Re: A _good_ and valid use for TPM

[Michael Gorven <michael@gorven.za.net>]

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On Saturday 21 February 2009 15:51:42 Robert Millan wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 20, 2009 at 09:45:28AM +0200, Michael Gorven wrote:
> > TPM can be used for good or for bad, but this is the case for everything
> > involving cryptography. We don't refuse to use encryption algorithms
> > because they could be used for DRM, so why should we refuse to use TPM?
>
> I don't agree with this analogy.  Unlike cryptography, TPMs have been
> designed from the ground up to serve an evil purpose.  They *could* have
> designed them with good intent, for example either of these could apply:
>
>   - Buyer gets a printed copy of the TPM's private key when they buy a
> board.
>
>   - An override button that's physically accessible from the chip can be
>     used to disable "hostile mode" and make the TPM sign everything.  From
>     that point physical access can be managed with traditional methods
> (e.g. locks).
>
> But they didn't.

Just to clarify, are you objecting to the use of TPM on principle and because 
you don't want to encourage use of it, or because you think this specific use 
(trusted boot path) is dangerous?

Michael

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