From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
linux-coco@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>, Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
patches@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance
Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 18:47:04 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <e8785bcb-45ed-492f-af66-deadfba6ac25@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261028152618.1356860-10-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
On 29/10/26 02:26, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote:
> AMD SEV-TIO currently establishes its SPDM session and enables IDE during
> connect, before userspace can retrieve or accept the device identity.
> Move AMD link setup behind its evidence_accept callback.
>
> During connect, reserve TC0's stream ID, create the firmware context,
> and forward only unencrypted identity discovery requests. Cache the
> complete slot-zero certificate chain as firmware receives it. Once
> firmware consumes that chain and yields its next request, pause the
> exchange without transmitting an authentication or session-establishment
> request. No IDE registers are programmed during this identity
> collection.
>
> Keep the generic callback optional until the following patch converts
> CCA, the remaining legacy link backend, and requires evidence_accept for
> every link backend.
>
> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Cc: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
> Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.c | 17 ++-
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.h | 5 +
> drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c | 189 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 3 files changed, 176 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.c
> index c84e23982b43..ff51f09961c4 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.c
> @@ -639,25 +639,23 @@ static void spdm_ctrl_init(struct spdm_ctrl *ctrl, struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data)
> static void spdm_ctrl_free(struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data)
> {
> struct sev_tio_status *tio_status = to_tio_status(dev_data);
> - size_t len = tio_status->spdm_req_size_max -
> - (sla_dobj_id_to_size(SPDM_DOBJ_ID_RESP) +
> - sizeof(struct sla_buffer_hdr));
> struct tsm_spdm *spdm = &dev_data->spdm;
>
> sla_buffer_unmap(dev_data->resp, dev_data->respbuf);
> sla_buffer_unmap(dev_data->req, dev_data->reqbuf);
> spdm->rsp = NULL;
> spdm->req = NULL;
> - sla_free(dev_data->req, len, true);
> - sla_free(dev_data->resp, len, false);
> - sla_free(dev_data->scratch, tio_status->spdm_scratch_size_max, true);
> + sla_free(dev_data->req, tio_status->spdm_req_size_max, true);
> + sla_free(dev_data->resp, tio_status->spdm_req_size_max, false);
> + sla_free(dev_data->scratch, dev_data->scratch_len, true);
>
> dev_data->req.sla = 0;
> dev_data->resp.sla = 0;
> dev_data->scratch.sla = 0;
> dev_data->respbuf = NULL;
> dev_data->reqbuf = NULL;
> - sla_free(dev_data->output, tio_status->spdm_out_size_max, true);
> + sla_free(dev_data->output, dev_data->output_len, true);
> + dev_data->output = SLA_NULL;
This is a bugfix (thanks for pointing!) and does not belong here. Want to repost, or I can (and should, really)?
> }
>
> static int spdm_ctrl_alloc(struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data)
> @@ -674,7 +672,7 @@ static int spdm_ctrl_alloc(struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data)
> dev_data->output = sla_alloc(dev_data->output_len, true);
>
> if (IS_SLA_NULL(dev_data->req) || IS_SLA_NULL(dev_data->resp) ||
> - IS_SLA_NULL(dev_data->scratch) || IS_SLA_NULL(dev_data->dev_ctx)) {
> + IS_SLA_NULL(dev_data->scratch) || IS_SLA_NULL(dev_data->output)) {
the same.
