TIMEOUT)) {
 		/* reset the receiver shutdown timer */
 		batadv_tp_reset_receiver_timer(tp_vars);
@@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	tp_vars = batadv_tp_list_find_session(bat_priv, icmp->orig,
 					      icmp->session, BATADV_TP_RECEIVER);
 	if (tp_vars) {
-		tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ batadv_tp_init_recv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	timer_setup(&tp_vars->timer, batadv_tp_receiver_shutdown, 0);
 
-	tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+	WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 
 	kref_get(&tp_vars->refcount);
 	hlist_add_head_rcu(&tp_vars->list, &bat_priv->tp_list);
@@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		tp_vars->last_recv_time = jiffies;
+		WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 	}
 
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 50/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: prevent parallel modifications of last_recv

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 6dde0cfcb36e4d5b3de35b75696937478441eed4 upstream.

When last_recv is updated to store the last receive sequence number, it is
assuming that nothing is modifying in parallel while:

* check for outdated packets is done
* out of order check is performed (and packets are stored in out-of-order
  queue)
* the out-of-order queue was searched for closed gaps
* sequence number for next ack is calculated

Nothing of that was actually protected. It could therefore happen that the
last_recv was updated multiple times in parallel and the final sequence
number was calculated with deltas which had no connection to the sequence
number they were added to.

Lock this whole region with the same lock which was already used to protect
the unacked (out-of-order) list.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 22 +++++++++++++---------
 net/batman-adv/types.h    |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index 91392e48514d64..c01ff6e72b5da5 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1303,6 +1303,7 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
  */
 static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 					  const struct sk_buff *skb)
+	__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
 {
 	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new;
@@ -1319,12 +1320,11 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 	payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
 	new->len = payload_len;
 
-	spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 	/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
 	if (list_empty(&tp_vars->unacked_list)) {
 		list_add(&new->list, &tp_vars->unacked_list);
 		tp_vars->unacked_count++;
-		goto out;
+		return true;
 	}
 
 	/* otherwise loop over the list and either drop the packet because this
@@ -1373,9 +1373,6 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
 		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
 
-out:
-	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
-
 	return true;
 }
 
@@ -1385,6 +1382,7 @@ static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
  * @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session
  */
 static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
+	__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
 {
 	struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *safe;
 	u32 to_ack;
@@ -1392,7 +1390,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
 	/* go through the unacked packet list and possibly ACK them as
 	 * well
 	 */
-	spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(un, safe, &tp_vars->unacked_list, list) {
 		/* the list is ordered, therefore it is possible to stop as soon
 		 * there is a gap between the last acked seqno and the seqno of
@@ -1410,7 +1407,6 @@ static void batadv_tp_ack_unordered(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars)
 		kfree(un);
 		tp_vars->unacked_count--;
 	}
-	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1489,6 +1485,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars;
 	size_t packet_size;
+	u32 to_ack;
 	u32 seqno;
 
 	icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data;
@@ -1517,6 +1514,8 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		WRITE_ONCE(tp_vars->last_recv_time, jiffies);
 	}
 
+	spin_lock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
+
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
 	 * lost. Resend the ACK
 	 */
@@ -1528,8 +1527,10 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		/* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has
 		 * not been enqueued correctly
 		 */
-		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb))
+		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) {
+			spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 			goto out;
+		}
 
 		/* send a duplicate ACK */
 		goto send_ack;
@@ -1543,11 +1544,14 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars);
 
 send_ack:
+	to_ack = tp_vars->last_recv;
+	spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
+
 	/* send the ACK. If the received packet was out of order, the ACK that
 	 * is going to be sent is a duplicate (the sender will count them and
 	 * possibly enter Fast Retransmit as soon as it has reached 3)
 	 */
-	batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, tp_vars->last_recv,
+	batadv_tp_send_ack(bat_priv, icmp->orig, to_ack,
 			   icmp->timestamp, icmp->session, icmp->uid);
 out:
 	if (likely(tp_vars))
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index b12b0851df6e7e..437d651a1cffe3 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -1505,7 +1505,7 @@ struct batadv_tp_vars {
 	/** @unacked_list: list of unacked packets (meta-info only) */
 	struct list_head unacked_list;
 
-	/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list */
+	/** @unacked_lock: protect unacked_list + &batadv_tp_receiver.last_recv */
 	spinlock_t unacked_lock;
 
 	/** @unacked_count: number of unacked entries */
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 51/96] batman-adv: tp_meter: handle overlapping packets

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit cbde75c38b21f022891525078622587ad557b7c1 upstream.

If the size of the packets would change during the transmission, it could
happen that some retries of packets are overlapping. In this case, precise
comparisons of sequence numbers by the receiver would be wrong. It is then
necessary to check if the start sequence number to the end sequence number
("seqno + length") would contain a new range.

If this is the case then this is enough to accept this packet. In all other
cases, the packet still has to be dropped (and not acked).

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 33a3bb4a3345 ("batman-adv: throughput meter implementation")
[ Switch to pre-splitted tp_vars structure names ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c | 25 +++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
index c01ff6e72b5da5..3a1561f5791987 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tp_meter.c
@@ -1293,7 +1293,8 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
 /**
  * batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order() - store an out of order packet
  * @tp_vars: the private data of the current TP meter session
- * @skb: the buffer containing the received packet
+ * @seqno: sequence number of new received packet
+ * @payload_len: length of the received packet
  *
  * Store the out of order packet in the unacked list for late processing. This
  * packets are kept in this list so that they can be ACKed at once as soon as
@@ -1302,22 +1303,17 @@ static int batadv_tp_send_ack(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, const u8 *dst,
  * Return: true if the packed has been successfully processed, false otherwise
  */
 static bool batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars,
-					  const struct sk_buff *skb)
+					  u32 seqno, u32 payload_len)
 	__must_hold(&tp_vars->unacked_lock)
 {
-	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_unacked *un, *new;
-	u32 payload_len;
 	bool added = false;
 
 	new = kmalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (unlikely(!new))
 		return false;
 
-	icmp = (struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *)skb->data;
-
-	new->seqno = ntohl(icmp->seqno);
-	payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
+	new->seqno = seqno;
 	new->len = payload_len;
 
 	/* if the list is empty immediately attach this new object */
@@ -1484,7 +1480,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 {
 	const struct batadv_icmp_tp_packet *icmp;
 	struct batadv_tp_vars *tp_vars;
-	size_t packet_size;
+	u32 payload_len;
 	u32 to_ack;
 	u32 seqno;
 
@@ -1519,15 +1515,17 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	/* if the packet is a duplicate, it may be the case that an ACK has been
 	 * lost. Resend the ACK
 	 */
-	if (batadv_seq_before(seqno, tp_vars->last_recv))
+	payload_len = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
+	to_ack = seqno + payload_len;
+	if (batadv_seq_before(to_ack, tp_vars->last_recv))
 		goto send_ack;
 
 	/* if the packet is out of order enqueue it */
-	if (ntohl(icmp->seqno) != tp_vars->last_recv) {
+	if (batadv_seq_before(tp_vars->last_recv, seqno)) {
 		/* exit immediately (and do not send any ACK) if the packet has
 		 * not been enqueued correctly
 		 */
-		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, skb)) {
+		if (!batadv_tp_handle_out_of_order(tp_vars, seqno, payload_len)) {
 			spin_unlock_bh(&tp_vars->unacked_lock);
 			goto out;
 		}
@@ -1537,8 +1535,7 @@ static void batadv_tp_recv_msg(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	}
 
 	/* if everything was fine count the ACKed bytes */
-	packet_size = skb->len - sizeof(struct batadv_unicast_packet);
-	tp_vars->last_recv += packet_size;
+	tp_vars->last_recv = to_ack;
 
 	/* check if this ordered message filled a gap.... */
 	batadv_tp_ack_unordered(tp_vars);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 52/96] batman-adv: tt: dont merge change entries with different VIDs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit f08e06c2d5c3e2434e7c773f2213f4a7dce6bc1e upstream.

batadv_tt_local_event() merges/cancels events for the same client which
would conflict or be duplicates. The matching of the queued events only
compares the MAC address - the VLAN ID stored in each event is ignored.

If a MAC would now appear on multiple VID, the two ADD change events (for
VID 1 and VID 2) would be merged to a single vid event. The remote can
therefore not calculate the correct TT table and desync. A full translation
table exchange is required to recover from this state.

A check of VID is therefore necessary to avoid such wrong merges/cancels.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index 79da90b9cf0659..c323660897d43d 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -486,6 +486,9 @@ static void batadv_tt_local_event(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (!batadv_compare_eth(entry->change.addr, common->addr))
 			continue;
 
+		if (entry->change.vid != tt_change_node->change.vid)
+			continue;
+
 		/* DEL+ADD in the same orig interval have no effect and can be
 		 * removed to avoid silly behaviour on the receiver side. The
 		 * other way around (ADD+DEL) can happen in case of roaming of
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 53/96] batman-adv: tt: track roam count per VID

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 12407d5f61c2653a64f2ff4b22f3c267f8420ef1 upstream.

batadv_tt_check_roam_count() is supposed to track roaming of a TT entry.
But TT entries are for a MAC + VID. The VID was completely missed and thus
leads to incorrect detection of ROAM counts when a client MAC exists in
multiple VLANs.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: c018ad3de61a ("batman-adv: add the VLAN ID attribute to the TT entry")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 9 +++++++--
 net/batman-adv/types.h             | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index c323660897d43d..4b3f39d6ddaf5b 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -3753,6 +3753,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
  * batadv_tt_check_roam_count() - check if a client has roamed too frequently
  * @bat_priv: the bat priv with all the soft interface information
  * @client: mac address of the roaming client
+ * @vid: VLAN identifier
  *
  * This function checks whether the client already reached the
  * maximum number of possible roaming phases. In this case the ROAMING_ADV
@@ -3760,7 +3761,7 @@ static void batadv_tt_roam_purge(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv)
  *
  * Return: true if the ROAMING_ADV can be sent, false otherwise
  */
-static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
+static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client, u16 vid)
 {
 	struct batadv_tt_roam_node *tt_roam_node;
 	bool ret = false;
@@ -3773,6 +3774,9 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
 		if (!batadv_compare_eth(tt_roam_node->addr, client))
 			continue;
 
+		if (tt_roam_node->vid != vid)
+			continue;
+
 		if (batadv_has_timed_out(tt_roam_node->first_time,
 					 BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_TIME))
 			continue;
@@ -3794,6 +3798,7 @@ static bool batadv_tt_check_roam_count(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client)
 		atomic_set(&tt_roam_node->counter,
 			   BATADV_ROAMING_MAX_COUNT - 1);
 		ether_addr_copy(tt_roam_node->addr, client);
+		tt_roam_node->vid = vid;
 
 		list_add(&tt_roam_node->list, &bat_priv->tt.roam_list);
 		ret = true;
@@ -3830,7 +3835,7 @@ static void batadv_send_roam_adv(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, u8 *client,
 	/* before going on we have to check whether the client has
 	 * already roamed to us too many times
 	 */
-	if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client))
+	if (!batadv_tt_check_roam_count(bat_priv, client, vid))
 		goto out;
 
 	batadv_dbg(BATADV_DBG_TT, bat_priv,
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 437d651a1cffe3..88831374e81747 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -2059,6 +2059,9 @@ struct batadv_tt_roam_node {
 	/** @addr: mac address of the client in the roaming phase */
 	u8 addr[ETH_ALEN];
 
+	/** @vid: VLAN identifier */
+	u16 vid;
+
 	/**
 	 * @counter: number of allowed roaming events per client within a single
 	 * OGM interval (changes are committed with each OGM)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 54/96] batman-adv: dat: prevent false sharing between VLANs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 20d7658b74169f86d4ac01b9185b3eadddf71f28 upstream.

The local hash of DAT entries is supposed to be VLAN (VID) aware. But
the adding to the hash and the search in the hash were not checking the VID
information of the hash entries. The entries would therefore only be
correctly separated when batadv_hash_dat() didn't select the same buckets
for different VIDs.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: be1db4f6615b ("batman-adv: make the Distributed ARP Table vlan aware")
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c | 12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c
index 9d27d7d7b2b4b4..592b61a2e7911e 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/distributed-arp-table.c
@@ -216,10 +216,13 @@ static void batadv_dat_purge(struct work_struct *work)
  */
 static bool batadv_compare_dat(const struct hlist_node *node, const void *data2)
 {
-	const void *data1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry,
-					 hash_entry);
+	const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry1;
+	const struct batadv_dat_entry *entry2;
 
-	return memcmp(data1, data2, sizeof(__be32)) == 0;
+	entry1 = container_of(node, struct batadv_dat_entry, hash_entry);
+	entry2 = data2;
+
+	return entry1->ip == entry2->ip && entry1->vid == entry2->vid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -346,6 +349,9 @@ batadv_dat_entry_hash_find(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv, __be32 ip,
 		if (dat_entry->ip != ip)
 			continue;
 
+		if (dat_entry->vid != vid)
+			continue;
+
 		if (!kref_get_unless_zero(&dat_entry->refcount))
 			continue;
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 55/96] batman-adv: tvlv: enforce 2-byte alignment

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit 32a6799255525d6ea4da0f7e9e0e521ad9560a46 upstream.

The fields of an aggregated OGM(v2) are accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset. As the header
length is even, an odd tvlv_len would misalign it and trigger unaligned
accesses on strict-alignment architectures.

