Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM

[Robert Millan <rmh@aybabtu.com>]

On Fri, Feb 20, 2009 at 01:29:50AM +0100, Jan Alsenz wrote:
> First of all a TPM is not just some kind of secure memory only accessible from
> early BIOS, it basically is a small computer.

The thing is, we have many of these "small computers" in any standard PC.
Many of them are technically capable of performing crypto checks and validating
your memory.

What makes the TPM different is not what it is, but what is _designed for_.

When you get one, it comes with an hostile setup.  If this computer was a
crypto card, this would be no trouble, since the crypto card can't coerce you
into using proprietary software.  However, the TPM device is capable of
deciding for you when your computer is "clean" and when it isn't.  This
empowers third parties to figure out if you're "clean" or not.

To get the picture, imagine this situation:

  - Youtube demands you run approved version of Adobe Flash.

  - You don't want to use Adobe's proprietary program, you'd rather use
    Gnash instead.

  - Youtube can challenge you to use your TPM to prove you're running Flash.

Then you're forced into either bowing to your TPM or not watching any videos.

Such kind of submission to a small piece of silicon is not acceptable.

-- 
Robert Millan

  The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and
  how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we
  still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."