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> goto free_spdm_exit;
> }
> @@ -773,7 +771,8 @@ int sev_tio_dev_create(struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data, u16 device_id,
> free_data_pg_exit:
> snp_free_firmware_page(data_pg);
> free_ctx_exit:
> - sla_free(create.dev_ctx_sla, tio_status->devctx_size, true);
> + sla_free(dev_data->dev_ctx, tio_status->devctx_size, true);
and this. Is this codex? :)
> + dev_data->dev_ctx = SLA_NULL;
> return ret;
> }
>
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.h b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.h
> index 67512b3dbc53..237da723483c 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.h
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tio.h
> @@ -58,6 +58,11 @@ struct tio_dsm {
> struct pci_tsm_pf0 tsm;
> struct tsm_dsm_tio data;
> struct sev_device *sev;
> + bool session_connected;
> + bool certificate_pending;
> + u16 certificate_request_len;
> + size_t certificate_offset;
> + int pending_spdm;
> };
>
> /* Data object IDs */
> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c
> index e905ed9de9b5..14d7ef84ee36 100644
> --- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev-tsm.c
> @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
> #include <linux/pci-doe.h>
> #include <linux/bitfield.h>
> #include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/unaligned.h>
>
> #include <asm/sev-common.h>
> #include <asm/sev.h>
> @@ -163,7 +164,7 @@ static int streams_register(struct pci_ide **ide)
> static void streams_unregister(struct pci_ide **ide)
> {
> for (int i = 0; i < TIO_IDE_MAX_TC; ++i)
> - if (ide[i])
> + if (ide[i] && ide[i]->name)
> pci_ide_stream_unregister(ide[i]);
> }
>
> @@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ static void dsm_remove(struct pci_tsm *tsm)
> if (is_pci_tsm_pf0(pdev)) {
> struct tio_dsm *dsm = container_of(tsm, struct tio_dsm, tsm.base_tsm);
>
> + kvfree(tsm->evidence.obj[PCI_TSM_EVIDENCE_TYPE_CERT0].data);
> pci_tsm_pf0_destructor(&dsm->tsm);
> kfree(dsm);
> }
> @@ -283,12 +285,120 @@ static int dsm_create(struct tio_dsm *dsm)
> return sev_tio_dev_create(&dsm->data, device_id, root_port_id, segment_id);
> }
>
> +/* Only identity discovery requests may leave the host before acceptance. */
> +static int dsm_identity_request(struct tio_dsm *dsm)
> +{
> + struct tsm_spdm *spdm = &dsm->data.spdm;
> + const u8 *req = spdm->req;
> +
> + if (spdm->req_len < 4)
> + return -EPROTO;
> +
> + switch (req[1]) {
> + case 0x84: /* GET_VERSION */
> + case 0xe1: /* GET_CAPABILITIES */
> + case 0xe3: /* NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS */
> + case 0x81: /* GET_DIGESTS */
> + dsm->certificate_pending = false;
> + return 0;
> + case 0x82: /* GET_CERTIFICATE */
> + if (spdm->req_len < 8 || (req[2] & 0xf) ||
> + get_unaligned_le16(req + 4) != dsm->certificate_offset)
> + return -EPROTO;
> + dsm->certificate_request_len = get_unaligned_le16(req + 6);
> + if (!dsm->certificate_request_len)
> + return -EPROTO;
> + dsm->certificate_pending = true;
> + return 0;
> + case 0xff: /* RESPOND_IF_READY preserves the pending certificate request. */
> + return 0;
> + default:
> + return -EPROTO;
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int dsm_cache_certificate(struct tio_dsm *dsm)
> +{
> + struct pci_tsm_evidence_object *object =
> + &dsm->tsm.base_tsm.evidence.obj[PCI_TSM_EVIDENCE_TYPE_CERT0];
> + struct tsm_spdm *spdm = &dsm->data.spdm;