Such a misaligned TVLV/OGM/OGMv2 is not created by a normal participant in
the mesh. Therefore, reject such malformed packets.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure")
[ Drop change for non-existing mcast handling ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c  | 11 ++++++++++-
 net/batman-adv/tvlv.c       |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c
index 93c2c5f6facc0d..cc4fbfd0b75530 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_iv_ogm.c
@@ -312,14 +312,23 @@ batadv_iv_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len,
 			  const struct batadv_ogm_packet *ogm_packet)
 {
 	int next_buff_pos = 0;
+	u16 tvlv_len;
 
 	/* check if there is enough space for the header */
 	next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm_packet);
 	if (next_buff_pos > packet_len)
 		return false;
 
+	tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len);
+
+	/* the fields of an aggregated OGM are accessed assuming (at least)
+	 * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGM must start at an even offset.
+	 */
+	if (tvlv_len & 1)
+		return false;
+
 	/* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */
-	next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm_packet->tvlv_len);
+	next_buff_pos += tvlv_len;
 
 	return next_buff_pos <= packet_len;
 }
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
index 12de9b44064dd4..2a62ab13bf87bb 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/bat_v_ogm.c
@@ -864,14 +864,23 @@ batadv_v_ogm_aggr_packet(int buff_pos, int packet_len,
 			 const struct batadv_ogm2_packet *ogm2_packet)
 {
 	int next_buff_pos = 0;
+	u16 tvlv_len;
 
 	/* check if there is enough space for the header */
 	next_buff_pos += buff_pos + sizeof(*ogm2_packet);
 	if (next_buff_pos > packet_len)
 		return false;
 
+	tvlv_len = ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len);
+
+	/* the fields of an aggregated OGMv2 are accessed assuming (at least)
+	 * 2-byte alignment, so a following OGMv2 must start at an even offset.
+	 */
+	if (tvlv_len & 1)
+		return false;
+
 	/* check if there is enough space for the optional TVLV */
-	next_buff_pos += ntohs(ogm2_packet->tvlv_len);
+	next_buff_pos += tvlv_len;
 
 	return next_buff_pos <= packet_len;
 }
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
index 8da8184a2ebdfc..84f0fb175b3313 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
@@ -448,6 +448,12 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len)
 			break;
 
+		/* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
+		 * alignment, so it must start at an even offset.
+		 */
+		if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1)
+			break;
+
 		tvlv_handler = batadv_tvlv_handler_get(bat_priv,
 						       tvlv_hdr->type,
 						       tvlv_hdr->version);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 56/96] batman-adv: tvlv: avoid race of cifsnotfound handler state

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>

commit edb557b2ba38fea2c5eb710cf366c797e187218c upstream.

TVLV handlers can have the flag BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND set to
signal that the OGM handler should be called (with NULL for data) when the
specific TVLV container was not found in the OGM. This is used by:

* DAT
* GW
* Multicast (OGM + Tracker)

The state whether the handler was executed was stored in the struct
batadv_tvlv_handler. But the TVLV processing is started without any lock.
Multiple parallel contexts processing TVLVs would therefore overwrite each
others BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag in the shared
batadv_tvlv_handler.

Drop the shared BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED flag and instead determine,
per TVLV buffer, whether a matching container was present by scanning the
packet's buffer.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: ef26157747d4 ("batman-adv: tvlv - basic infrastructure")
[ Context ]
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/batman-adv/tvlv.c  | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 net/batman-adv/types.h |  7 -----
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
index 84f0fb175b3313..2c224951d0195c 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/tvlv.c
@@ -394,7 +394,6 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 		tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
 					  BATADV_NO_FLAGS,
 					  tvlv_value, tvlv_value_len);
-		tvlv_handler->flags |= BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED;
 	} else {
 		if (!src)
 			return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
@@ -413,6 +412,48 @@ static int batadv_tvlv_call_handler(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	return NET_RX_SUCCESS;
 }
 
+/**
+ * batadv_tvlv_containers_contain() - check if a tvlv buffer holds a container
+ * @tvlv_value: tvlv content
+ * @tvlv_value_len: tvlv content length
+ * @type: tvlv container type to look for
+ * @version: tvlv container version to look for
+ *
+ * Return: true if a container of the given type and version is present in the
+ * tvlv buffer, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(void *tvlv_value,
+					   u16 tvlv_value_len, u8 type,
+					   u8 version)
+{
+	struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr;
+	u16 tvlv_value_cont_len;
+
+	while (tvlv_value_len >= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr)) {
+		tvlv_hdr = tvlv_value;
+		tvlv_value_cont_len = ntohs(tvlv_hdr->len);
+		tvlv_value = tvlv_hdr + 1;
+		tvlv_value_len -= sizeof(*tvlv_hdr);
+
+		if (tvlv_value_cont_len > tvlv_value_len)
+			break;
+
+		/* the next tvlv header is accessed assuming (at least) 2-byte
+		 * alignment, so it must start at an even offset.
+		 */
+		if (tvlv_value_cont_len & 1)
+			break;
+
+		if (tvlv_hdr->type == type && tvlv_hdr->version == version)
+			return true;
+
+		tvlv_value = (u8 *)tvlv_value + tvlv_value_cont_len;
+		tvlv_value_len -= tvlv_value_cont_len;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /**
  * batadv_tvlv_containers_process() - parse the given tvlv buffer to call the
  *  appropriate handlers
@@ -433,7 +474,9 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 				   u8 *src, u8 *dst,
 				   void *tvlv_value, u16 tvlv_value_len)
 {
+	u16 tvlv_value_start_len = tvlv_value_len;
 	struct batadv_tvlv_handler *tvlv_handler;
+	void *tvlv_value_start = tvlv_value;
 	struct batadv_tvlv_hdr *tvlv_hdr;
 	u16 tvlv_value_cont_len;
 	u8 cifnotfound = BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND;
@@ -474,12 +517,20 @@ int batadv_tvlv_containers_process(struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(tvlv_handler,
 				 &bat_priv->tvlv.handler_list, list) {
-		if ((tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND) &&
-		    !(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED))
-			tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
-						  cifnotfound, NULL, 0);
+		if (!(tvlv_handler->flags & BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND))
+			continue;
 
-		tvlv_handler->flags &= ~BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED;
+		/* if the corresponding container was present then the handler
+		 * was already called from the loop above
+		 */
+		if (batadv_tvlv_containers_contain(tvlv_value_start,
+						   tvlv_value_start_len,
+						   tvlv_handler->type,
+						   tvlv_handler->version))
+			continue;
+
+		tvlv_handler->ogm_handler(bat_priv, orig_node,
+					  cifnotfound, NULL, 0);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/types.h b/net/batman-adv/types.h
index 88831374e81747..79ffd25fd4eba2 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/types.h
+++ b/net/batman-adv/types.h
@@ -2492,13 +2492,6 @@ enum batadv_tvlv_handler_flags {
 	 *  will call this handler even if its type was not found (with no data)
 	 */
 	BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND = BIT(1),
-
-	/**
-	 * @BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED: interval tvlv handling flag - the
-	 *  API marks a handler as being called, so it won't be called if the
-	 *  BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CIFNOTFND flag was set
-	 */
-	BATADV_TVLV_HANDLER_OGM_CALLED = BIT(2),
 };
 
 /**
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 57/96] ring-buffer: Remove ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>

[ Upstream commit 119a5d573622ae90ba730d18acfae9bb75d77b9a ]

When the ring buffer was first introduced, reading the non-consuming
"trace" file required disabling the writing of the ring buffer. To make
sure the writing was fully disabled before iterating the buffer with a
non-consuming read, it would set the disable flag of the buffer and then
call an RCU synchronization to make sure all the buffers were
synchronized.

The function ring_buffer_read_start() originally  would initialize the
iterator and call an RCU synchronization, but this was for each individual
per CPU buffer where this would get called many times on a machine with
many CPUs before the trace file could be read. The commit 72c9ddfd4c5bf
("ring-buffer: Make non-consuming read less expensive with lots of cpus.")
separated ring_buffer_read_start into ring_buffer_read_prepare(),
ring_buffer_read_sync() and then ring_buffer_read_start() to allow each of
the per CPU buffers to be prepared, call the read_buffer_read_sync() once,
and then the ring_buffer_read_start() for each of the CPUs which made
things much faster.

The commit 1039221cc278 ("ring-buffer: Do not disable recording when there
is an iterator") removed the requirement of disabling the recording of the
ring buffer in order to iterate it, but it did not remove the
synchronization that was happening that was required to wait for all the
buffers to have no more writers. It's now OK for the buffers to have
writers and no synchronization is needed.

Remove the synchronization and put back the interface for the ring buffer
iterator back before commit 72c9ddfd4c5bf was applied.

Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250630180440.3eabb514@batman.local.home
Reported-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1039221cc278 ("ring-buffer: Do not disable recording when there is an iterator")
Tested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>

Assisted-by: Kiro:claude-opus-4.8
[doebel@amazon.de: move patch section using guard() macro into a
separate block to address declaration after statement warning.]
Signed-off-by: Bjoern Doebel <doebel@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/ring_buffer.h |  4 +--
 kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c  | 72 ++++++++-----------------------------
 kernel/trace/trace.c        | 14 +++-----
 kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c    |  8 ++---
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 76 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ring_buffer.h b/include/linux/ring_buffer.h
index 7d5a78f49d43dd..be5c1209224695 100644
--- a/include/linux/ring_buffer.h
+++ b/include/linux/ring_buffer.h
@@ -128,9 +128,7 @@ ring_buffer_consume(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, u64 *ts,
 		    unsigned long *lost_events);
 
 struct ring_buffer_iter *
-ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
-void ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync(void);
-void ring_buffer_read_start(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter);
+ring_buffer_read_start(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags);
 void ring_buffer_read_finish(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter);
 
 struct ring_buffer_event *
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 03a7127efc5a8a..1089daa17b09e2 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -4858,28 +4858,20 @@ ring_buffer_consume(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, u64 *ts,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_consume);
 
 /**
- * ring_buffer_read_prepare - Prepare for a non consuming read of the buffer
+ * ring_buffer_read_start - start a non consuming read of the buffer
  * @buffer: The ring buffer to read from
  * @cpu: The cpu buffer to iterate over
  * @flags: gfp flags to use for memory allocation
  *
- * This performs the initial preparations necessary to iterate
- * through the buffer.  Memory is allocated, buffer recording
- * is disabled, and the iterator pointer is returned to the caller.
- *
- * Disabling buffer recording prevents the reading from being
- * corrupted. This is not a consuming read, so a producer is not
- * expected.
- *
- * After a sequence of ring_buffer_read_prepare calls, the user is
- * expected to make at least one call to ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync.
- * Afterwards, ring_buffer_read_start is invoked to get things going
- * for real.
+ * This creates an iterator to allow non-consuming iteration through
+ * the buffer. If the buffer is disabled for writing, it will produce
+ * the same information each time, but if the buffer is still writing
+ * then the first hit of a write will cause the iteration to stop.
  *
- * This overall must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
+ * Must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
  */
 struct ring_buffer_iter *
-ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
+ring_buffer_read_start(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
 	struct ring_buffer_iter *iter;
@@ -4904,51 +4896,15 @@ ring_buffer_read_prepare(struct trace_buffer *buffer, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
 
 	atomic_inc(&cpu_buffer->resize_disabled);
 
-	return iter;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_prepare);
+	{
+		guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock);
 
-/**
- * ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync - Synchronize a set of prepare calls
- *
- * All previously invoked ring_buffer_read_prepare calls to prepare
- * iterators will be synchronized.  Afterwards, read_buffer_read_start
- * calls on those iterators are allowed.
- */
-void
-ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync(void)
-{
-	synchronize_rcu();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync);
-
-/**
- * ring_buffer_read_start - start a non consuming read of the buffer
- * @iter: The iterator returned by ring_buffer_read_prepare
- *
- * This finalizes the startup of an iteration through the buffer.
- * The iterator comes from a call to ring_buffer_read_prepare and
- * an intervening ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync must have been
- * performed.
- *
- * Must be paired with ring_buffer_read_finish.
- */
-void
-ring_buffer_read_start(struct ring_buffer_iter *iter)
-{
-	struct ring_buffer_per_cpu *cpu_buffer;
-	unsigned long flags;
-
-	if (!iter)
-		return;
-
-	cpu_buffer = iter->cpu_buffer;
+		arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
+		rb_iter_reset(iter);
+		arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
+	}
 
-	raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
-	arch_spin_lock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
-	rb_iter_reset(iter);
-	arch_spin_unlock(&cpu_buffer->lock);
-	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cpu_buffer->reader_lock, flags);
+	return iter;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ring_buffer_read_start);
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c
index 5bcd4cbeeb4fe1..ed32d3c4f0e76b 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c
@@ -4480,21 +4480,15 @@ __tracing_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, bool snapshot)
 	if (iter->cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
 		for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
 			iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
-				ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
-							 cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
-		}
-		ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
-		for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
-			ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
+				ring_buffer_read_start(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
+						       cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
 			tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
 		}
 	} else {
 		cpu = iter->cpu_file;
 		iter->buffer_iter[cpu] =
-			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
-						 cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
-		ring_buffer_read_prepare_sync();
-		ring_buffer_read_start(iter->buffer_iter[cpu]);
+			ring_buffer_read_start(iter->array_buffer->buffer,
+					       cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
 		tracing_iter_reset(iter, cpu);
 	}
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c b/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c
index 9da76104f7a28b..18d1551db2b0d5 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_kdb.c
@@ -43,17 +43,15 @@ static void ftrace_dump_buf(int skip_entries, long cpu_file)
 	if (cpu_file == RING_BUFFER_ALL_CPUS) {
 		for_each_tracing_cpu(cpu) {
 			iter.buffer_iter[cpu] =
-			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
-						 cpu, GFP_ATOMIC);
-			ring_buffer_read_start(iter.buffer_iter[cpu]);
+			ring_buffer_read_start(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
+					       cpu, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			tracing_iter_reset(&iter, cpu);
 		}
 	} else {
 		iter.cpu_file = cpu_file;
 		iter.buffer_iter[cpu_file] =
-			ring_buffer_read_prepare(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
+			ring_buffer_read_start(iter.array_buffer->buffer,
 						 cpu_file, GFP_ATOMIC);
-		ring_buffer_read_start(iter.buffer_iter[cpu_file]);
 		tracing_iter_reset(&iter, cpu_file);
 	}
 
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 58/96] ext4: add bounds check for inline data length in ext4_read_inline_page

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuto Ohnuki <ytohnuki@amazon.com>

[ Upstream commit 356227096eb66e41b23caf7045e6304877322edf ]

ext4_read_inline_page() does not validate that the inline data length
fits within a page before copying data. If the inline size exceeds
PAGE_SIZE due to filesystem corruption, this could lead to a kernel
memory write beyond the page boundary.

