Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM

[Robert Millan <rmh@aybabtu.com>]

On Sun, Feb 22, 2009 at 03:21:21AM +0200, Alex Besogonov wrote:
> Robert Millan wrote:
>>> Making sure, that noone can override it, can be awfully difficult, especially
>>> under a physical attacker. A hardware that is at least a bit designed to
>>> withstand such an attack can help a lot.
>> I'm not sure why is physical security so awfully difficult for you (can't you
>> use locks, tamper-proof seals, cameras and alarms?), but most people who're in
>> the bussiness of protecting physical goods manage to sort it out.
> My devices will be installed at clients' locations. It's impossible to  
> guarantee that all devices will be physically secure.
>
> If you live in the USA then one day such device might contain your  
> private data. Would you like it to be stolen?

My private data is safely stored.  The stuff Google reads from my Gmail
account is *not* private data.

If you send your private stuff elsewhere and trust noone can read it because
a small chip that's not even under your control told you so, you're being
naive...

> Reverse engineering the TPM chip is very costly. And I'm not going to  
> try to protect data from NSA or CIA or another three-letter agency.

...but thankfully, not as much as I thought.

-- 
Robert Millan

  The DRM opt-in fallacy: "Your data belongs to us. We will decide when (and
  how) you may access your data; but nobody's threatening your freedom: we
  still allow you to remove your data and not access it at all."