Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM

[Jan Alsenz <janalsenz@student.ethz.ch>]

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Robert Millan wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 21, 2009 at 10:43:16PM +0200, Michael Gorven wrote:
>>>> Just to clarify, are you objecting to the use of TPM on principle and
>>>> because you don't want to encourage use of it, or because you think this
>>>> specific use (trusted boot path) is dangerous?
>>> I can't reply to this question, because it's not just a specific use, it's
>>> part of the design, of its purpose.  One of the design goals is remote
>>> attestation, which is a threat to our freedom and is unethical.
>>>
>>> If there was a device that behaves like a TPM except remote attestation is
>>> not possible (e.g. by one of the means described above), I wouldn't object
>>> to it, and I think the GNU project wouldn't either, but then referring to
>>> that as "TPM" is misleading.
>> I wasn't actually referring to the remote attestation. Just using the TPM to 
>> store a disk encryption key sealed with PCR registers, so that it would only 
>> be provided once it's been verified that GRUB hasn't been changed. 
>> (Personally I wouldn't want to use remote attestation at all.)
> 
> First of all, I think it's a poor approach, because there's no way to garantee
> the TPM is doing what it's supposed to (can you read its source code?  how do
> you know for sure there are no backdoors?).

As I said before: you can make the very same argument for every single part of
your PC.
Why do you trust Intel or AMD with your CPU? They are also involved in the TCG!


Greets,

Jan


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