Add a bounds check after computing len, returning -EFSCORRUPTED if the
value exceeds PAGE_SIZE.

The upstream commit replaced a BUG_ON(len > PAGE_SIZE) in
ext4_read_inline_folio(). In 6.1 and earlier, the function is still named
ext4_read_inline_page() and the BUG_ON was never present, so this patch
adds the bounds check directly.

Fixes: 46c7f254543d ("ext4: add read support for inline data")
Signed-off-by: Yuto Ohnuki <ytohnuki@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ext4/inline.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c
index 129f7ff56b43bd..edaa8820226070 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/inline.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c
@@ -513,6 +513,14 @@ static int ext4_read_inline_page(struct inode *inode, struct page *page)
 		goto out;
 
 	len = min_t(size_t, ext4_get_inline_size(inode), i_size_read(inode));
+	if (len > PAGE_SIZE) {
+		ext4_error_inode(inode, __func__, __LINE__, 0,
+				 "inline size %zu exceeds PAGE_SIZE", len);
+		ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+		brelse(iloc.bh);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 	kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
 	ret = ext4_read_inline_data(inode, kaddr, len, &iloc);
 	flush_dcache_page(page);
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 59/96] crypto: af_alg - Set merge to zero early in af_alg_sendmsg

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

commit 9574b2330dbd2b5459b74d3b5e9619d39299fc6f upstream.

If an error causes af_alg_sendmsg to abort, ctx->merge may contain
a garbage value from the previous loop.  This may then trigger a
crash on the next entry into af_alg_sendmsg when it attempts to do
a merge that can't be done.

Fix this by setting ctx->merge to zero near the start of the loop.

Fixes: 8ff590903d5 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - User-space interface for skcipher operations")
Reported-by: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <ramdhan@starlabs.sg>
Reported-by: Bing-Jhong Billy Jheng <billy@starlabs.sg>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Dmitrichenko <mdmitrichenko@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/af_alg.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c
index 4983dd68578e24..6acee8e0041a42 100644
--- a/crypto/af_alg.c
+++ b/crypto/af_alg.c
@@ -892,6 +892,8 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size,
 			continue;
 		}
 
+		ctx->merge = 0;
+
 		if (!af_alg_writable(sk)) {
 			err = af_alg_wait_for_wmem(sk, msg->msg_flags);
 			if (err)
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 60/96] net: cpsw_new: Fix potential unregister of netdev that has not been registered yet

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>

commit 9d724b34fbe13b71865ad0906a4be97571f19cf5 upstream.

If an error occurs during register_netdev() for the first MAC in
cpsw_register_ports(), even though cpsw->slaves[0].ndev is set to NULL,
cpsw->slaves[1].ndev would remain unchanged. This could later cause
cpsw_unregister_ports() to attempt unregistering the second MAC.
To address this, add a check for ndev->reg_state before calling
unregister_netdev(). With this change, setting cpsw->slaves[i].ndev
to NULL becomes unnecessary and can be removed accordingly.

Fixes: ed3525eda4c4 ("net: ethernet: ti: introduce cpsw switchdev based driver part 1 - dual-emac")
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205-cpsw-error-path-v1-2-6e58bae6b299@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Wenshan Lan <jetlan9@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Elizaveta Tereshkina <etereshkina@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_new.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_new.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_new.c
index 66b1620b6f5b0e..cc276241f39161 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_new.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_new.c
@@ -1456,7 +1456,8 @@ static void cpsw_unregister_ports(struct cpsw_common *cpsw)
 	int i = 0;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < cpsw->data.slaves; i++) {
-		if (!cpsw->slaves[i].ndev)
+		if (!cpsw->slaves[i].ndev ||
+		    cpsw->slaves[i].ndev->reg_state != NETREG_REGISTERED)
 			continue;
 
 		unregister_netdev(cpsw->slaves[i].ndev);
@@ -1476,7 +1477,6 @@ static int cpsw_register_ports(struct cpsw_common *cpsw)
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(cpsw->dev,
 				"cpsw: err registering net device%d\n", i);
-			cpsw->slaves[i].ndev = NULL;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
-- 
2.53.0

[PATCH 5.10 61/96] mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>

commit 84a04eb5b210643bd67aab81ff805d32f62aa865 upstream.

llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(),
llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform
in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data.  They build a
scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area
and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API
(e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).

On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb
before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame().  The
cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference
counting.  When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared
buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially
belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.

On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has
been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).

The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto
operation.  skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not
shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments,
it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in
place.  This is the same pattern used by:

  - ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c)
  - MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c)
  - WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)
  - TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c)

Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to:
  - Silent data corruption of other skb clones
  - Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a
    page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb()
  - Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security
    enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free)

Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis.

Fixes: 4c14a2fb5d14 ("mac802154: add llsec decryption method")
Fixes: 03556e4d0dbb ("mac802154: add llsec encryption method")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-wpan/20260525161806.96158-1-doruk@0sec.ai/
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Closes: <link to your mail on lore>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260526183726.56100-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/mac802154/llsec.c |   14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

--- a/net/mac802154/llsec.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/llsec.c
@@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80
 {
 	struct ieee802154_hdr hdr;
 	int rc, authlen, hlen;
+	struct sk_buff *trailer;
 	struct mac802154_llsec_key *key;
 	u32 frame_ctr;
 
@@ -766,6 +767,12 @@ int mac802154_llsec_encrypt(struct mac80
 	skb->mac_len = ieee802154_hdr_push(skb, &hdr);
 	skb_reset_mac_header(skb);
 
+	rc = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		llsec_key_put(key);
+		return rc;
+	}
+
 	rc = llsec_do_encrypt(skb, sec, &hdr, key);
 	llsec_key_put(key);
 
@@ -905,6 +912,13 @@ llsec_do_decrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, co
 		 const struct ieee802154_hdr *hdr,
 		 struct mac802154_llsec_key *key, __le64 dev_addr)
 {
+	struct sk_buff *trailer;
+	int err;
+
+	err = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
 	if (hdr->sec.level == IEEE802154_SCF_SECLEVEL_ENC)
 		return llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(skb, sec, hdr, key, dev_addr);
 	else

[PATCH 5.10 62/96] KEYS: fix overflow in keyctl_pkey_params_get_2()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

commit cb481e59ea6cae3b7796ac1d7a22b6b24c3f3c0b upstream.

The length for the internal output buffer is calculated incorrectly, which
can result overflow when a too small buffer is provided.

Fix the bug by allocating internal output with the size of the maximum
length of the cryptographic primitive instead of caller provided size.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260531024914.3712130-1-jarkko@kernel.org/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+
Fixes: 00d60fd3b932 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Reported-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alessandro Groppo <ale.grpp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c |    9 ++++++++-
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c
@@ -138,28 +138,35 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(cons
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_dec_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_enc_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
 		if (uparams.in_len  > info.max_data_size ||
 		    uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
 			return -EINVAL;
+
+		params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
 
 	params->in_len  = uparams.in_len;
-	params->out_len = uparams.out_len; /* Note: same as in2_len */
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 63/96] keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>

commit fd15b457a86939c38aa12116adabd8ff686c5e51 upstream.

A: request_key()       B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================       =========================

create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
                       get auth key
                       load rka from auth key
                       copy user payload
                       sleep on #PF

helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key
                       wake up
                       use rka->target_key
                       **USE-AFTER-FREE**

Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount.  Take a payload reference while
authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state.  Hold that
reference across the instantiate and reject paths.  Drop the auth key
owning reference from revoke and destroy.

[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
 concurrency scenario.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Reported-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260519144403.436694-1-eeesssooo020@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Shaomin Chen <eeesssooo020@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h |    2 ++
 security/keys/internal.h             |    2 ++
 security/keys/keyctl.c               |   24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c     |   33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/request_key_auth-type.h
@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@
 #define _KEYS_REQUEST_KEY_AUTH_TYPE_H
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
 
 /*
  * Authorisation record for request_key().
  */
 struct request_key_auth {
 	struct rcu_head		rcu;
+	refcount_t		usage;
 	struct key		*target_key;
 	struct key		*dest_keyring;
 	const struct cred	*cred;
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ extern struct key *request_key_auth_new(
 					const void *callout_info,
 					size_t callout_len,
 					struct key *dest_keyring);
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey);
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka);
 
 extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id);
 
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -1196,9 +1196,13 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
 	payload = NULL;
@@ -1207,7 +1211,7 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		payload = kvmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!payload)
-			goto error;
+			goto error_put_rka;
 
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 		if (!copy_from_iter_full(payload, plen, from))
@@ -1233,6 +1237,8 @@ static long keyctl_instantiate_key_commo
 
 error2:
 	kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1358,15 +1364,19 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id,
 	if (!instkey)
 		goto error;
 
-	rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
-	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+	rka = request_key_auth_get(instkey);
+	if (!rka) {
+		ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
 		goto error;
+	}
+	if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
 	 * writable) */
 	ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto error;
+		goto error_put_rka;
 
 	/* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
 	ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
@@ -1379,6 +1389,8 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id,
 	if (ret == 0)
 		keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
 
+error_put_rka:
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 error:
 	return ret;
 }
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(co
 static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *);
 static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *);
 static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
+static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *);
 
 /*
  * The request-key authorisation key type definition.
@@ -116,6 +117,31 @@ static void free_request_key_auth(struct
 }
 
 /*
+ * Take a reference to the request-key authorisation payload so callers can
+ * drop authkey->sem before doing operations that may sleep.
+ */
+struct request_key_auth *request_key_auth_get(struct key *authkey)
+{
+	struct request_key_auth *rka;
+
+	down_read(&authkey->sem);
+	rka = dereference_key_locked(authkey);
+	if (rka && !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &authkey->flags))
+		refcount_inc(&rka->usage);
+	else
+		rka = NULL;
+	up_read(&authkey->sem);
+
+	return rka;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_put(struct request_key_auth *rka)
+{
+	if (rka && refcount_dec_and_test(&rka->usage))
+		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+}
+
+/*
  * Dispose of the request_key_auth record under RCU conditions
  */
 static void request_key_auth_rcu_disposal(struct rcu_head *rcu)
@@ -136,8 +162,10 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(stru
 	struct request_key_auth *rka = dereference_key_locked(key);
 
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
+	if (!rka)
+		return;
 	rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-	call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+	request_key_auth_put(rka);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -150,7 +178,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(str
 	kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
 	if (rka) {
 		rcu_assign_keypointer(key, NULL);
-		call_rcu(&rka->rcu, request_key_auth_rcu_disposal);
+		request_key_auth_put(rka);
 	}
 }
 
@@ -174,6 +202,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct
 	rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rka)
 		goto error;
+	refcount_set(&rka->usage, 1);
 	rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!rka->callout_info)
 		goto error_free_rka;

[PATCH 5.10 64/96] wifi: mt76: mt76x2u: Add support for ELECOM WDC-867SU3S

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zenm Chen <zenmchen@gmail.com>

commit f4ce0664e9f0387873b181777891741c33e19465 upstream.

Add the ID 056e:400a to the table to support an additional MT7612U
adapter: ELECOM WDC-867SU3S.

Compile tested only.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.x
Signed-off-by: Zenm Chen <zenmchen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260407154430.9184-1-zenmchen@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76x2/usb.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id mt76x2
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7612) },	/* Aukey USBAC1200 - Alfa AWUS036ACM */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x057c, 0x8503) },	/* Avm FRITZ!WLAN AC860 */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x7392, 0xb711) },	/* Edimax EW 7722 UAC */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(0x056e, 0x400a) },	/* ELECOM WDC-867SU3S */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x7632) },	/* HC-M7662BU1 */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x2126) }, /* LiteOn WN4516R module, nonstandard USB connector */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(0x0471, 0x7600) }, /* LiteOn WN4519R module, nonstandard USB connector */

[PATCH 5.10 65/96] wifi: ath11k: fix warning when unbinding

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>

commit 8b7a26b6681922a38cd5a7829ace61f8e54df9b7 upstream.

If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware,
the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released.
However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath11k_pci),
and we get:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6231 at mm/slub.c:4368 free_large_kmalloc+0x57/0x90
Call Trace:
free_large_kmalloc
ath11k_dp_free
ath11k_core_deinit
ath11k_pci_remove
...

The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing
initialization is failing.

In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in
order to avoid the double free.

