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From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
	"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
	"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
	"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
	Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>,
	"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
	Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
	"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"patches@lists.linux.dev" <patches@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance
Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 20:03:46 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7ddf5f6d-0eca-4eda-9240-3903a7cd86eb@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110125202.GD738765@nvidia.com>

On 10/11/26 23:52, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 04:32:34PM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>> My AI predicts 1000-2000 lines of code very careful spec derived code
>>> just to remove this padding. Such a big spec mistake.
>>
>> Out of curiosity - why that many? There is only a handful of SPDM
>> messages and secure SPDM has the size in the header.
> 
> It sounds like there are alot of options. Since nothing is sized in
> the message you have to parse the negotiated algorithms and spec
> version to figure out how big each crypto field is and manually sum
> everything up.
> 
> IDK I thought it was alot too, but it is just an estimate.
> 
>>> 1) I think this removes alot of code from the TSM drivers. All this
>>>      stuff they have to go back and get the data after the fact, or the
>>>      thing that is almost like this in RMM, goes away. The TSM drivers
>>>      are very slim, just run their communicate loops.
>>
>> It is already like this pretty much, is not it? Well, on AMD.
> 
> Not quite, AMD doesn't have any way to return the session transcript
> to userspace, and it hides VCA under it's get measurements thing. It
> only looks simple because these issues haven't been addressed.
> 
> In terms of presenting a consistent uAPI for SPDM AMD is the furthest
> away from the rest and probably the best reason to do this design
> since it would bring it into alignment.
> 
>>> 2) Clear uniform path to 1.3, stop after GET_DIGESTS, let userspace
>>>      inspect the certificates, continue with the slot. Again drivers can
>>>      be super simple, just need to pause at the right point in the
>>>      sequence.
>>
>>
>> The AMD PSP calls SPDM_DIGESTS first, then SPDM_CERTIFICATE (just
>> like the PCIe spec depicts). May be stop at SPDM_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP?
> 
> That's wasteful too, GET_DIGESTS before KEY_EXCHANGE isn't signed so
> it can't really be used for anything.

The attacker could steer the slot selection to less optimal, is that the attack?

The TSM has to pick a slot to sign GET_DIGESTS which we then want to use to pick a better slot and switch to that?

> This is also after the OS has
> told PSP what the slot is, so it can't even help do slot selection.

How is pausing going to help with the slot selection?

>>> 3) The data collected and presented to userspace is perfectly uniform
>>>      governed only by the SPDM specification. There is a clear path to
>>>      adopt newer versions in the kernel with in-kernel SPDM that
>>>      instantly with nearly no-code works with all the TSM drivers.
>>> 4) This is about half of in-kernel SPDM, the receive buffer
>>>      reassembly, certificate chain reassembly, x509, padding stripping.
>>>      Each a complicated topic on its own. We always imagined having
>>>      in-kernel SPDM, so I view this as effectively free code - contigent
>>>      on organizing the in-kernel SPDM implementation in a properly
>>>      modular way.
>>> 5) Without AI this looks actually fairly scary. I can see why people
>>>      wanted to avoid it with different schemes to have the TSM do some
>>>      of the work. Yet we planned to do it anyhow for in-kernel SPDM so..
>>> 6) With AI this is probably a weeks work I suppose to really expertly
>>>      polish and make excellent tests.
>>> 7) There is clear overlap with Alistair's work, I don't have a sense
>>>      right now how close some of the parts in that series are to fitting
>>>      this shape.
>>
>> You want the above just to prevent IDE keys from being programmed
>> into the device before accepting the device in the host os, or there
>> is more to it?
> 
> I want a consistent uAPI that is 100% the same for all four
> implementations. I do not want ARM to show the VCA before measurements
> in a transcript and AMD to hide the VCA in an AMD specific measurement
> blob - for example.
> 
> I want a uAPI where the user cannot tell the difference between the
> four backends. When they operate the same PCIe device they all give
> exactly the same uAPI experiance.

That's great, cannot agree more, but what was that recurring thing about not programming IDE keys before accepting the PF? Thanks,


> 
> Jason

-- 
Alexey


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-11  9:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31  6:24     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:09     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:45         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04  9:21           ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-04 14:00             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:05     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:35       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  4:22     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:39       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29  5:30     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08   ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11       ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:41         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-11-06  7:47   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-06 13:14     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 14:21       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:03       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56   ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30  9:58       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31  3:47           ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11             ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 12:01                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-03 15:16                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04  8:03                     ` Xu Yilun
2026-11-04  9:49                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:41                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 16:54                           ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 15:53                             ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 19:30                               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 22:39                                 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-08 18:33                                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:55                                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-09 13:47                                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 17:37                                     ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 18:53                                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 20:54                                         ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 23:40                                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 13:15                                             ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-10 14:20                                               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 13:09                                                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-11 14:13                                                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10  1:40                                         ` Alistair
2026-11-10 15:07                                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10  5:32                                         ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-10 12:52                                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11  9:03                                             ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2026-11-10 20:07                               ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04  9:03                     ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:48                       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06  8:24                     ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 12:49                       ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-06 15:53                         ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 18:54                           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 16:31                 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-03 17:56                   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22           ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32   ` Jason Gunthorpe

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