From: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Cc: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Jiang, Dave" <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
Xu Yilun <yilun.xu@linux.intel.com>,
"Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>,
"Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
"Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"patches@lists.linux.dev" <patches@lists.linux.dev>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 22:12:39 +1100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aac37ee5-03e0-4a30-b22c-0f7f20e58cae@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117011837.GG2245175@nvidia.com>
On 17/11/26 12:18, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:48:26AM +1100, Alexey Kardashevskiy wrote:
>>> Again, my reference threat is the hypervisor programs the device to do
>>> DMA after 1 second and then tricks the guest into doing DMA
>>> ENABLE. This must be prevented by the guest and device co-operating.>
>>> For a concrete example, imagine a RDMA NIC. The hypervisor boots it up
>>> and establishes a remote QP with RDMA access to all memory. Passes it
>>> to the guest and the guest does DMA ENABLE. Hypervisor suspends the
>>> guest immediately after and rewrites all its memory via the network.
>>
>> Then the HV is in the guest's TCB, no?
>
> No, it has access to an unlocked PCI device. That should never make
> the HV part of the guest TCB. Creating that barrier is entire point of
> TDISP.
>
>> I do not know anything about RDMA NICs but there must be some access
>> control. How is this different than giving the host an SSH key to
>> the guest's root account, for example?
>
> It is completely different. The entire point of TDISP is to take a PCI
> device in the system and then allow the guest to accept it into its
> TCB.
>
> My point is: when the guest accepts the device it cannot be "Dirty"
> with state and commands loaded into it by the untrusted hypervisor!
I do get that :) I am trying to figure out how the guest can guarantee (== the device can prove) that the device is clean.
>>> Devices MUST have protections against these kinds of attacks built
>>> into their LOCKED/RUN state transitions and verification, somehow. No
>>> spec says how to do this.>
Exactly that. No spec.
>>> Pretty much any device that does DMA can be tricked into doing
>>> something like this :(
>>
>> So we basically want guarantees that bus master is off when
>> transitioning to RUN, is that right?
>
> No. We need guarentees that the device is *clean* before we do DMA
> ENABLE.
>
> Clean means something like "just reset"
>
> IIRC we can't change bus master while in RUN anyhow, that is not how
> any of this is expected to work.
We cannot clear the BM (triggers ERROR) but 0->1 is allowed. Although the VM can only ask to enable it without knowing for sure what it was...
> We expect the device to respond to RUN and LOCK and do one of the
> options I gave.
>
>> A TDI measurements could include the VF config space but we do not
>> have TDI measurements... Huh.
>>
>> Sorry but it sounds like the device driver is the one which has deep
>> enough knowledge of the device and, upon transitioning to RUN, can
>> tell the device to stop/reset (via encrypted MMIO) while keeping DMA
>> blocked.
>
> Too late, DMA has already been activated, that breaks our model to try
> to activate DMA somehow after the driver starts.
If DMA is activated as SWIOTLB (so the device is still "adversary") - then we could (I am not really suggesting this, just clarifying).
> Plus many devices
> cannot reset themselves just from mmio..
Well it does not need to reset, it needs to know it was quiesced...
> The device knows what it is doing, the device has to respond to TDISP
> in an appropriate way to give this guarantee, or it is security broken.
>>>>> We run the attestation without a bound driver now so the device is
>>>> quiet but so far PCIe TDISP did not require this.
>>>
>>> There are many things the specs don't *require* but have to be done in
>>> a certain way to get security. Enabling dma and binding a driver
>>> before taking a measurement is obviously security wrong.
>>
>> Well, I meant that the driver can start with encrypted MMIO (or not
>> encrypted) and untrusted DMA (SWIOTLB or vIOMMU with only shared
>> mappings) and then, after the attestation, switch to trusted DMA
>> (and remap everything).
>
> That's not our goal in Linux. We want unmodified drivers to work with
> TDISP devices in RUN.
True.
>> Say, it is a the only NIC in the guest and the VM wants to run it as
>> trusted but the attestation server is outside. Reloading the driver
>> is just easier.
>
> A flow where the VM self-attests is really weird, and I don't think it
> can really be made secure in cases when the NIC is involved. We want
> to log the attestation (Eg to a PCR) and then the online verification
> can check if the lohged measurement is acceptable or not. Since the
> log is tamper proof we have a record of exactly what was accepted
> before it could have compromised the VM.
Nah, I meant to use SWIOTLB which does not compromise the VM. Thanks,
>> Right now my guests request measurements with a guest userspace
>> provided nonce and the PSP talks to the device to get them.
>
> This is basically right.
>
> Jason
--
Alexey
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 11:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 117+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-28 15:26 [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/11] attestation: Restrict inherited operations per instance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:29 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/11] attestation: Filter evidence objects " Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:44 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-31 6:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 19:14 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/11] attestation: Enter secure operation when evidence is accepted Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 13:51 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:36 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:09 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:28 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/11] attestation: Bind object selection to accepted evidence snapshots Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/11] attestation: Make the evidence-get challenge attribute optional Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/11] PCI/TSM: Describe the PCI attestation control family Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 14:01 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:43 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:45 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:21 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-04 14:00 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:05 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:50 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:35 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 4:22 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 11:30 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/11] attestation: Add attestation helpers for PCI/TSM integration Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/11] PCI/TSM: Bind CTLV attestation to connected and locked contexts Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-28 22:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 5:30 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-29 12:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 14:04 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 14:08 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-10-30 15:39 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 12:11 ` Jiri Pirko
2026-11-03 15:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/11] crypto/ccp: Defer SEV-TIO link setup until evidence acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-11-06 7:47 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-06 13:14 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 14:21 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 6:23 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-host: Publish slot zero and establish streams after acceptance Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-29 16:56 ` Dave Jiang
2026-10-29 17:10 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-30 9:58 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-10-30 13:15 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-31 3:47 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-02 10:11 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 12:01 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-03 15:16 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 8:03 ` Xu Yilun
2026-11-04 9:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:41 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 16:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 15:53 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-06 19:30 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 22:39 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-08 18:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 10:55 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-09 13:47 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 17:37 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 18:53 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-09 20:54 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-09 23:40 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 13:15 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-10 14:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 13:09 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-11 14:13 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-12 1:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 12:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-17 0:48 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-17 1:18 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-18 11:12 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy [this message]
2026-11-10 1:40 ` Alistair
2026-11-10 15:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-17 23:12 ` Alistair Francis
2026-11-18 0:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 5:32 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-10 12:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-11 9:03 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-12 9:37 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-12 14:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-12 15:47 ` Dave Jiang
2026-11-12 16:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 8:54 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 14:52 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 16:29 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 19:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 16:38 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 19:12 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-13 17:12 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-13 19:34 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 13:38 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-16 14:33 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-17 13:00 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-17 14:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-18 11:12 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-17 11:17 ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2026-11-17 13:28 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-10 20:07 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-04 9:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-04 13:48 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-06 8:24 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 12:49 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-06 15:53 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-06 18:54 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-03 16:31 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-03 17:56 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-02 10:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 10:22 ` Reshetova, Elena
2026-11-02 17:37 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-10-28 15:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/11] virt: coco: arm-cca-guest: Refresh selected evidence against trusted digests Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm)
2026-10-30 12:34 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/11] PCI/TSM: Add CTLV attestation Xu Yilun
2026-10-30 15:32 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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