Fixes: d5c65159f289 ("ath11k: driver for Qualcomm IEEE 802.11ax devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Baochen Qiang <baochen.qiang@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Rameshkumar Sundaram <rameshkumar.sundaram@oss.qualcomm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260420110130.509670-1-jtornosm@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <jeff.johnson@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath11k/dp.c
@@ -1015,6 +1015,7 @@ void ath11k_dp_free(struct ath11k_base *
 		idr_destroy(&dp->tx_ring[i].txbuf_idr);
 		spin_unlock_bh(&dp->tx_ring[i].tx_idr_lock);
 		kfree(dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status);
+		dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status = NULL;
 	}
 
 	/* Deinit any SOC level resource */

[PATCH 5.10 66/96] wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Fix C2H bit location in RX descriptor

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>

commit 83d38df6929118c3f996b9e3351c2d5014073d87 upstream.

Bit 28 of double word 2 in the RX descriptor indicates if the packet is
a normal 802.11 frame, or a message from the wifi firmware to the
driver (Card 2 Host).

Commit f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation
macros") mistakenly made the driver look for this bit in double word 1,
causing packet loss and Bluetooth coexistence problems.

Fixes: f5678bfe1cdc ("rtlwifi: rtl8821ae: Replace local bit manipulation macros")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Bitterblue Smith <rtl8821cerfe2@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Ping-Ke Shih <pkshih@realtek.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/04da7398-cedb-425a-a810-5772ab10139d@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8821ae/trx.h
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ static inline int get_rx_desc_paggr(__le
 
 static inline int get_rx_status_desc_rpt_sel(__le32 *__pdesc)
 {
-	return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 1), BIT(28));
+	return le32_get_bits(*(__pdesc + 2), BIT(28));
 }
 
 static inline int get_rx_desc_rxmcs(__le32 *__pdesc)

[PATCH 5.10 67/96] f2fs: validate ACL entry sizes in f2fs_acl_from_disk()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>

commit c4810ada31e80cbe4011467c4f3b1e93f94134f3 upstream.

f2fs_acl_count() only validates the aggregate ACL xattr length. A
malformed ACL can still place ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP in a slot that only
contains struct f2fs_acl_entry_short bytes, and f2fs_acl_from_disk()
then reads entry->e_id before verifying that a full entry fits.

Require a short entry before reading e_tag and e_perm, and require a
full entry before reading e_id for ACL_USER and ACL_GROUP. Return
-EFSCORRUPTED from these new truncated-entry checks, while keeping the
pre-existing -EINVAL paths unchanged.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0
RIP: 0033:0x7f4b835ea7aa
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888114589960 which belongs
to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 8-byte
region [ffff888114589960, ffff888114589968)
Read of size 4
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x6fb/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x430 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?)
  __f2fs_get_acl+0x5/0x7e0 (fs/f2fs/acl.c:169)
  __get_acl+0x281/0x380 (?:?)
  vfs_get_acl+0x10b/0x190 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x2a/0x410 (?:?)
  do_get_acl+0x9/0x410 (?:?)
  do_getxattr+0xe8/0x260 (?:?)
  filename_getxattr+0xd1/0x140 (?:?)
  do_getname+0x2d/0x2d0 (?:?)
  path_getxattrat+0x16c/0x200 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc8/0x290 (?:?)
  cgroup_update_frozen+0x9d/0x320 (?:?)
  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 (?:?)
  trace_hardirqs_on+0x1a/0x170 (?:?)
  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 (?:?)
  do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87)
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?)

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: af48b85b8cd3 ("f2fs: add xattr and acl functionalities")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/f2fs/acl.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/f2fs/acl.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/acl.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static inline int f2fs_acl_count(size_t
 static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_disk(const char *value, size_t size)
 {
 	int i, count;
+	int err = -EINVAL;
 	struct posix_acl *acl;
 	struct f2fs_acl_header *hdr = (struct f2fs_acl_header *)value;
 	struct f2fs_acl_entry *entry = (struct f2fs_acl_entry *)(hdr + 1);
@@ -68,8 +69,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 
-		if ((char *)entry > end)
+		if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+				sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry_short) > end)) {
+			err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
 			goto fail;
+		}
 
 		acl->a_entries[i].e_tag  = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_tag);
 		acl->a_entries[i].e_perm = le16_to_cpu(entry->e_perm);
@@ -84,6 +88,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 			break;
 
 		case ACL_USER:
+			if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) {
+				err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+				goto fail;
+			}
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_uid =
 				make_kuid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -91,6 +100,11 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry));
 			break;
 		case ACL_GROUP:
+			if (unlikely((char *)entry +
+					sizeof(struct f2fs_acl_entry) > end)) {
+				err = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+				goto fail;
+			}
 			acl->a_entries[i].e_gid =
 				make_kgid(&init_user_ns,
 						le32_to_cpu(entry->e_id));
@@ -106,7 +120,7 @@ static struct posix_acl *f2fs_acl_from_d
 	return acl;
 fail:
 	posix_acl_release(acl);
-	return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
 static void *f2fs_acl_to_disk(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,

[PATCH 5.10 68/96] bpf: use kvfree() for replaced sysctl write buffer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>

commit 4c21b5927d4364bfe7365f2700da5fea0ed0d004 upstream.

proc_sys_call_handler() allocates its temporary sysctl buffer with
kvzalloc() and passes it to __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). Since
kvzalloc() may fall back to vmalloc() for large allocations, freeing
that buffer with kfree() is wrong and can corrupt memory.

Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and kvzalloc()/vmalloc
allocations.

The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc5.

Reproduced the bug based on v7.1-rc4 in a QEMU x86_64 guest booted with
KASAN and CONFIG_FAILSLAB enabled. To exercise the replacement path, the
test tree also included the accompanying fix for the stale ret == 1
check in __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(). The reproducer confines
failslab injections to the proc_sys_call_handler() range, uses
stacktrace-depth=32, and injects fail-nth=1 while writing 8191 bytes to
/proc/sys/kernel/domainname from a task in the target cgroup. Under
that setup, fail-nth=1 triggered the fault:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffeb0200024d48
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000  SMP KASAN NOPTI
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 209 Comm: repro_proc_sys_ Not tainted 7.1.0-rc4-00686-g97625979a5d4  PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:kfree+0x6e/0x510
  ...
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   ? __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x626/0xc30
   __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x74d/0xc30
   ? __pfx___cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x345/0x870
   ? proc_sys_call_handler+0x250/0x480
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   proc_sys_call_handler+0x3a2/0x480
   ? __pfx_proc_sys_call_handler+0x10/0x10
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? selinux_file_permission+0x39f/0x500
   ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
   ? lock_is_held_type+0x9e/0x120
   vfs_write+0x98e/0x1000
   ...
   </TASK>

With this fix applied on top of the same test setup, rerunning the
reproducer with fail-nth=1 yields no corresponding Oops reports.

Fixes: 4508943794ef ("proc: use kvzalloc for our kernel buffer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Dawei Feng <dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260603105317.944304-3-dawei.feng@seu.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c
@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ int __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_sysctl(struc
 	kfree(ctx.cur_val);
 
 	if (ret == 1 && ctx.new_updated) {
-		kfree(*buf);
+		kvfree(*buf);
 		*buf = ctx.new_val;
 		*pcount = ctx.new_len;
 	} else {

[PATCH 5.10 69/96] MIPS: DEC: Prevent initial console buffer from landing in XKPHYS

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>

commit 7fb13fd35110ebe95eb053faf79d018f51144d85 upstream.

In 64-bit configurations calling the initial console output handler from
a kernel thread other than the initial one will result in a situation
where the stack has been placed in the XKPHYS 64-bit memory segment and
consequently so has been the buffer allocated there that is used as the
argument corresponding to the `%s' output conversion specifier for the
firmware's printf() entry point.

This 64-bit address will then be truncated by 32-bit firmware, resulting
in an attempt to access the wrong memory location, which in turn will
cause all kinds of unpredictable behaviour, such as a kernel crash:

  Console: colour dummy device 160x64
  Calibrating delay loop... 49.36 BogoMIPS (lpj=192512)
  pid_max: default: 32768 minimum: 301
  CPU 0 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000000000203bd00, epc == ffffffffbfc08364, ra == ffffffffbfc08800
  Oops[#1]:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0-rc2-00254-gfb649bda6f56-dirty #121
  $ 0   : 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000000023 ffffffff80684ba0
  $ 4   : 000000000203bd00 ffffffffbfc0f3b4 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000073
  $ 8   : 0a303d7469000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000073 ffffffffbfc0f473
  $12   : 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffff80684c1c 0000000000000000
  $16   : 0000000000000000 ffffffff80596dc9 0000000000000000 ffffffffbfc09240
  $20   : ffffffff80684c40 ffffffffbfc0f400 000000000000002d 000000000000002b
  $24   : ffffffffffffffbf 000000000203bd00
  $28   : ffffffff805f0000 ffffffff80684b58 0000000000000030 ffffffffbfc08800
  Hi    : 0000000000000000
  Lo    : 0000000000000aa8
  epc   : ffffffffbfc08364 0xffffffffbfc08364
  ra    : ffffffffbfc08800 0xffffffffbfc08800
  Status: 140120e2        KX SX UX KERNEL EXL
  Cause : 00000008 (ExcCode 02)
  BadVA : 000000000203bd00
  PrId  : 00000430 (R4000SC)
  Modules linked in:
  Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo=(____ptrval____), task=(____ptrval____), tls=0000000000000000)
  Stack : 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000004d0000004d
          80684cc0806a2a40 80596dc80000004d 8061000000000000 bfc0850c80684c38
          0000000000000000 000000000203bd00 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000000000000000 00000000bfc0f3b4 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
          0000002500000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 802c1a7400000000
          0203bd0080596dc8 0203bd4d69000000 6c61632000000018 5f746567646e6172
          6c616320625f6d6f 5f736e5f6d6f7266 206361323778302b 303d74696e726320
          806a0a38806b0000 806a0a38806b0000 00000000806b0000 80683c58806b0000
          ...
  Call Trace:

  Code: a082ffff  03e00008  00601021 <80820000> 00001821  10400005  24840001  80820000  24630001

  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

  KN04 V2.1k    (PC: 0xa0026768, SP: 0x806848e8)
  >>

In this case the pointer in $4 was truncated from 0x980000000203bd00 to
0x000000000203bd00.

This may happen when no final console driver has been enabled in the
configuration and consequently the initial console continues being used
late into bootstrap or with an upcoming change that will switch the zs
driver to use a platform device, which in turn will make the console
handover happen only after other kernel threads have already been
started.

Fix the issue by making the buffer static and initdata, and therefore
placed in the CKSEG0 32-bit compatibility segment, observing that the
console output handler is called with the console lock held, implying
no need for this code to be reentrant.  Add an assertion to verify the
buffer actually has been placed in a compatibility segment.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v2.6.12+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c
+++ b/arch/mips/dec/prom/console.c
@@ -2,8 +2,9 @@
 /*
  *	DECstation PROM-based early console support.
  *
- *	Copyright (C) 2004, 2007  Maciej W. Rozycki
+ *	Copyright (C) 2004, 2007, 2026  Maciej W. Rozycki
  */
+#include <linux/bug.h>
 #include <linux/console.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -14,9 +15,11 @@
 static void __init prom_console_write(struct console *con, const char *s,
 				      unsigned int c)
 {
-	char buf[81];
+	static char buf[81] __initdata = { 0 };
 	unsigned int chunk = sizeof(buf) - 1;
 
+	BUG_ON((long)buf != (int)(long)buf);
+
 	while (c > 0) {
 		if (chunk > c)
 			chunk = c;

[PATCH 5.10 70/96] exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>

commit 3f5f8ee9917cc2b9076ac533492d8a200edcabb8 upstream.

In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from
exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through
TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points
into bh->b_data):

	brelse(bh);
	if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
		...
		len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
		...
	}

After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the
underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent
exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in
commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in
exfat_load_upcase_table()").

Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on
each branch.

Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image
(long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path).
With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and
the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the
unpatched kernel faults:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0

With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes
cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a
crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the
instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the
patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim.

Fixes: ca06197382bd ("exfat: add directory operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/exfat/dir.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/exfat/dir.c
+++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c
@@ -1043,12 +1043,12 @@ rewind:
 				continue;
 			}
 
-			brelse(bh);
 			if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
 				unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar;
 
 				if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME ||
 				    name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) {
+					brelse(bh);
 					step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE;
 					continue;
 				}
@@ -1059,6 +1059,7 @@ rewind:
 					uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN;
 
 				len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
+				brelse(bh);
 				name_len += len;
 
 				unichar = *(uniname+len);
@@ -1077,6 +1078,7 @@ rewind:
 				continue;
 			}
 
+			brelse(bh);
 			if (entry_type &
 					(TYPE_CRITICAL_SEC | TYPE_BENIGN_SEC)) {
 				if (step == DIRENT_STEP_SECD) {

[PATCH 5.10 71/96] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>

commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream.

tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to
crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike
the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously
(e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the
meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the
per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it:
tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and
aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences
aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory.

Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO):

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51
  Workqueue: events_unbound
  Call Trace:
   tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999)
   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)

  Allocated by task 169:
   __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415)
   tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502)
   tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72)
   ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137)
   setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446)
   copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579)
   create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132)
   __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316)
   do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

  Freed by task 8:
   kfree (mm/slub.c:6566)
   tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119)
   cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704)
   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)

This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix
slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt
side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before
crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous
return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY
return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt
path was left without the equivalent guard.

Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference
before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching
bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the
-EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the
synchronous success/error return and at the end of
tipc_aead_decrypt_done().

Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is
flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the
cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn
down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive
tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts
synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The
unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the
unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks
maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free
on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk@0sec.ai>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen@est.tech>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617075818.37431-1-doruk@0sec.ai
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/tipc/crypto.c |    9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

--- a/net/tipc/crypto.c
+++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c
@@ -954,12 +954,20 @@ static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net
 		goto exit;
 	}
 
+	/* Get net to avoid freed tipc_crypto when delete namespace */
+	if (!maybe_get_net(net)) {
+		tipc_bearer_put(b);
+		rc = -ENODEV;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
 	/* Now, do decrypt */
 	rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
 	if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY)
 		return rc;
 
 	tipc_bearer_put(b);
+	put_net(net);
 
 exit:
 	kfree(ctx);
@@ -997,6 +1005,7 @@ static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struc
 	}
 
 	tipc_bearer_put(b);
+	put_net(net);
 }
 
 static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr)

[PATCH 5.10 72/96] pNFS: Fix use-after-free in pnfs_update_layout()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>

commit 13e198a90ca4050f4bee8a3f23680389a6563ccc upstream.

When hitting the NFS_LAYOUT_RETURN branch in pnfs_update_layout(),
the code calls pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo). If it succeeds,
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo) is called before trace_pnfs_update_layout(),
which still references 'lo'. This results in a use-after-free when the
tracepoint accesses lo's fields.

Fix this by moving the tracepoint call before pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo).

Fixes: 2c8d5fc37fe2 ("pNFS: Stricter ordering of layoutget and layoutreturn")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfs/pnfs.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/pnfs.c
@@ -2074,11 +2074,11 @@ lookup_again:
 		dprintk("%s wait for layoutreturn\n", __func__);
 		lseg = ERR_PTR(pnfs_prepare_to_retry_layoutget(lo));
 		if (!IS_ERR(lseg)) {
-			pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo);
 			dprintk("%s retrying\n", __func__);
 			trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo,
 						 lseg,
 						 PNFS_UPDATE_LAYOUT_RETRY);
+			pnfs_put_layout_hdr(lo);
 			goto lookup_again;
 		}
 		trace_pnfs_update_layout(ino, pos, count, iomode, lo, lseg,

[PATCH 5.10 73/96] irqchip/imgpdc: Fix resource leak, add missing chained handler cleanup on remove

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>

commit 37738fdf2ab1e504d1c63ce5bc0aeb6452d8f057 upstream.

The driver allocates domain generic chips using
irq_alloc_domain_generic_chips() during probe and sets up chained
handlers using irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(). However, on driver
removal, the generic chips are not freed and the chained handlers are
not removed.

The generic chips remain on the global gc_list and may later be accessed by
generic interrupt chip suspend, resume, or shutdown callbacks after the
driver has been removed, potentially resulting in a use-after-free and
kernel crash.

The chained handlers that were installed in probe for peripheral and
syswake interrupts are also left dangling, which can lead to spurious
interrupts accessing freed memory.

Fix these issues by:

  - Setting IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC flag in domain->flags, so the
    core code automatically removes generic chips when irq_domain_remove()
    is called

  - Clearing all chained handlers with NULL in pdc_intc_remove()

Fixes: b6ef9161e43a ("irq-imgpdc: add ImgTec PDC irqchip driver")
Signed-off-by: Qingshuang Fu <fuqingshuang@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260618021352.661773-1-fffsqian@163.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-imgpdc.c
@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ static int pdc_intc_probe(struct platfor
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "cannot add IRQ domain\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
+	priv->domain->flags |= IRQ_DOMAIN_FLAG_DESTROY_GC;
 
 	/*
 	 * Set up 2 generic irq chips with 2 chip types.
@@ -472,6 +473,11 @@ static int pdc_intc_remove(struct platfo
 {
 	struct pdc_intc_priv *priv = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
 
+	for (unsigned int i = 0; i < priv->nr_perips; ++i)
+		irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->perip_irqs[i], NULL, NULL);
+
+	irq_set_chained_handler_and_data(priv->syswake_irq, NULL, NULL);
+
 	irq_domain_remove(priv->domain);
 	return 0;
 }

[PATCH 5.10 74/96] fpga: region: fix use-after-free in child_regions_with_firmware()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>

commit 54f3c5643ec523a04b6ec0e7c19eb10f5ebebdd3 upstream.

Move of_node_put(child_region) after the error print to avoid accessing
freed memory when pr_err() references child_region.

Fixes: 0fa20cdfcc1f ("fpga: fpga-region: device tree control for FPGA")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wentao Liang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn>
[ Yilun: Fix the Fixes tag ]
Reviewed-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260408154534.404327-1-vulab@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c
+++ b/drivers/fpga/of-fpga-region.c
@@ -166,11 +166,10 @@ static int child_regions_with_firmware(s
 						     fpga_region_of_match);
 	}
 
-	of_node_put(child_region);
-
 	if (ret)
 		pr_err("firmware-name not allowed in child FPGA region: %pOF",
 		       child_region);
+	of_node_put(child_region);
 
 	return ret;
 }

[PATCH 5.10 75/96] ocfs2: reject oversized group bitmap descriptors

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>

commit 9bd541e09dffff27e5bec0f9f45b0228173a5375 upstream.

ocfs2_validate_gd_parent() only bounds bg_bits against the parent
allocator's chain geometry.  A malicious descriptor can still claim a
bg_size/bg_bits pair that exceeds the bitmap bytes that physically fit in
the group descriptor block, so later bitmap scans and bit updates can run
past bg_bitmap.

Add a physical-cap check based on ocfs2_group_bitmap_size() for the parent
allocator type and reject descriptors whose bg_size or bg_bits exceed that
capacity.  Keep the existing chain geometry check so both the on-disk
bitmap layout and the allocator metadata must agree before the descriptor
is used.

Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN use-after-free in _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0
Read of size 8
Call trace:
  dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?)
  print_report+0xd0/0x630 (?:?)
  _find_next_bit+0x7f/0xc0 (?:?)
  srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?)
  __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0 (?:?)
  kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 (?:?)
  ocfs2_find_max_contig_free_bits+0x35/0x70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1375)
  ocfs2_block_group_set_bits+0x472/0x4b0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1457)
  ocfs2_cluster_group_search+0x16b/0x440 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:86)
  ocfs2_bg_discontig_fix_result+0x1ef/0x230 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1786)
  ocfs2_search_chain+0x8f8/0x10a0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1886)
  get_page_from_freelist+0x70e/0x2370 (?:?)
  lock_release+0xc6/0x290 (?:?)
  do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 (?:?)
  kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 (?:?)
  __bfs+0x147/0x240 (?:?)
  get_page_from_freelist+0x83d/0x2370 (?:?)
  ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits+0x38c/0xe70 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:96)
  sched_domains_numa_masks_clear+0x70/0xd0 (?:?)
  check_irq_usage+0xe8/0xb70 (?:?)
  __ocfs2_claim_clusters+0x18d/0x4c0 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:2497)
  check_path+0x24/0x50 (?:?)
  rcu_is_watching+0x20/0x50 (?:?)
  check_prev_add+0xfd/0xd00 (?:?)
  ocfs2_add_clusters_in_btree+0x17d/0x810 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x1f5/0x3d0 (?:?)
  ocfs2_add_inode_data+0xd9/0x120 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  filemap_add_folio+0x105/0x1f0 (?:?)
  ocfs2_write_begin_nolock+0x29f7/0x2f80 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:3043)
  ocfs2_read_inode_block+0xb5/0x110 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  down_write+0xf5/0x180 (?:?)
  ocfs2_write_begin+0x180/0x240 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  __mark_inode_dirty+0x758/0x9a0 (?:?)
  inode_to_bdi+0x41/0x90 (?:?)
  balance_dirty_pages_ratelimited_flags+0xf8/0x1d0 (?:?)
  generic_perform_write+0x252/0x440 (?:?)
  mnt_put_write_access_file+0x16/0x70 (?:?)
  file_update_time_flags+0xe4/0x200 (?:?)
  ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x80a/0x1320 (fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:?)
  lock_acquire+0x184/0x2f0 (?:?)
  ksys_write+0xd2/0x170 (?:?)
  apparmor_file_permission+0xf5/0x310 (?:?)
  read_zero+0x8d/0x140 (?:?)
  lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 (?:?)

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260524111248.1429884-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com
Fixes: ccd979bdbce9 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem")
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5
Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

--- a/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c
@@ -203,8 +203,16 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(stru
 				    int resize)
 {
 	unsigned int max_bits;
+	unsigned int max_bitmap_bits;
+	unsigned int max_bitmap_size;
+	int suballocator;
 	struct ocfs2_group_desc *gd = (struct ocfs2_group_desc *)bh->b_data;
 
+	suballocator = le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno) != OCFS2_SB(sb)->bitmap_blkno;
+	max_bitmap_size = ocfs2_group_bitmap_size(sb, suballocator,
+						  OCFS2_SB(sb)->s_feature_incompat);
+	max_bitmap_bits = max_bitmap_size * 8;
+
 	if (di->i_blkno != gd->bg_parent_dinode) {
 		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bad parent pointer (%llu, expected %llu)\n",
 			 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
@@ -212,6 +220,20 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_gd_parent(stru
 			 (unsigned long long)le64_to_cpu(di->i_blkno));
 	}
 
+	if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size) > max_bitmap_size) {
+		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bitmap size %u but physical max of %u\n",
+			 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+			 le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_size),
+			 max_bitmap_size);
+	}
+
+	if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bitmap_bits) {
+		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count %u but physical max of %u\n",
+			 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+			 le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits),
+			 max_bitmap_bits);
+	}
+
 	max_bits = le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_cpg) * le16_to_cpu(di->id2.i_chain.cl_bpc);
 	if (le16_to_cpu(gd->bg_bits) > max_bits) {
 		do_error("Group descriptor #%llu has bit count of %u\n",

[PATCH 5.10 76/96] KVM: SVM: Fix page overflow in sev_dbg_crypt() for ENCRYPT path

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com>

commit 78ee2d50185a037b3d2452a97f3dad69c3f7f389 upstream.

In sev_dbg_crypt(), the per-iteration transfer length is bounded by
the source page offset (PAGE_SIZE - s_off) but not by the destination
page offset (PAGE_SIZE - d_off).  When d_off > s_off, the encrypt
path (__sev_dbg_encrypt_user) performs a read-modify-write using a
single-page intermediate buffer (dst_tpage):

  1. __sev_dbg_decrypt() expands the size to round_up(len + (d_off & 15), 16)
     before issuing the PSP command.  If len + (d_off & 15) > PAGE_SIZE,
     the PSP writes beyond the end of the 4096-byte dst_tpage allocation.

  2. The subsequent memcpy()/copy_from_user() into
     page_address(dst_tpage) + (d_off & 15) of 'len' bytes overflows
     by up to 15 bytes under the same condition.

Trigger example: s_off = 0, d_off = 1, debug.len = PAGE_SIZE -
the PSP is instructed to write round_up(4097, 16) = 4112 bytes to
a 4096-byte buffer.

Fix by also bounding len by (PAGE_SIZE - d_off), the same check that
sev_send_update_data() already performs for its single-page guest
region.

 ==================================================================
 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
 Write of size 4095 at addr ff110062293bb009 by task sev_dbg_test/228214

 CPU: 96 UID: 0 PID: 228214 Comm: sev_dbg_test Tainted: G     U  W           7.0.0-smp--5ce9b0c48211-dbg #156 PREEMPTLAZY
 Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN
 Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20250817.1-0 08/25/2025
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x70
  print_report+0xbc/0x260
  kasan_report+0xa2/0xd0
  kasan_check_range+0x25f/0x2c0
  __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70
  sev_dbg_crypt+0x993/0xd10 [kvm_amd]
  sev_mem_enc_ioctl+0x33c/0x450 [kvm_amd]
  kvm_vm_ioctl+0x65d/0x6d0 [kvm]
  __se_sys_ioctl+0xb2/0x100
  do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x870
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  </TASK>

 The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
 page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7fe72b6a0 pfn:0x62293bb
 memcg:ff11000112827d82
 flags: 0x1400000000000000(node=1|zone=1)
 raw: 1400000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
 raw: 00000007fe72b6a0 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff ff11000112827d82
 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

 Memory state around the buggy address:
  ff110062293bbf00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  ff110062293bbf80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 >ff110062293bc000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
                    ^
  ff110062293bc080: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  ff110062293bc100: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
 ==================================================================
 Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint

Fixes: 24f41fb23a39 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_DECRYPT command")
Fixes: 7d1594f5d94b ("KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV DEBUG_ENCRYPT command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ashutosh Desai <ashutoshdesai993@gmail.com>
[sean: add sample KASAN splat, Fixes, and stable@]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260501203537.2120074-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -836,6 +836,7 @@ static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm
 		s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
 		d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
 		len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
+		len = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE - d_off);
 
 		if (dec)
 			ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,

[PATCH 5.10 77/96] fbdev: Fix fb_new_modelist to prevent null-ptr-deref in fb_videomode_to_var

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>

commit 7f08fc10fa3d3366dc3af723970bd03d7d6d10e3 upstream.

info->var, a framebuffer's current mode, is expected to have a matching
entry in info->modelist. var_to_display() relies on this and treats a
failed fb_match_mode() as "This should not happen". fb_set_var() keeps it
true by adding the mode to the list on every change, and
do_register_framebuffer() does the same at registration.

store_modes() replaces the modelist from userspace. fb_new_modelist()
validates the new modes but does not check that info->var still has a
match. It relies on fbcon_new_modelist() to re-point consoles, but that
only handles consoles mapped to the framebuffer. With fbcon unbound there
are none, so info->var is left describing a mode that is no longer in the
list.