> + const u8 *rsp = spdm->rsp;
> + size_t portion, remainder, total;
> +
> + if (spdm->rsp_len < 4)
> + return -EPROTO;
> + if (rsp[1] != 0x02) /* CERTIFICATE */
> + return 0;
> + if (!dsm->certificate_pending || spdm->rsp_len < 8 || (rsp[2] & 0xf))
> + return -EPROTO;
> +
> + portion = get_unaligned_le16(rsp + 4);
> + remainder = get_unaligned_le16(rsp + 6);
> + total = dsm->certificate_offset + portion + remainder;
> + if (!portion || portion > dsm->certificate_request_len ||
> + portion > spdm->rsp_len - 8 || total > U16_MAX)
> + return -EPROTO;
> +
> + if (!object->data) {
> + object->data = kvmalloc(total, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!object->data)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + object->len = total;
> + } else if (total != object->len) {
> + return -EPROTO;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy((u8 *)object->data + dsm->certificate_offset, rsp + 8, portion);
> + dsm->certificate_offset += portion;
> + dsm->certificate_pending = false;
> + if (!remainder && (object->len < 4 ||
> + get_unaligned_le16(object->data) != object->len))
> + return -EPROTO;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int dsm_collect_identity(struct tio_dsm *dsm, int ret)
> +{
> + struct pci_tsm_evidence_object *object =
> + &dsm->tsm.base_tsm.evidence.obj[PCI_TSM_EVIDENCE_TYPE_CERT0];
> + struct tsm_spdm *spdm = &dsm->data.spdm;
> +
> + while (ret == PCI_DOE_FEATURE_CMA || ret == PCI_DOE_FEATURE_SSESSION) {
> + /* Firmware consumed this exact chain; resume only after acceptance. */
> + if (object->len && dsm->certificate_offset == object->len) {
> + dsm->pending_spdm = ret;
> + return 0;
> + }
> + if (ret != PCI_DOE_FEATURE_CMA)
> + return -EPROTO;
> + ret = dsm_identity_request(dsm);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + ret = pci_doe(dsm->tsm.doe_mb, PCI_VENDOR_ID_PCI_SIG,
> + PCI_DOE_FEATURE_CMA, spdm->req, spdm->req_len,
> + spdm->rsp, spdm->rsp_len);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> + spdm->rsp_len = ret;
> + ret = dsm_cache_certificate(dsm);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> + ret = sev_tio_continue(&dsm->data);
> + }
> +
> + /* Connect must stop before session establishment, with a complete chain. */
> + return ret < 0 ? ret : -EPROTO;
> +}
> +
> +static void dsm_disconnect(struct pci_dev *pdev);
> +
> static int dsm_connect(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> {
(indent)
> struct tio_dsm *dsm = pdev_to_tio_dsm(pdev);
> struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data = &dsm->data;
> u8 ids[TIO_IDE_MAX_TC];
> - u8 tc_mask;
> int ret;
>
> if (pci_find_doe_mailbox(pdev, PCI_VENDOR_ID_PCI_SIG,
> @@ -300,35 +410,54 @@ static int dsm_connect(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> ret = stream_alloc(pdev, dev_data->ide, 0);
> if (ret)
> return ret;
> -
> ret = dsm_create(dsm);
> if (ret)
> - goto ide_free_exit;
> + goto disconnect;
> +
> + /* Reserve TC0's stream ID without programming or enabling IDE. */
> + memset(ids, 0xff, sizeof(ids));
> + ids[0] = dev_data->ide[0]->stream_id;
> + dev_data->cert_slot = 0;
> + ret = sev_tio_dev_connect(dev_data, BIT(0), ids, dev_data->cert_slot);
> + ret = dsm_collect_identity(dsm, ret);
Cannot librspdm do that collection, directly via DOE? Ideally in the generic code? There nothing special for the PSP to do and stopping SEV-TIO's connect half way is weird.
