From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
To: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
"Jiang, Dave" <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>,
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"patches@lists.linux.dev" <patches@lists.linux.dev>,
Alistair <alistair23@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 10:33:19 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116143319.GA2245175@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <DS4PPFA84FA90FC465DE2D4A57521CEB991E77C2@DS4PPFA84FA90FC.namprd11.prod.outlook.com>
On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 01:38:50PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > 1) No easy way to get the VCA, no easy way to do capture
>
> My understanding is that VCA must have been included into
> SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T from the beginning, it was omitted
> by mistake and we asked to fix it as Dave already pointed out.
That makes some sense, but it just makes this struct bigger and
worser. As I explained ot Aneesh I'd rather not have a VCA at all but
the transcript that includes VCA (or is maybe only VCA) with preserved
message boundary markers. Userspace can compute VCA for the purposes
of the signature hash.
> > 2) Wrong digests design for the guest. SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T
> > is a terrible idea since it is not grounded in any spec. The other
> > two have multiple guest digests computed directly over spec
> > defined objects.
> >
> > 3) Even if you like SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T it includes
> > TDISP_CAPABILITIES for some bad reason. Nobody else even
> > exports this info from their TSM or digests it. Thus Intel would
> > need unique API for the VMM to even build
> > SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T. Not nice.
>
> I dont think there is an expectation that there needs to be unique API
> to build this structure (I think we can hide it in the tdx-specific code), but
> your point below is valid: this SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T blob
> needs to end up on the guest side because only using this blob the guest
> can currently verify the evidence of the SPDM connection establishment.
Right.
Any every other arch can build their digested data in the VMM using
the standard APIs because all their digests are over standard things.
Intel cannot do this because you digested information that nobody else
even exports, and your forward compatability story rests on passing
this opaque blob from host kernel through VMM to guest kernel to
compute an opaque digest over. Again, nobody else is doing something
like this so we have an Intel specific uAPI. For no particularly good
reasons beyond someone decided on the wrong digests.
> > 4) How does future extension work? Oh you probably have to pass
> > SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T as an opaque blob through to the
> > VMM. Lovely, so only Intel needs a special Intel specific blob
> > uAPI? Bah. This is a very bad idea.
>
> How does the evidence retrieval would be specified between the host and
> the guest? We actually haven’t discussed this part so far, but focused solely
> on the host part. If you envision that Linux would standardize objects that
> guest can ask host to provide, i.e. "give me VCA", "give me all available cert
> chains", etc.
This is what everyone else seems to have done, at least that is how
AMD constructed their digests, I couldn't find their guest to host
protocol. ARM has done it explicitly.
Even Intel could build the SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T in userspace
from the common information if it wasn't for the TDISP_CAPABILITIES
and the forward compatibility issue.
It is not really the struct that it is the issue, it is the single
digest over the entire struct that covers something no spec defines in
aggregate.
> Then yes, having a structure like above that incorporates all these
> parts is a problem we must solve. Could you please share your view
> on this one also? This is also important part of overall design.
So if you keep this then you have to get a uAPI 'give me the intel
blob' to build your VMM with. It is not impossible but it seems
unnecessary if you'd just digest the right stuff instead of a giant
struct.
ARM keeps several digests:
protocol_data_digest = H_rmm(VCA)
identity_digest = H_rmm(cert_1 || ... || cert_n)
pubkey_digest = H_rmm(<public key>)
meas_digest = H_rmm(GET_MEASUREMENTS || MEASUREMENTS)
report_digest = H_rmm(interface_report)
I'm not sure VCA is strictly necessary. pubkey_digest is because RMM
does not parse x509, since TDX does it also isn't necessary.
So you end up with three digests for TDX that are grounded in the
spec, instead of one digest covering some concatenation of stuff no
spec defines.
> > 7) Lack of an API to do evidence colllection for the host, the only
> > provided API always changes the guest visible information.
> > Not nice.
>
> Could you please elaborate more on this one? If you mean initial
> evidence collection, then it doesnt change and must not change
> (we concluded this already).
No, again, I don't see a use for initial collection and it should be
difficult/impossible to access in the uAPI. I'd rather you remove it
and stick to a 'tsm generated nonce' instead.
If someone wants one collection they can ask for one tsm generated
nonce from userspace. Having tdx module force a collection is not
nice. Of course you have to do this anyhow to get the basic
information out due to the SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T which,
again, doesn't fit very well.
Also "tsm generated nonce" has to be a global set for the vdevice and
visible to the guest, and unchanging while the vdevice
exists. Otherwise it doesn't work. You can't mix guest provided nonce
and tsm provided nonce together under the same LOCKED session.
> If you mean collecting measurements only that guest can ask later on
> (with guest provided nonce), then didnt you say you want this to be
> always reflected via trusted digest exposed to the guest?
The guest and host can collect measurments independently, and without
synchronization. The CSP may run an audit daemon on the host that
collects the current state of the device to look for tampering,
confirm live update, etc.
If the CSP's audit action causes any guest visible data to change then
the API is broken. In Intel's case a recollection by the host triggers
the guest's digest over SPDM_DEVICE_ATTESTATION_INFO_T to change.
For TSMs that work this way they will have to disable host evidence
collection inside the driver once a vdevice is created and cannot
support host audit. It is not optimal.
What you want is an API to retrive measurements for a vdevice
triggered by the guest that updates the guest visisble information
And another one to retrive measurements for the host pci device that
doesn't change the vdevice at all.
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 14:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 6:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:21 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-04 14:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 5:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-11-06 7:47 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-06 13:14 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 14:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 6:23 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 9:58 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 3:47 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 12:01 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-03 15:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 8:03 ` Xu Yilun
2026-11-04 9:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 16:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 15:53 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 19:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 22:39 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-08 18:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:55 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-09 13:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 17:37 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 18:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 20:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 23:40 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 13:15 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-10 14:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 13:09 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-11 14:13 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-12 1:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 12:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 1:40 ` Alistair
2026-11-10 15:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 5:32 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-10 12:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 9:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 9:37 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-12 14:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-12 15:47 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-12 16:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 8:54 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 14:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 16:29 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 19:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 16:38 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 19:12 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 17:12 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 19:34 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 13:38 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-16 14:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-11-10 20:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:48 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 8:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 12:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-06 15:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 18:54 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 16:31 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-03 17:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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