A later console takeover runs var_to_display(), where fb_match_mode()
returns NULL and leaves fb_display[i].mode NULL. fbcon_switch() passes it
to display_to_var(), and fb_videomode_to_var() dereferences the NULL mode.

Keep the current mode in the list in fb_new_modelist(), the same way
fb_set_var() does.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges <icb@fastmail.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c
@@ -1989,6 +1989,18 @@ int fb_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info
 	if (list_empty(&info->modelist))
 		return 1;
 
+	/*
+	 * The new modelist may not contain the current mode (info->var), and
+	 * fbcon_new_modelist() below only re-points consoles mapped to this
+	 * framebuffer. Add the current mode here so info->var keeps a match
+	 * even when fbcon is unbound.
+	 */
+	if (!fb_match_mode(&info->var, &info->modelist)) {
+		fb_var_to_videomode(&mode, &info->var);
+		if (fb_add_videomode(&mode, &info->modelist))
+			return 1;
+	}
+
 	fbcon_new_modelist(info);
 
 	return 0;

[PATCH 5.10 78/96] fbdev: modedb: Fix misaligned fields in the 1920x1080-60 mode

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steffen Persvold <spersvold@gmail.com>

commit d894c48a57d78206e4df9c90d4acfaf39394806a upstream.

The 1920x1080@60 modedb entry has one too many initializers before
its sync field: a stray "0" occupies the sync slot, which shifts the
remaining values by one field. The entry therefore decodes as
sync = 0, vmode = FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT (0x3,
i.e. FB_VMODE_INTERLACED | FB_VMODE_DOUBLE), and flag =
FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED, instead of the intended sync = positive H/V,
vmode = non-interlaced.

fb_find_mode() then returns a 1920x1080 mode flagged as interlaced +
doublescan with active-low syncs. Drivers that honour var->vmode and
var->sync when programming display timing enable doublescan and the
wrong sync polarity, corrupting the output.

Drop the stray initializer so sync and vmode hold their intended
values (positive H/V sync, non-interlaced), matching the adjacent
1920x1200 entry.

Fixes: c8902258b2b8 ("fbdev: modedb: Add 1920x1080 at 60 Hz video mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steffen Persvold <spersvold@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c
+++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static const struct fb_videomode modedb[
 		FB_VMODE_DOUBLE },
 
 	/* 1920x1080 @ 60 Hz, 67.3 kHz hsync */
-	{ NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5, 0,
+	{ NULL, 60, 1920, 1080, 6734, 148, 88, 36, 4, 44, 5,
 		FB_SYNC_HOR_HIGH_ACT | FB_SYNC_VERT_HIGH_ACT,
 		FB_VMODE_NONINTERLACED },
 

[PATCH 5.10 79/96] NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>

commit 9e18e83b8846a5c3fe13fc8a464b4865d33996c6 upstream.

nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after
decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns
nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.

Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct
nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not
cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore
leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.

The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(),
which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.

Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching
nfsd4_decode_secinfo().

Fixes: 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c
@@ -1821,10 +1821,11 @@ static __be32 nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_na
 					   union nfsd4_op_u *u)
 {
 	struct nfsd4_secinfo_no_name *sin = &u->secinfo_no_name;
+
+	sin->sin_exp = NULL;
 	if (xdr_stream_decode_u32(argp->xdr, &sin->sin_style) < 0)
 		return nfserr_bad_xdr;
 
-	sin->sin_exp = NULL;
 	return nfs_ok;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 80/96] nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>

commit 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1 upstream.

nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each
call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for
NFS_DFACL.  Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly
allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default.  If
the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns
false and argp->acl_access is left dangling.

ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and
ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle.
Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on
argp.  The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside
nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process()
skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is
unreachable on decode failure:

    svc_process_common()
      pc_decode()                  /* decode_setaclargs: false */
      /* pc_func skipped */
      pc_release()                 /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */

The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server.

Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(),
which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition
to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL
procedures.  pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after
decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are
removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one
place.  This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by
the sibling GETACL procedures.

Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c |   17 ++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs2acl.c
@@ -129,10 +129,7 @@ static __be32 nfsacld_proc_setacl(struct
 	resp->status = fh_getattr(fh, &resp->stat);
 
 out:
-	/* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
-	   nfssvc_decode_setaclargs. */
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+	/* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfsaclsvc_release_setacl. */
 	return rpc_success;
 
 out_drop_lock:
@@ -310,6 +307,16 @@ static void nfsaclsvc_release_access(str
 
 struct nfsd3_voidargs { int dummy; };
 
+static void nfsaclsvc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+	struct nfsd_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
+
+	fh_put(&resp->fh);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+}
+
 #define ST 1		/* status*/
 #define AT 21		/* attributes */
 #define pAT (1+AT)	/* post attributes - conditional */
@@ -343,7 +350,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_a
 		.pc_func = nfsacld_proc_setacl,
 		.pc_decode = nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs,
 		.pc_encode = nfssvc_encode_attrstatres,
-		.pc_release = nfssvc_release_attrstat,
+		.pc_release = nfsaclsvc_release_setacl,
 		.pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd_attrstat),
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c
@@ -116,10 +116,7 @@ out_drop_lock:
 out_errno:
 	resp->status = nfserrno(error);
 out:
-	/* argp->acl_{access,default} may have been allocated in
-	   nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs. */
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
-	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+	/* argp->acl_{access,default} are released in nfs3svc_release_setacl. */
 	return rpc_success;
 }
 
@@ -223,6 +220,16 @@ static void nfs3svc_release_getacl(struc
 
 struct nfsd3_voidargs { int dummy; };
 
+static void nfs3svc_release_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
+{
+	struct nfsd3_setaclargs *argp = rqstp->rq_argp;
+	struct nfsd3_attrstat *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
+
+	fh_put(&resp->fh);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_access);
+	posix_acl_release(argp->acl_default);
+}
+
 #define ST 1		/* status*/
 #define AT 21		/* attributes */
 #define pAT (1+AT)	/* post attributes - conditional */
@@ -256,7 +263,7 @@ static const struct svc_procedure nfsd_a
 		.pc_func = nfsd3_proc_setacl,
 		.pc_decode = nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs,
 		.pc_encode = nfs3svc_encode_setaclres,
-		.pc_release = nfs3svc_release_fhandle,
+		.pc_release = nfs3svc_release_setacl,
 		.pc_argsize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_argzero = sizeof(struct nfsd3_setaclargs),
 		.pc_ressize = sizeof(struct nfsd3_attrstat),

[PATCH 5.10 81/96] nfsd: check get_user() return when reading princhashlen

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dominik Woźniak <stalion@gmail.com>

commit e186fa1c057f5eccb22afb1e83e34c0627085868 upstream.

In __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(), the get_user() that reads
princhashlen from the userspace cld_msg_v2 buffer does not check its
return value. A failing copy leaves princhashlen with uninitialised
stack contents, which are then used to drive memdup_user() and stored
as princhash.len on the resulting reclaim record. The other get_user()
calls in this function all check the return; only this one is missed,
which is most likely a copy-paste oversight from when v2 upcalls were
introduced.

Mirror the existing pattern used a few lines above for namelen.
namecopy is declared with __free(kfree) so the early return cleans up
the already-allocated buffer automatically.

Fixes: 6ee95d1c8991 ("nfsd: add support for upcall version 2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dominik Woźniak <stalion@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4recover.c
@@ -815,7 +815,8 @@ __cld_pipe_inprogress_downcall(const str
 			if (IS_ERR(name.data))
 				return PTR_ERR(name.data);
 			name.len = namelen;
-			get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len);
+			if (get_user(princhashlen, &ci->cc_princhash.cp_len))
+				return -EFAULT;
 			if (princhashlen > 0) {
 				princhash.data = memdup_user(
 						&ci->cc_princhash.cp_data,

[PATCH 5.10 82/96] dlm: prevent NPD when writing a positive value to event_done

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>

commit 8e2bad543eca5c25cd02cbc63d72557934d45f13 upstream.

do_uevent returns the value written to event_done. In case it is a
positive value, new_lockspace would undo all the work, and lockspace
would not be set. __dlm_new_lockspace, however, would treat that
positive value as a success due to commit 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use
count with multiple joins").

Down the line, device_create_lockspace would pass that NULL lockspace to
dlm_find_lockspace_local, leading to a NULL pointer dereference.

Treating such positive values as successes prevents the problem. Given
this has been broken for so long, this is unlikely to break userspace
expectations.

Fixes: 8511a2728ab8 ("dlm: fix use count with multiple joins")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nazar Kalashnikov <nazarkalashnikov0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/dlm/lockspace.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/dlm/lockspace.c
+++ b/fs/dlm/lockspace.c
@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ static int new_lockspace(const char *nam
 	   lockspace to start running (via sysfs) in dlm_ls_start(). */
 
 	error = do_uevent(ls, 1);
-	if (error)
+	if (error < 0)
 		goto out_recoverd;
 
 	wait_for_completion(&ls->ls_members_done);

[PATCH 5.10 83/96] usb: cdns3: gadget: fix NULL pointer dereference in ep_queue

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yongchao Wu <yongchao.wu@autochips.com>

commit 7f6f127b9bc34bed35f56faf7ecb1561d6b39000 upstream.

When the gadget endpoint is disabled or not yet configured, the ep->desc
pointer can be NULL. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference when
__cdns3_gadget_ep_queue() is called, causing a kernel crash.

Add a check to return -ESHUTDOWN if ep->desc is NULL, which is the
standard return code for unconfigured endpoints.

This prevents potential crashes when ep_queue is called on endpoints
that are not ready.

Fixes: 7733f6c32e36 ("usb: cdns3: Add Cadence USB3 DRD Driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yongchao Wu <yongchao.wu@autochips.com>
Acked-by: Peter Chen <peter.chen@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260331000407.613298-1-yongchao.wu@autochips.com
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Dmitrichenko <mdmitrichenko@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c
@@ -2587,6 +2587,9 @@ static int __cdns3_gadget_ep_queue(struc
 	struct cdns3_request *priv_req;
 	int ret = 0;
 
+	if (!ep->desc)
+		return -ESHUTDOWN;
+
 	request->actual = 0;
 	request->status = -EINPROGRESS;
 	priv_req = to_cdns3_request(request);

[PATCH 5.10 84/96] bnxt_en: Modify bnxt_disable_int_sync() to be called more than once.

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>

[ Upstream commit 38290e37297087f7ea3ef7904b8f185d77c42976 ]

In the event of a fatal firmware error, we want to disable IRQ early
in the recovery sequence.  This change will allow it to be called
safely again as part of the normal shutdown sequence.

Reviewed-by: Edwin Peer <edwin.peer@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Vasundhara Volam <vasundhara-v.volam@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <michael.chan@broadcom.com>
Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: d930276f2cdd ("bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -4382,6 +4382,9 @@ static void bnxt_disable_int_sync(struct
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (!bp->irq_tbl)
+		return;
+
 	atomic_inc(&bp->intr_sem);
 
 	bnxt_disable_int(bp);

[PATCH 5.10 85/96] bnxt_en: Fix NULL pointer dereference

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kyle Meyer <kyle.meyer@hpe.com>

[ Upstream commit d930276f2cddd0b7294cac7a8fe7b877f6d9e08d ]

PCIe errors detected by a Root Port or Downstream Port cause error
recovery services to run on all subordinate devices regardless of
administrative state.

The .error_detected() callback, bnxt_io_error_detected(), disables
and synchronizes IRQs via bnxt_disable_int_sync(), which calls
bnxt_cp_num_to_irq_num() to map completion rings to IRQs using
bp->bnapi.

Since bp->bnapi is allocated on NIC open and freed on NIC close, PCIe
error recovery on a closed NIC can dereference a NULL pointer.

Check if bp->bnapi is NULL before disabling and synchronizing IRQs.

Fixes: e5811b8c09df ("bnxt_en: Add IRQ remapping logic.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kyle Meyer <kyle.meyer@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavan Chebbi <pavan.chebbi@broadcom.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aiNM1CY2-StPilxW@hpe.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -4382,7 +4382,7 @@ static void bnxt_disable_int_sync(struct
 {
 	int i;
 
-	if (!bp->irq_tbl)
+	if (!bp->irq_tbl || !bp->bnapi)
 		return;
 
 	atomic_inc(&bp->intr_sem);

[PATCH 5.10 86/96] hv: utils: handle and propagate errors in kvp_register

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>

[ Upstream commit 3fcf923302a8f5c0dc3af3d2ca2657cb5fae4297 ]

Make kvp_register() return an error code instead of silently ignoring
failures, and propagate the error from kvp_handle_handshake() instead of
returning success.

This propagates both kzalloc_obj() and hvutil_transport_send() failures
to kvp_handle_handshake() and thus to kvp_on_msg().