> + if (!ret)
> + return 0;
> +
> +disconnect:
> + dsm_disconnect(pdev);
> + return ret;
> +}
>
> - tc_mask = streams_setup(dev_data->ide, ids);
> +static int dsm_evidence_accept(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> +{
> + struct tio_dsm *dsm = pdev_to_tio_dsm(pdev);
> + struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data = &dsm->data;
> + u8 ids[TIO_IDE_MAX_TC];
> + int ret;
>
> - dev_data->cert_slot = pdev->tsm->evidence.slot;
> - ret = sev_tio_dev_connect(dev_data, tc_mask, ids, dev_data->cert_slot);
> - ret = sev_tio_spdm_cmd(dsm, ret);
> - if (ret)
> - goto free_exit;
> + if (pdev->tsm->evidence.slot)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + if (!dsm->pending_spdm)
> + return -ENODATA;
>
> - streams_enable(dev_data->ide);
> + streams_setup(dev_data->ide, ids);
I kinda get the appeal of not enabling IDE before accepting but in practice the host still has to have a knob in IOMMU to prevent a malicious device from DMAing T=1 trafic so accept() would trigger enable_dma() hook.
> + ret = sev_tio_spdm_cmd(dsm, dsm->pending_spdm);
> + dsm->pending_spdm = 0;
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_session;
> + dsm->session_connected = true;
>
> + ret = streams_enable(dev_data->ide);
> + if (ret)
> + goto err_session;
> ret = streams_register(dev_data->ide);
> if (ret)
> - goto free_exit;
> -
> + goto err_session;
> return 0;
>
> -free_exit:
> - sev_tio_dev_reclaim(dev_data);
> -
> - streams_disable(dev_data->ide);
> -ide_free_exit:
> -
> - streams_teardown(dev_data->ide);
> -
> +err_session:
> + /* Disconnect owns cleanup after firmware or IDE setup has started. */
> + pdev->tsm->error = true;
> return ret;
> }
>
> @@ -339,14 +468,20 @@ static void dsm_disconnect(struct pci_dev *pdev)
> struct tsm_dsm_tio *dev_data = &dsm->data;
> int ret;
>
> - ret = sev_tio_dev_disconnect(dev_data, force);
> - ret = sev_tio_spdm_cmd(dsm, ret);
> - if (ret && !force) {
> - ret = sev_tio_dev_disconnect(dev_data, true);
> - sev_tio_spdm_cmd(dsm, ret);
> + /* A paused or failed connect needs forced firmware cleanup. */
> + if (dev_data->reqbuf && dev_data->respbuf) {
> + force |= !dsm->session_connected;
> + ret = sev_tio_dev_disconnect(dev_data, force);
> + ret = sev_tio_spdm_cmd(dsm, ret);
> + if (ret && !force) {
> + ret = sev_tio_dev_disconnect(dev_data, true);
> + sev_tio_spdm_cmd(dsm, ret);
> + }
> }
>
> sev_tio_dev_reclaim(dev_data);
> + dsm->session_connected = false;
> + dsm->pending_spdm = 0;
>
> streams_disable(dev_data->ide);
> streams_unregister(dev_data->ide);
> @@ -357,6 +492,8 @@ static struct pci_tsm_ops sev_tsm_ops = {
> .probe = dsm_probe,
> .remove = dsm_remove,
> .connect = dsm_connect,
> + .evidence_accept = dsm_evidence_accept,
I saw in your branch you are ditching the connect() hook, is that the plan? Thanks,
> + .evidence_types = BIT(PCI_TSM_EVIDENCE_TYPE_CERT0),
> .disconnect = dsm_disconnect,
> };
>
--
Alexey
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-06 7:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 6:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:21 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-04 14:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 5:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-11-06 7:47 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2026-11-06 13:14 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 14:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 6:23 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 9:58 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 3:47 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 12:01 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-03 15:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 8:03 ` Xu Yilun
2026-11-04 9:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 16:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 15:53 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 19:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 22:39 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-08 18:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:55 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-09 13:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 17:37 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 18:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 20:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 23:40 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 13:15 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-10 14:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 13:09 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-11 14:13 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-12 1:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 12:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 1:40 ` Alistair
2026-11-10 15:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 5:32 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-10 12:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 9:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 9:37 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-12 14:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-12 15:47 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-12 16:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 20:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:48 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 8:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 12:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-06 15:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 18:54 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 16:31 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-03 17:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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