Fixes: 245ba56a52a3 ("Staging: hv: Implement key/value pair (KVP)")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Reviewed-by: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c |   27 ++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv_kvp.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void kvp_send_key(struct work_str
 static void kvp_respond_to_host(struct hv_kvp_msg *msg, int error);
 static void kvp_timeout_func(struct work_struct *dummy);
 static void kvp_host_handshake_func(struct work_struct *dummy);
-static void kvp_register(int);
+static int kvp_register(int);
 
 static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kvp_timeout_work, kvp_timeout_func);
 static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kvp_host_handshake_work, kvp_host_handshake_func);
@@ -127,24 +127,26 @@ static void kvp_register_done(void)
 	hv_poll_channel(kvp_transaction.recv_channel, kvp_poll_wrapper);
 }
 
-static void
+static int
 kvp_register(int reg_value)
 {
 
 	struct hv_kvp_msg *kvp_msg;
 	char *version;
+	int ret;
 
 	kvp_msg = kzalloc(sizeof(*kvp_msg), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!kvp_msg)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (kvp_msg) {
-		version = kvp_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
-		kvp_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = reg_value;
-		strcpy(version, HV_DRV_VERSION);
-
-		hvutil_transport_send(hvt, kvp_msg, sizeof(*kvp_msg),
-				      kvp_register_done);
-		kfree(kvp_msg);
-	}
+	version = kvp_msg->body.kvp_register.version;
+	kvp_msg->kvp_hdr.operation = reg_value;
+	strcpy(version, HV_DRV_VERSION);
+
+	ret = hvutil_transport_send(hvt, kvp_msg, sizeof(*kvp_msg),
+				    kvp_register_done);
+	kfree(kvp_msg);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static void kvp_timeout_func(struct work_struct *dummy)
@@ -186,9 +188,8 @@ static int kvp_handle_handshake(struct h
 	 */
 	pr_debug("KVP: userspace daemon ver. %d connected\n",
 		 msg->kvp_hdr.operation);
-	kvp_register(dm_reg_value);
 
-	return 0;
+	return kvp_register(dm_reg_value);
 }
 
 

[PATCH 5.10 87/96] mptcp: fix missing wakeups in edge scenarios

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 9d8d28738f24b75616d6ca7a27cb4aed88520343 ]

The mptcp_recvmsg() can fill MPTCP socket receive queue via
mptcp_move_skbs(), but currently does not try to wakeup any listener,
because the same process is going to check the receive queue soon.

When multiple threads are reading from the same fd, the above can
cause stall. Add the missing wakeup.

Fixes: 6771bfd9ee24 ("mptcp: update mptcp ack sequence from work queue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260602-net-mptcp-misc-fixes-7-1-rc7-v2-1-856831229976@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/mptcp/protocol.c |    8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

--- a/net/mptcp/protocol.c
+++ b/net/mptcp/protocol.c
@@ -1571,6 +1571,14 @@ static bool __mptcp_move_skbs(struct mpt
 
 	if (mptcp_ofo_queue(msk) || moved > 0) {
 		mptcp_check_data_fin((struct sock *)msk);
+
+		/* When multiple threads read from the same socket, the caller
+		 * filling the receive queue does not try to wake up any other
+		 * listener, which can stall it. Flag the data as ready and
+		 * issue the missing wakeup here.
+		 */
+		set_bit(MPTCP_DATA_READY, &msk->flags);
+		((struct sock *)msk)->sk_data_ready((struct sock *)msk);
 		return true;
 	}
 	return false;

[PATCH 5.10 88/96] misc: fastrpc: Add dma_mask to fastrpc_channel_ctx

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>

[ Upstream commit 9bde43a0e2f469961e18d0a3496a9a74379c22bf ]

dma_set_mask_and_coherent only updates the mask to which the device
dma_mask pointer points to. Add a dma_mask to the channel ctx and set
the device dma_mask to point to that, otherwise the dma_set_mask will
return an error and the dma_set_coherent_mask will be skipped too.

Co-developed-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Abel Vesa <abel.vesa@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221125071405.148786-11-srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Stable-dep-of: 5401fb4fe10f ("misc: fastrpc: Fix NULL pointer dereference in rpmsg callback")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ struct fastrpc_channel_ctx {
 	struct list_head users;
 	struct miscdevice miscdev;
 	struct kref refcount;
+	u64 dma_mask;
 };
 
 struct fastrpc_user {
@@ -1689,6 +1690,7 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_probe(struct rp
 	kref_init(&data->refcount);
 
 	dev_set_drvdata(&rpdev->dev, data);
+	rdev->dma_mask = &data->dma_mask;
 	dma_set_mask_and_coherent(rdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data->users);
 	spin_lock_init(&data->lock);

[PATCH 5.10 89/96] misc: fastrpc: Fix NULL pointer dereference in rpmsg callback

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>

[ Upstream commit 5401fb4fe10fac6134c308495df18ed74aebb9c4 ]

A NULL pointer dereference was observed on Hawi at boot when the DSP
sends a glink message before fastrpc_rpmsg_probe() has completed
initialization:

  Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000178
  pc : _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c
  lr : fastrpc_rpmsg_callback+0x3c/0xcc [fastrpc]
  ...
  Call trace:
   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x34/0x8c (P)
   fastrpc_rpmsg_callback+0x3c/0xcc [fastrpc]
   qcom_glink_native_rx+0x538/0x6a4
   qcom_glink_smem_intr+0x14/0x24 [qcom_glink_smem]

The faulting address 0x178 corresponds to the lock variable inside
struct fastrpc_channel_ctx, confirming that cctx is NULL when
fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() attempts to take the spinlock.

There are two issues here. First, dev_set_drvdata() is called before
spin_lock_init() and idr_init(), leaving a window where the callback
can retrieve a valid cctx pointer but operate on an uninitialized
spinlock. Second, the rpmsg channel becomes live as soon as the driver
is bound, so fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() can fire before dev_set_drvdata()
is called at all, resulting in dev_get_drvdata() returning NULL.

Fix both issues by moving all cctx initialization ahead of
dev_set_drvdata() so the structure is fully initialized before it
becomes visible to the callback, and add a NULL check in
fastrpc_rpmsg_callback() as a guard against any remaining window.

Fixes: f6f9279f2bf0 ("misc: fastrpc: Add Qualcomm fastrpc basic driver model")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reviewed-by: Bjorn Andersson <andersson@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srini@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530204528.116920-4-srini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c
@@ -1689,7 +1689,6 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_probe(struct rp
 
 	kref_init(&data->refcount);
 
-	dev_set_drvdata(&rpdev->dev, data);
 	rdev->dma_mask = &data->dma_mask;
 	dma_set_mask_and_coherent(rdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&data->users);
@@ -1697,6 +1696,7 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_probe(struct rp
 	idr_init(&data->ctx_idr);
 	data->domain_id = domain_id;
 	data->rpdev = rpdev;
+	dev_set_drvdata(&rpdev->dev, data);
 
 	return of_platform_populate(rdev->of_node, NULL, NULL, rdev);
 }
@@ -1744,6 +1744,9 @@ static int fastrpc_rpmsg_callback(struct
 	if (len < sizeof(*rsp))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!cctx)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
 	ctxid = ((rsp->ctx & FASTRPC_CTXID_MASK) >> 4);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&cctx->lock, flags);

[PATCH 5.10 90/96] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Improve the logic of reserving fb_mmio on Gen2 VMs

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>

[ Upstream commit 016a25e4b0df4d77e7c258edee4aaf982e4ee809 ]

If vmbus_reserve_fb() in the kdump/kexec kernel fails to properly reserve
the framebuffer MMIO range (which is below 4GB) due to a Gen2 VM's
screen.lfb_base being zero [1], there is an MMIO conflict between the
drivers hyperv-drm and pci-hyperv: when the driver pci-hyperv's
hv_allocate_config_window() calls vmbus_allocate_mmio() to get an
MMIO range, typically it gets a 32-bit MMIO range that overlaps with the
framebuffer MMIO range, and later hv_pci_enter_d0() fails with an
error message "PCI Pass-through VSP failed D0 Entry with status" since
the host thinks that PCI devices must not use MMIO space that the
host has assigned to the framebuffer.

This is especially an issue if pci-hyperv is built-in and hyperv-drm is
built as a module. Consequently, the kdump/kexec kernel fails to detect
PCI devices via pci-hyperv, and may fail to mount the root file system,
which may reside in a NVMe disk. The issue described here has existed
for SR-IOV VF NICs since day one of the pci-hyperv driver, and has been
worked around on x64 when possible. With the recent introduction of
ARM64 VMs that boot from NVMe, there is no workaround, so we need a
formal fix.

On Gen2 VMs, if the screen.lfb_base is 0 in the kdump/kexec kernel [1],
fall back to the low MMIO base, which should be equal to the framebuffer
MMIO base [2] (the statement is true according to my testing on x64
Windows Server 2016, and on x64 and ARM64 Windows Server 2025 and on
Azure. I checked with the Hyper-V team and they said the statement should
continue to be true for Gen2 VMs). In the first kernel, screen.lfb_base
is not 0; if the user specifies a very high resolution, it's not enough
to only reserve 8MB: let's always reserve half of the space below 4GB,
but cap the reservation to 128MB, which is the required framebuffer size
of the highest resolution 7680*4320 supported by Hyper-V.

While at it, fix the comparison "end > VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS" by changing
the > to >=. Here the 'end' is an inclusive end (typically, it's
0xFFFF_FFFF for the low MMIO range).

Note: vmbus_reserve_fb() now also reserves an MMIO range at the beginning
of the low MMIO range on CVMs, which have no framebuffers (the
'screen.lfb_base' in vmbus_reserve_fb() is 0 for CVMs), just in case the
host might treat the beginning of the low MMIO range specially [3]. BTW,
the OpenHCL kernel is not affected by the change, because that kernel
boots with DeviceTree rather than ACPI (so vmbus_reserve_fb() won't run
there), and there is no framebuffer device for that kernel.

Note: normally Gen1 VMs don't have the MMIO conflict issue because the
framebuffer MMIO range (which is hardcoded to base=4GB-128MB and
size=64MB for Gen1 VMs by the host) is always reported via the legacy PCI
graphics device's BAR, so the kdump/kexec kernel can reserve the 64MB
MMIO range; however, if the VM is configured to use a very high resolution
and the required framebuffer size exceeds 64MB (AFAIK, in practice, this
isn't a typical configuration by users), the hyperv-drm driver may need to
allocate an MMIO range above 4GB and change the framebuffer MMIO location
to the allocated MMIO range -- in this case, there can still be issues [4]
which can't be easily fixed: any possible affected Gen1 users would have
to use a resolution whose framebuffer size is <= 64MB, or switch to Gen2
VMs.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SA1PR21MB692176C1BC53BFC9EAE5CF8EBF51A@SA1PR21MB6921.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SA1PR21MB69218F955B62DFF62E3E88D2BF222@SA1PR21MB6921.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SN6PR02MB415726B17D5A6027CD1717E8D4342@SN6PR02MB4157.namprd02.prod.outlook.com/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/SA1PR21MB69213486F821CA5A2C793C81BF342@SA1PR21MB6921.namprd21.prod.outlook.com/

Fixes: 4daace0d8ce8 ("PCI: hv: Add paravirtual PCI front-end for Microsoft Hyper-V VMs")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Ruffell <matthew.ruffell@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c |   56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -2134,8 +2134,8 @@ static acpi_status vmbus_walk_resources(
 		return AE_NO_MEMORY;
 
 	/* If this range overlaps the virtual TPM, truncate it. */
-	if (end > VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS && start < VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS)
-		end = VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS;
+	if (end >= VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS && start < VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS)
+		end = VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS - 1;
 
 	new_res->name = "hyperv mmio";
 	new_res->flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
@@ -2202,26 +2202,52 @@ static int vmbus_acpi_remove(struct acpi
 
 static void vmbus_reserve_fb(void)
 {
-	int size;
+	resource_size_t start = 0, size;
+	resource_size_t low_mmio_base;
+
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+		/* Gen2 VM: get FB base from EFI framebuffer */
+		start = screen_info.lfb_base;
+		size = max_t(__u32, screen_info.lfb_size, 0x800000);
+
+		low_mmio_base = hyperv_mmio->start;
+		if (!low_mmio_base || upper_32_bits(low_mmio_base) ||
+		    (start && start < low_mmio_base)) {
+			pr_warn("Unexpected low mmio base %pa\n", &low_mmio_base);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * If the kdump/kexec or CVM kernel's lfb_base
+			 * is 0, fall back to the low mmio base.
+			 */
+			if (!start)
+				start = low_mmio_base;
+			/*
+			 * Reserve half of the space below 4GB for high
+			 * resolutions, but cap the reservation to 128MB.
+			 */
+			size = min((SZ_4G - start) / 2, SZ_128M);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Gen1 VM: get FB base from screen_info */
+		start = screen_info.lfb_base;
+		size = max_t(__u32, screen_info.lfb_size, 0x4000000);
+	}
+
+	if (!start) {
+		pr_warn("Unexpected framebuffer mmio base of zero\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Make a claim for the frame buffer in the resource tree under the
 	 * first node, which will be the one below 4GB.  The length seems to
 	 * be underreported, particularly in a Generation 1 VM.  So start out
 	 * reserving a larger area and make it smaller until it succeeds.
 	 */
+	for (; !fb_mmio && (size >= 0x100000); size >>= 1)
+		fb_mmio = __request_region(hyperv_mmio, start, size, fb_mmio_name, 0);
 
-	if (screen_info.lfb_base) {
-		if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
-			size = max_t(__u32, screen_info.lfb_size, 0x800000);
-		else
-			size = max_t(__u32, screen_info.lfb_size, 0x4000000);
-
-		for (; !fb_mmio && (size >= 0x100000); size >>= 1) {
-			fb_mmio = __request_region(hyperv_mmio,
-						   screen_info.lfb_base, size,
-						   fb_mmio_name, 0);
-		}
-	}
+	pr_info("hv_mmio=%pR,%pR fb=%pR\n", hyperv_mmio, hyperv_mmio->sibling, fb_mmio);
 }
 
 /**

[PATCH 5.10 91/96] phonet: Pass ifindex to fill_addr().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>

[ Upstream commit 08a9572be36819b5d9011604edfa5db6c5062a7a ]

We will convert addr_doit() and getaddr_dumpit() to RCU, both
of which call fill_addr().

The former will call phonet_address_notify() outside of RCU
due to GFP_KERNEL, so dev will not be available in fill_addr().

Let's pass ifindex directly to fill_addr().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 71de0177b28d ("net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/phonet/pn_netlink.c |   13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 
 /* Device address handling */
 
-static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr,
+static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ifindex, u8 addr,
 		     u32 portid, u32 seq, int event);
 
 void phonet_address_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr)
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ void phonet_address_notify(int event, st
 			nla_total_size(1), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (skb == NULL)
 		goto errout;
-	err = fill_addr(skb, dev, addr, 0, 0, event);
+
+	err = fill_addr(skb, dev->ifindex, addr, 0, 0, event);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
@@ -92,8 +93,8 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr,
-			u32 portid, u32 seq, int event)
+static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ifindex, u8 addr,
+		     u32 portid, u32 seq, int event)
 {
 	struct ifaddrmsg *ifm;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
@@ -107,7 +108,7 @@ static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb
 	ifm->ifa_prefixlen = 0;
 	ifm->ifa_flags = IFA_F_PERMANENT;
 	ifm->ifa_scope = RT_SCOPE_LINK;
-	ifm->ifa_index = dev->ifindex;
+	ifm->ifa_index = ifindex;
 	if (nla_put_u8(skb, IFA_LOCAL, addr))
 		goto nla_put_failure;
 	nlmsg_end(skb, nlh);
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ static int getaddr_dumpit(struct sk_buff
 			if (addr_idx++ < addr_start_idx)
 				continue;
 
-			if (fill_addr(skb, pnd->netdev, addr << 2,
+			if (fill_addr(skb, pnd->netdev->ifindex, addr << 2,
 					 NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
 					cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWADDR) < 0)
 				goto out;

[PATCH 5.10 92/96] phonet: Pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify().

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>

[ Upstream commit 68ed5c38b512b734caf3da1f87db4a99fcfe3002 ]

Currently, phonet_address_notify() fetches netns and ifindex from dev.

Once addr_doit() is converted to RCU, phonet_address_notify() will be
called outside of RCU due to GFP_KERNEL, and dev will be unavailable
there.

Let's pass net and ifindex to phonet_address_notify().

Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 71de0177b28d ("net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h |    2 +-
 net/phonet/pn_dev.c         |   10 +++++++---
 net/phonet/pn_netlink.c     |   12 ++++++------
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h
+++ b/include/net/phonet/pn_dev.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ int phonet_address_add(struct net_device
 int phonet_address_del(struct net_device *dev, u8 addr);
 u8 phonet_address_get(struct net_device *dev, u8 addr);
 int phonet_address_lookup(struct net *net, u8 addr);
-void phonet_address_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr);
+void phonet_address_notify(struct net *net, int event, u32 ifindex, u8 addr);
 
 int phonet_route_add(struct net_device *dev, u8 daddr);
 int phonet_route_del(struct net_device *dev, u8 daddr);
--- a/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
@@ -98,10 +98,13 @@ static void phonet_device_destroy(struct
 	mutex_unlock(&pndevs->lock);
 
 	if (pnd) {
+		struct net *net = dev_net(dev);
+		u32 ifindex = dev->ifindex;
 		u8 addr;
 
 		for_each_set_bit(addr, pnd->addrs, 64)
-			phonet_address_notify(RTM_DELADDR, dev, addr);
+			phonet_address_notify(net, RTM_DELADDR, ifindex, addr);
+
 		kfree(pnd);
 	}
 }
@@ -244,8 +247,9 @@ static int phonet_device_autoconf(struct
 	ret = phonet_address_add(dev, req.ifr_phonet_autoconf.device);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
-	phonet_address_notify(RTM_NEWADDR, dev,
-				req.ifr_phonet_autoconf.device);
+
+	phonet_address_notify(dev_net(dev), RTM_NEWADDR, dev->ifindex,
+			      req.ifr_phonet_autoconf.device);
 	return 0;
 }
 
--- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 static int fill_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ifindex, u8 addr,
 		     u32 portid, u32 seq, int event);
 
-void phonet_address_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 addr)
+void phonet_address_notify(struct net *net, int event, u32 ifindex, u8 addr)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int err = -ENOBUFS;
@@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ void phonet_address_notify(int event, st
 	if (skb == NULL)
 		goto errout;
 
-	err = fill_addr(skb, dev->ifindex, addr, 0, 0, event);
+	err = fill_addr(skb, ifindex, addr, 0, 0, event);
 	if (err < 0) {
 		WARN_ON(err == -EMSGSIZE);
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		goto errout;
 	}
-	rtnl_notify(skb, dev_net(dev), 0,
-		    RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	rtnl_notify(skb, net, 0, RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, NULL, GFP_KERNEL);
 	return;
 errout:
-	rtnl_set_sk_err(dev_net(dev), RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, err);
+	rtnl_set_sk_err(net, RTNLGRP_PHONET_IFADDR, err);
 }
 
 static const struct nla_policy ifa_phonet_policy[IFA_MAX+1] = {
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static int addr_doit(struct sk_buff *skb
 	else
 		err = phonet_address_del(dev, pnaddr);
 	if (!err)
-		phonet_address_notify(nlh->nlmsg_type, dev, pnaddr);
+		phonet_address_notify(net, nlh->nlmsg_type, ifm->ifa_index, pnaddr);
 	return err;
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 93/96] net: phonet: free phonet_device after RCU grace period

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Santosh Kalluri <santosh.kalluri129@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 71de0177b28da751f407581a4515cf4d762f6296 ]

phonet_device_destroy() removes a phonet_device from the per-net device
list with list_del_rcu(), but frees it immediately. RCU readers walking
the same list can still hold a pointer to the object after it has been
removed, leading to a slab-use-after-free.

Use kfree_rcu(), matching the lifetime rule already used by
phonet_address_del() for the same object type.

Fixes: eeb74a9d45f7 ("Phonet: convert devices list to RCU")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Santosh Kalluri <santosh.kalluri129@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi@remlab.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/phonet/pn_dev.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pn_dev.c
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void phonet_device_destroy(struct
 		for_each_set_bit(addr, pnd->addrs, 64)
 			phonet_address_notify(net, RTM_DELADDR, ifindex, addr);
 
-		kfree(pnd);
+		kfree_rcu(pnd, rcu);
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 5.10 94/96] mmc: renesas_sdhi: Add OF entry for RZ/G2H SoC

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com>

[ Upstream commit f48ee49726ee4ab545fd2dc644f169c0809b19b3 ]

The RZ/G2H (R8A774E1) SoC was previously handled via the generic
"renesas,rcar-gen3-sdhi" fallback compatible string. However, because
the SDHI IP on RZ/G2H is identical with the R-Car H3-N (R8A77951), it
requires the specific quirks and configuration defined in
`of_r8a7795_compatible` rather than the generic Gen3 data.

Add the explicit "renesas,sdhi-r8a774e1" match entry to map it correctly.
Note that the DT binding file renesas,sdhi.yaml does not need an update
as the entry for this SoC is already present.

Fixes: 31941342888d ("arm64: dts: renesas: r8a774e1: Add SDHI nodes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj@bp.renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulfh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c
+++ b/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac.c
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static const struct renesas_sdhi_of_data
 static const struct of_device_id renesas_sdhi_internal_dmac_of_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r7s9210", .data = &of_rza2_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-mmc-r8a77470", .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, },
+	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a774e1", .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a7795", .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,sdhi-r8a7796", .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, },
 	{ .compatible = "renesas,rcar-gen3-sdhi", .data = &of_rcar_gen3_compatible, },

[PATCH 5.10 95/96] misc: fastrpc: fix DMA address corruption due to find_vma misuse

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain@outlook.com>

[ Upstream commit 464c6ad2aa16e1e1df9d559289199356493d1e00 ]

fastrpc_get_args() uses find_vma() to look up the VMA for a user-provided
pointer and compute a DMA address offset. When the address falls in a gap
before the returned VMA, (ptr & PAGE_MASK) - vma->vm_start underflows,
corrupting the DMA address sent to the DSP.

Replace find_vma() with vma_lookup(), which returns NULL when the address
is not contained within any VMA.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 80f3afd72bd4 ("misc: fastrpc: consider address offset before sending to DSP")
Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain@outlook.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srini@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530204528.116920-3-srini@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ adapted `vma_lookup(mm, ptr)` to `find_vma(mm, ptr)` plus a `ptr >= vma->vm_start` guard since `vma_lookup()` does not exist in 5.10 ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/misc/fastrpc.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/fastrpc.c
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ static int fastrpc_get_args(u32 kernel,
 
 			mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
 			vma = find_vma(current->mm, ctx->args[i].ptr);
-			if (vma)
+			if (vma && ctx->args[i].ptr >= vma->vm_start)
 				pages[i].addr += (ctx->args[i].ptr & PAGE_MASK) -
 						 vma->vm_start;
 			mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);

[PATCH 5.10 96/96] virtiofs: fix UAF on submount umount

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 06b41351779e9289e8785694ade9042ae85e41ea ]

iput() called from fuse_release_end() can Oops if the super block has
already been destroyed.  Normally this is prevented by waiting for
num_waiting to go down to zero before commencing with super block shutdown.

This only works, however, for the last submount instance, as the wait
counter is per connection, not per superblock.

Revert to using synchronous release requests for the auto_submounts case,
which is virtiofs only at this time.

Reported-by: Aurélien Bombo <abombo@microsoft.com>
Reported-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Cc: Greg Kurz <gkurz@redhat.com>
Closes: https://github.com/kata-containers/kata-containers/issues/12589
Fixes: 26e5c67deb2e ("fuse: fix livelock in synchronous file put from fuseblk workers")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <gkurz@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/fuse/file.c |    8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/fs/fuse/file.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/file.c
@@ -330,8 +330,14 @@ void fuse_release_common(struct file *fi
 	 * aio and closes the fd before the aio completes.  Since aio takes its
 	 * own ref to the file, the IO completion has to drop the ref, which is
 	 * how the fuse server can end up closing its clients' files.
+	 *
+	 * Exception is virtio-fs, which is not affected by the above (server is
+	 * on host, cannot close open files in guest).  Virtio-fs needs sync
+	 * release, because the num_waiting mechanism to wait for all requests
+	 * before commencing with fs shutdown doesn't work if submounts are
+	 * used.
 	 */
-	fuse_file_put(ff, false, isdir);
+	fuse_file_put(ff, ff->fm->fc->auto_submounts, isdir);
 }
 
 static int fuse_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/96] 5.10.260-rc1 review

[Brett A C Sheffield]

# Librecast Test Results

020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast

CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 5.10.260-rc1-00097-g8c447b22d9b1 #1 SMP Thu Jul 2 19:01:20 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux

Tested-by: Brett A C Sheffield <bacs@librecast.net>

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/96] 5.10.260-rc1 review

[Woody Suwalski]

Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.260 release.
> There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 04 Jul 2026 15:50:58 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.260-rc1.gz
>
Problem with the kernel.org web site? I am getting

https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/


  404 Not Found

Same for v6.x and v7.x..
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/ seems OK???

Woody

Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/96] 5.10.260-rc1 review

[Pavel Machek]

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Hi!

> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.260 release.
> There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-5.10.y

Tested-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) <pavel@nabladev.com>

Best regards,
                                                                Pavel


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Re: [PATCH 5.10 00/96] 5.10.260-rc1 review

[Mark Brown]

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On Thu, Jul 02, 2026 at 06:18:52PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.260 release.
> There are 96 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.

Tested-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>

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Re: [PATCH 5.10 01/96] net/sched: act_pedit: use NLA_POLICY for parsing ex keys

[Ben Hutchings]

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On Thu, 2026-07-02 at 18:18 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
> 
> [ Upstream commit 5036034572b79daa6d6600338e8e8229e2a44b09 ]
> 
> Transform two checks in the 'ex' key parsing into netlink policies
> removing extra if checks.
[...]

No objection, but this should also be applied to 5.15 and 6.1.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
You can't have everything.  Where would you put it?

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Re: [PATCH 5.10 11/96] slimbus: qcom-ngd-ctrl: Register callbacks after creating the ngd

[Ben Hutchings]

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On Thu, 2026-07-02 at 18:19 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> 5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> 
> ------------------
> 
> From: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com>
> 
> [ Upstream commit 2a9d50e9ea406e0c8735938484adc20515ef1b47 ]
[...]

No objections, but this is missing from 5.15, 6.1, and 6.6.

Ben.

-- 
Ben Hutchings
You can't have everything.  Where would you put it?

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Re: [PATCH 5.10 01/96] net/sched: act_pedit: use NLA_POLICY for parsing ex keys

[Wentao Guan]

> On Thu, 2026-07-02 at 18:18 +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > 5.10-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
> >
> > ------------------
> >
> > >From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela@mojatatu.com>
> >
> > [ Upstream commit 5036034572b79daa6d6600338e8e8229e2a44b09 ]
> >
> > Transform two checks in the 'ex' key parsing into netlink policies
> > removing extra if checks.
> [...]
> 
> No objection, but this should also be applied to 5.15 and 6.1.
Good idea, but i am not sure that here is a logic change,
as policy for stable tree it be should applied to 5.15 and 6.1.

BRs
Wentao Guan